Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

44. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 2, 1968, 1200Z.

39276. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my sixty-ninth weekly message.

A. General

1. For some weeks we have been developing our concept of a “counter-offensive,” with emphasis on pacification, moving from the improved allied military position and the growing political strength of the GVN to more extensive and more secure control of the countryside.² At our October 1 joint meeting with President Thieu and his principal advisors on military and pacification matters, it was most encouraging to have confirmation that they have been working along generally similar lines toward these objectives.³

2. Thieu not only has the keenest interest in pacification but the most thorough knowledge of the problems involved of any of the GVN officials. He has demonstrated his personal leadership in the seminars he has held for top officials in each of the corps areas in the past few weeks, the final one to be held in II Corps today. He is determined to launch a broad pacification offensive that should move substantial numbers of hamlets from the “contested” to the “relatively secure” category. The extent of GVN homework on the new planning concepts was evident in our October 1 meeting.

3. The concept targets primarily the some 3800 contested hamlets where approximately 3 million people live rather than the VC held areas with the remaining 3 million of a total population of 17-1/2 million. As Thieu points out, adding these 3800 hamlets to the 5,000-odd already relatively secure would bring over 82 percent of South Viet Nam’s population under reasonable GVN control. It would forestall any VC effort to partition the country or justify any claim to coalition government. It would involve a shift of regional forces, and the creation of new local defense forces in the areas to be secured plus a concerted attack of the VC infrastructure as an intensified Chieu Hoi program. The plan would also stress strengthening hamlet and village administration to compete with VC “Liberation Committees.” We are all agreed here that the concept is basically sound. Thieu and his advisors have been thinking in terms of a year-long campaign to begin in December. At our suggestion, however, Thieu agreed to a two-phase approach, the first phase with a goal of 1,000 hamlets to start hopefully within one month and to be completed by Tet, in order to take advantage of the opportunities that now exist to expand the GVN’s control in the countryside, for the enemy is clearly faltering in his efforts to keep the initiative.

4. Friendly forces continued to forestall the enemy’s efforts at mounting offensive operations. In I Corps, the 3rd Marine Division continued to seize large caches of ammunition, weapons, food and supplies which had been prepositioned to sustain multi-regimental size attacks by the enemy against our position south of the DMZ. In III Corps a series of unglamorous operations northwest of Saigon in Hau Nghia Province discovered similar caches, and also uncovered dispensaries which had been set up to care for thousands of wounded, complete with generators, operating tables, and refrigeration equipment. In the same area our forces have destroyed over a thousand bunkers and over 2500 more have been identified. These are all indications of the magnitude of the enemy’s preparation for large scale attacks. He was clearly preparing to support sustained offensive action against Saigon.

5. The level of fighting did not change greatly with enemy killed increasing slightly to 3,782 (47 percent by RVNAF, 48 percent by US) and friendly killed down slightly to 501 (67 percent RVNAF and 30 percent US). I have tried in my recent messages to highlight the growing number of examples of fine ARVN performance. I think nothing better illustrates the full ARVN participation in the successful blunting of Communist offensive action than these figures, especially when one recalls that the ARVN fights without the same firepower in their battalions,without the same lavish artillery and air support that our forces have. As General Abrams has put it, “They are in the fight and they are doing well. They are paying the price and they are exacting the toll.” There are of course still weaknesses in ARVN to be overcome. But not only are these weaknesses being corrected, the ARVN in its present state has turned in a truly fine performance in recent weeks. As General Abrams has said, in some cases “heroic.”

6. Enemy strategy continues unchanged. Although he made battalion-sized attacks only against Special Forces camps and RF/PF posts in I Corps and III Corps during the week, it is clear that he wanted and intended to do much more with the vast stores we have seized from him, but he was unable to bring it off. He was undoubtedly trying, without success, to clear the way to Saigon and other cities.

7. There is one view that sees the enemy bound to continue this same course, largely by his doctrinal approach which to a large degree determines his long-term goals and which tends also to shape his view of the situation. There are some striking parallels between the strategy pronounced in the COSVN 6th resolution, the principal current statement of strategy, and the pronouncements of Truong Chinh prior to the shift to the “general offensive” in 1954. The Communists apparently see us in the same position that the French were just before Geneva. The emphasis on loss of morale of US and GVN forces, on the adverse effects of the war on the US economy, its divisive effect in the United States, and the movement of world opinion against the United States all find parallels in the earlier documents relating to the French war against the Viet Minh.

8. Other doctrinal points which might incline the enemy towards continuing the offensive are the belief that the negotiations will only ratify what he must win on the battlefield; and the belief that the “balance of forces” shifts in his favor continually as the fighting goes on. His determination to bring about the “popular uprising” might lead to increasingly reckless—and costly—attacks spearheaded at the “puppet forces” in the belief that this will lead to the destruction of the GVN.

