339. Telegram From the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations to the Department of State1
3356. Roth to Bator.
- 1.
- At your discretion you may also wish to discuss some aspects of the following cable with Wirtz. Weaver of course is in on discussions here.
- 2.
- The full cables of last week undoubtedly have given you a feel as to the present state of play. Key questions now are how much the Community will move in non-group agriculture; what sort of a grains agreement we can put together, and whether the outline of the decoupage-chemicals package Rey has given faint signals he can accept can be negotiated beginning this week and will contain numbers that make sense or not. Hanging over all is the question of time.
- 3.
- Wyndham White still does not feel that member countries have any real sense of urgency of some of these problems. Yet, Mike2 and I do [not] feel that any additional appeals to capitals at this point make any sense as our Embassies have discussed these problems ad nauseam.
- 4.
-
Therefore, our strategy will be as follows: Tuesday,3 intensive bilateral meetings with Community to see what Rey has brought back from Brussels. These will continue until Wednesday when there will be a Steering Committee meeting. By Thursday we, and most likely British, will then be ready to surface positive offers. Whether these will be formally tabled or given to Rey on a more informal basis will depend on degree of progress we have made and on tactics best suited to situation as of Thursday. These offers will be ad referendum and therefore will not commit any of us irrevocably. We intend to put the offer together in following manner:
The positive offer will basically be our original exceptions list converted into a positive list with a single multilateral addendum. This addendum will consist of our withdrawals. The withdrawals will be in three parts, i.e., a basic minimum list; secondly, a larger list; and, thirdly, a still larger list. These three sets of withdrawals will in turn be related to three sets of assumptions.
- A.
- The first set of assumptions relate to the maximum package and, conversely to the smallest number of withdrawals, i.e., some agricultural items, man made fibers and an amended steel offer. It would involve, for [Page 896] instance, full US offers on aluminum to meet a 6 percent cut in the Community tariff, a meaningful grains agreement, EEC acceptance of all our key agricultural requests, a satisfactory decoupage package plus all our requested improvements in industry from all participants. We, in turn, would do the most we can on requests made to us. It would also include acceptance of a large part of Community’s disparities request which amounts only to $100 million (U.S. trade) on a weighted trade coverage basis. (“50 percent equivalent” offers.)
- B.
- In second package, an additional group of withdrawals would be added to the above if maximum assumptions were not met. In it, we would assume no EEC or U.S. tariff cut on aluminum, that only industrial offers presently on table were possible and that we would accept a lesser figure in disparities, etc. We would still in the minimum package as in the maximum our basic non-group agricultural items from Community. [sic]
- C.
- Finally, in a third package, additional withdrawals would be added to above on assumption that chemicals were taken substantially out of the negotiation.
- 5.
- The strategy here is to put a positive offer on the table that is realistic. We, the British, and Wyndham White all agree that this is only way that issues can be clarified before Council of Ministers meet next week. On other hand I would be concerned from a negotiating point of view if we table a positive offer that was expressed only in terms of what was already on the table. Therefore even the two smaller packages assume as a necessary minimum our basic agricultural requests to EEC. In addition it is important by using the technique of minimum and maximum packages to indicate the flexibility that is available for U.S. if the other countries can join with us in pushing toward a wider result. This also avoids the impression that the blame for no Kennedy Round or a mini Kennedy Round is placed at doorstep of U.S. I think, too, this approach would help Rey in his discussions with the Community and avoid any unpleasant surprises at last moment since the positive offer step is one that has to be gone through before the end of Kennedy Round in any case. I would expect to show this document to Rey and discuss it with him before it was officially tabled on Thursday.
- 6.
- Even the minimum packages, i.e., package #2 and #3, contain our full demands in agriculture. This is necessary if we are going to continue to press the Community for adequate movement in this area. It could be possible, however, that we might come to Wednesday and find that so little progress has been made with the Community in agriculture and with all the countries concerned in grains that even such a minimum package was unrealistic. Tentatively, I would then think we should still table our positive offer alternatives indicating that minimum requirements of the second or third package must be met but saying that as there [Page 897] is apparently no movement, I believe further discussion would not be productive and am therefore requesting a full Ministerial meeting after the Council of Ministries meeting next week.
- 7.
- I am not sure what agency problems may come up in putting these packages together this week. On the whole I think there is general agreement with the approach and with what should go in. I think on the whole we are working well as a team.
- 8.
- If this goes according to schedule, Mike and I will probably both come back Thursday night or Friday for discussions over weekend and into next Monday. I would hope we could have at least one discussion with the President at that time.