Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy

234. Memorandum From the Assistant General Counsel, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Hudec) to the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (Herter)¹

Washington, April 13, 1964.

SUBJECT

• April 11 Meeting on Antidumping Policy

The participants were Secretary Dillon, Governor Herter, Under Secretary Ball, Mr. Hendrick,² Mr. Jacobson, and Mr. Hudec.

Governor Herter opened the meeting by presenting the STR memorandum to Secretary Dillon.³ After reading the memorandum, Secretary Dillon replied by stating that Treasury believed that any delay in publishing these regulations would result in legislative action on antidumping. He referred to the fact that the House Office of Legislative Counsel had been asked to rush preparation of a new antidumping bill for Congressman Herlong⁴ by the end of this month. In response to a question, he added that the Herlong request had been made “with Chairman Mills’ blessing”. He informed the meeting that there was a plan to take up the Herlong bill in Ways and Means just before the end-of-session matters—debt ceiling, etc. This information was accompanied by a lengthy reading and analysis of the sponsors of the Humphrey bill. Governor Herter and Mr. Jacobson related our information that Chairman Mills had no intention of having hearings on dumping this year. Secretary Dillon replied that this was not so, without elaborating further.

Governor Herter, Mr. Jacobson, and, later, Under Secretary Ball stated the case for international negotiations and the damage that publication of the regulations might do. Secretary Dillon replied that Treasury was not opposed to international negotiations on antidumping. He displayed general receptiveness to the whole idea.⁵

In his view, publication of the amendments would not “give away” anything in our bargaining posture. The regulations eliminating retroactive assessment were, he thought, minor matters. The biggest U.S. counter was the threat of worse legislation, which should be sufficient to persuade other governments not to go further than the U.S.

The others at the meeting disagreed with this appraisal. After some exchange of views on this point, Secretary Dillon developed what amounted to an alternative answer. He emphasized Mr. Hendrick’s observation that the regulations might not come into effect for as much as 8 months after publication. He thought this delay could be used to minimize whatever bargaining “give-away” there was in the proposed regulations. The liberalizing changes in the regulations can be expected to come under heavy fire during the initial 60-day period for public comment. The U.S. could argue that such changes stood a chance of being withdrawn or nullified without the support of an international accord. He agreed to a period of consultations or negotiations that would follow this line. The others agreed that, with this kind of delay, there might be some room for negotiating.

The specific Treasury proposal was to publish the regulations on April 22. Ambassador Leddy would use the OECD meeting on April 21 to set up consultation sometime in the next 60 days. All agreed to this step.

Secretary Dillon disavowed any interest in the relative roles of OECD and GATT in the international discussions, stating that he would plead “nolo contendere” (?) in this matter. STR and State could work this one out to their own satisfaction. Everyone assumed that the first step would be OECD consultations, but their content and strategy were left open.

Governor Herter pressed Secretary Dillon on the matter of further interagency work to develop a negotiating position, noting that Treasury had heretofore dissented from the TSC Subcommittee report.⁶ Secretary Dillon expressed some surprise at this fact.

Mr. Hendrick explained that Treasury saw nothing that could be gained, because antidumping policy is largely a matter of administrative discretion which cannot be controlled by international agreement. The Secretary noted that the possibility of this conclusion would always have to be kept in mind as a qualification, but went on to state that he was in agreement with the idea of negotiations, and he agreed to have Treasury participate actively in preparing a negotiating position for the coming negotiations.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Herter Papers, Antidumping, Box 5. Limited Official Use. Transmitted through Roth.
2. James P. Hendrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.
3. Not further identified.
4. A. Sydney Herlong, Jr., Democratic Representative from Florida.
5. The Departments of Commerce, Labor, State, and the Treasury subsequently concurred with the recommendation by Herter to the President for negotiation of an international agreement on antidumping. (Memorandum from Herter to President Johnson, October 11, 1966; Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Kennedy Round Crisis, April–June, Tabs 17–24, Box 52)
6. Not further identified.