9. Great claims are made by Hanoi for the progress this strategy has brought about since Tet, while, as I have pointed out previously, his cadre who are doing the fighting on the ground are increasingly questioning whether the effort has been worth the cost. It is claimed that we have been forced to adopt a defensive posture, concerned only with the protection of major urban centers. At the same time fantastically exaggerated claims are made about the defeats which are allegedly being inflicted upon us. I suppose it is possible that someone in Hanoi may be persuaded by these claims.

10. However while support for this view abounds in the enemy’s current strategic pronouncements, it may well exaggerate the rigidity of the enemy’s strategic thinking. For example, while the COSVN resolution parallels Truong Chinh’s language, it seems likely that Truong Chinh, who reportedly adheres more closely than some others to the classic Maoist line, probably feels that the attempt to move to the general offensive was made prematurely, and that it may be necessary to return to the second stage offensive and the concept of “protracted war.” Further, there may well be those in the Hanoi hierarchy who believe that gains can be made at the negotiating table without further heavy battlefield sacrifices. In other words, I think it possible that the use of rhetoric traceable to Truong Chinh’s 1954 writings and in some cases to Mao Tse-tung’s work serves in part to conceal a considerable range of differences among the leaders in Hanoi, and I believe that it is quite possible that the advocates of continuing the present strategy may be under considerable pressure.

11. In my last message I reported on the likely return from exile of General Duong Van Minh. Thieu told me yesterday that he will return on Saturday, October 5. Thieu sent his Interior Minister to Bangkok to discuss “Big” Minh’s future role which may be that of advisor to the President. Most knowledgeable Vietnamese consider Minh’s return as a positive factor making for greater nationalist unity and I am inclined to agree, although working out a proper role for him will not be easy. The same beneficial results are not likely to be obtained, however, from the return of some of the other exiled Generals and I am planning to make some remarks along these lines to Thieu at the next appropriate occasion. I think he already shares these views.⁴

12. In our joint meeting yesterday I referred to the problem of land tenure as it applied to farmers who had been cultivating lands under Viet Cong control. In response to a question I had raised during Thieu’s visit to Ba Tri in Kien Hoa Province, he had described a three point GVN policy: A) that landlords would not be permitted to collect back rents from such tenants; B) that farmers given land by the Viet Cong would not be expected to pay taxes for several years; C) that farmers given land by the Viet Cong would be allowed to keep the land they are farming and would be given titles to regularize possession of it. I pointed out that the third point differed from the provisions of the ordinances now in effect but that I thought that if carried out it would have far reaching consequences in gaining the allegiance and support of farmers who had been cultivating lands under Viet Cong control. Thieu reaffirmed his statement and said that the farmers would definitely be allowed to keep these lands and that a government committee was now working out the details. This I believe can prove to be a highly constructive development and a useful weapon in gaining the adherence of the peasant.

[Omitted here is discussion of political, military, and economic matters and the pacification effort.]

Bunker

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 9:25 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission. This telegram is printed in full in Pike (ed.), The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 588-593.
2. Komer outlined the principles of the pacification “counter-offensive” in a September 22 memorandum to Abrams. He noted: “the idea of an all-out counter-offensive is a natural. We are apparently largely pre-empting Hanoi’s ‘third-phase’ offensive, which lays the enemy open for a counter-stroke. Moreover the political need for increased momentum makes it imperative that we seize the opportunity. We may have until a new administration takes over next January to prove that this war is no longer stalemated. If we can, we may have bought the time to achieve a favorable settlement. If we Don’t, we may be up the creek without a paddle. If we start at the top (the only way to get things started quickly in this country), it will be easy to sell Thieu and Huong on a general counter-offensive. They will surely go so far as to say the right words. But this solves less than half the problem! Unless we also sign them on to a quite systematic plan and program with time-phased goals and deadlines, we will end up like the VC/NVA—long on words but short on performance.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Komer Files: Lot 69 D 303, Vietnam/Turkey)
3. Bunker transmitted detailed notes of this meeting in telegram 39342 from Saigon, October 3. (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
4. In telegram 37862 from Saigon, September 14, the Embassy noted while Minh could play a constructive role in the South Vietnamese political scene, he also could become a “liability” if he threw his support behind dissident Buddhist groups. The Embassy also noted that Minh’s return to Vietnam was imminent: “President Thieu has told us that he is in touch with Big Minh and has asked a friend to explain the ‘facts of life’ to him. Presumably this means that Thieu is seeking some kind of understanding with Minh before agreeing to his return. While clearly worried by Minh’s reputation for naivete, Thieu likes him personally and is well aware of the possible benefits of his return. If Big Minh supports the government in one way or another, he can contribute to popular backing for the Thieu regime in the critical days ahead. This is worth a gamble, and Thieu is clearly thinking about taking it.” (Ibid., POL 30 VIET S) In telegram 246778 to Saigon, September 28, the Department assessed the risks associated with Minh’s return as minimal: “We are inclined to view that, despite obvious risks, his return is not likely to be particularly disruptive and may actually add to nationalist unity and strength at this time.” (Ibid.)