Office of the Historian

255. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, October 28, 1964.

PARTICIPANTS

  • STR:
  • Honorable Christian A. Herter
  • Honorable William M. Roth
  • Mr. Kenneth Auchincloss
  • White House:
  • Honorable McGeorge Bundy
  • Mr. Francis Bator
  • State:
  • Honorable George W. Ball
  • Honorable G. Griffith Johnson
  • Agriculture:
  • Honorable Charles S. Murphy
  • Mr. Raymond Ioanes
[Page 671]

SUBJECT

  • Agricultural Rules for the Kennedy Round

Under Secretary Murphy acknowledged that members of the Agriculture Department were not of one mind on the position drafted the day before for the treatment of agriculture in light of the failure of bilateral talks with the EEC. One problem, he said, was that our public claims that we would insist on tying agriculture into the Kennedy Round have assumed political importance domestically. Does yesterday’s cable,2 he asked, represent a radical change in our policy?

No, Mr. Bundy replied, we would continue to hold in good faith to our policy of pressing firmly for the inclusion of agriculture in the Kennedy Round.

Gov. Herter went over some of the arguments brought out in the conversation the night before. Mr. Bundy stressed the overriding importance of not having the KR appear to be delayed by U.S. stubbornness, which could have serious effects on our overall Atlantic policy. The French clearly want to block the KR, he believed, and will pin the blame on us if they can. Domestically, it would be unacceptable to “uncouple” industry from agriculture in the negotiations, and that appeared to be what Ambassador Blumenthal was suggesting in his telegram that morning.3

Under Secretary Murphy asked what really is meant by “rules” on agriculture? Under Secretary Ball felt that they were abstractions with little practical effect.

Gov. Herter noted that Amb. Blumenthal had asked what to do if the EEC representatives now should go back on even the basic points they had agreed to. Mr. Bator thought that with Wyndham White as a witness, we would have an airtight case for avoiding the blame for such a breakdown.

Under Secretary Murphy asked Gov. Herter whether he thought we would lose any ground by taking the stand proposed. The Governor felt that we had not lost any ground but had failed to gain some. What we had hoped was to get some agreement in advance that would to an extent prejudge the EEC’s offers. This had now proved impossible. In view of the importance of holding to the Nov. 16 date, he thought that we should now move forward.

Mr. Bundy added that he could not see that this choice was contrary to our agricultural interests since the alternative was a strong risk of killing the KR. If that happened, it would create the most favorable situation [Page 672] for the EEC to take unilateral action to cut back imports of U.S. farm products. The only thing we have going for us in getting agricultural concessions, he contended, is our industrial offers.

Under Secretary Murphy asked what was the next step, if industrial exceptions were tabled on Nov. 16th. Gov Herter pointed out that if we begin the “confrontation and justification” on industrial products in January, we must make up our minds as to how far we’ll go ahead without the inclusion of agriculture. In his judgment, agriculture should be brought in soon after that time, and everyone should be clear on this. He was convinced that the prospects for getting reasonable agricultural offers from the EEC would be much improved if the grains price issue could be patched up. However, he shared Mr. Murphy’s worry about how firm the United States will be in fighting for agriculture in the negotiations. Mr. Bundy observed that we could not make the basic decision on the role of agriculture. Only the President could do so, when we are further along with the negotiations. Mr. Murphy asked whether this decision now will prejudice the Presidential decision later, and Mr. Bundy replied that it would not.

Under Secretary Murphy asked what we would do if the EEC agrees, and then fails, to table its agricultural offers early in 1965. Mr. Bundy thought that question was too hypothetical to be answered now.

Mr. Murphy said that he would concur in the message, with trepidation. Gov. Herter noted that if the EEC tried to retract any of the points on which it has already agreed, we would be “in a new ball game.”

Mr. Ioanes asked when we should table our agricultural exceptions list—on Nov. 16th or at some later date. Under Secretary Ball recommended the latter. We would then have the advantage of holding back our agricultural list until the EEC is ready to present its. However, we should offer to exchange both lists on 16th if the EEC (as seemed highly unlikely) were prepared to do so. Gov. Herter felt that this issue, as well as the question of how to present our decision domestically, should be discussed with Amb. Blumenthal when he arrived that weekend.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Kennedy Round, 1964–1965 I, Box 12. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. The meeting was held in Herter’s office.↩
  2. See footnote 4, Document 254.↩
  3. Reference is to Tagg 2420 from Geneva, October 28. (Department of State, Central Files, FT 7 GATT)↩