43. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Hanoi’s Purpose in the Oslo Talks
Hanoi’s recent decision to send several officials to Oslo for conversations with the Norwegian Government appears intended to persuade us to agree to a bombing halt in exchange for some tacit—and limited— Hanoi restraint in the DMZ area. It is also designed to gain Norwegian support for the North Vietnamese position. It does not, however, appear designed to open a new channel for negotiations. In fact, it appears intended to reinforce the Hanoi position in Paris, and to move the Paris negotiations forward. It thus underlines the importance Hanoi attaches to the Paris talks.
Chan Indicates Readiness to Stop Cross-DMZ Shelling. The most interesting element in the North Vietnamese position as presented in Oslo by Ambassador Nguyen Tho Chan was a statement to the effect that Hanoi would be prepared to stop shelling across the DMZ if we stop the bombing of North Vietnam and “other acts of war,” including our own shelling across the DMZ. This line is not, strictly speaking, new; Hanoi had earlier said that the status of the DMZ could be restored if we would stop our violations of it. The noteworthy aspect of its presentation in Oslo is that it has now been included in an official Hanoi presentation.
Because of the circumstances surrounding the North Vietnamese statement, and because of Norwegian imprecision, it is not completely clear whether the Hanoi officials had intended from the start to make a [Page 113] special point of the DMZ. Nor is it completely clear whether their remarks were nothing more than the standard line that “we will stop firing at you if you stop firing at us.” From the unusual nature of the contact, however, it appears reasonable to conclude that the Hanoi officials were given definite instructions to present their line on the DMZ. It is also clear that they were under instructions not to discuss their position further but were merely to state it and depart.
Hanoi knows that the Norwegians would report the Oslo conversations to us. It may have calculated that the Norwegians would use the North Vietnamese statement to urge us to accept Hanoi’s proposal on the DMZ as evidence of military restraint and to undertake a complete bombing halt on that basis. It may hope that we will do so.
But Hanoi Still Rejects Responsibility for Southern Matters. Chan’s remarks were made in a way which suggests that Hanoi still wishes to reject responsibility for any involvement in the war South of the 17th Parallel. He consistently rejected any implication that Hanoi had troops in the South, and he attempted to convey the impression that Hanoi’s role in the war would be completely ended once US “aggression” against the North had ceased and Hanoi had in consequence stopped shelling across the DMZ. He also consistently pushed the NLF forward as the party with which Southern matters had to be discussed, e.g., in dealing with the question of the safety of US forces in the South after the bombing had been stopped. On the role of the GVN, Chan appears to have deliberately misconstrued Foreign Minister Lyng’s direct question on this subject by replying with a lengthy statement that Hanoi would not engage in reprisals. The implication was therefore left that Hanoi would not deal with the GVN or accord it any degree of legitimacy. Nevertheless, Chan did not specifically rule out GVN participation in talks, but even said that this could be a matter for discussion after a bombing halt.
Knows That Statement Does Not Meet Full US Demand. Hanoi knows that Chan’s statement about the DMZ does not meet the full range of US demands on a bombing halt. However, Hanoi has on several occasions in recent months made statements which it knew did not fully meet our position, in the hope that we would respond affirmatively (e.g., its series of statements justifying but not admitting Northern troop presence in the South, and Colonel Ha Van Lau’s circumspect reference to the “lull” in an interview with an American journalist).
Hanoi may not now want to make any specific statement in Paris on its readiness to stop shelling across the DMZ. It knows that such a statement would not fully meet the US desiderata and it may not want to give us the opportunity to respond by pressing it for some move on other elements in that position. It has thus chosen to address the issue [Page 114] through Oslo, where, as already noted, it might expect to gain additional leverage on the US via the Norwegians.
We May Wish to Raise in Paris. However, since Chan indicated at one point that the matter should be discussed in Paris, our delegation could raise it discreetly at some convenient opportunity. We could indicate that we find Chan’s remarks promising and that we would like to explore North Vietnamese intentions around the DMZ area further. This would indicate our particular interest in the area, while pointing up that we take indirect messages seriously but prefer ultimately to resolve such complicated questions directly and with at least some measure of precision. We could, of course, also want to indicate that we reserve our stand on other issues.
It is possible that Hanoi may respond to such an overture by withdrawing or at least failing to reiterate its statement as soon as we indicate that we want to pursue it and might ask for more. However, as INR has pointed out before, we believe that one area in which Hanoi may be prepared to exercise some restraint is the DMZ. Hanoi’s position with regard to this issue is thus particularly worth exploring. This would be especially true now, since Chan’s remarks suggest that Hanoi is thinking seriously about this problem and may thus be prepared to shift its stand further, and since his remarks also point up in general terms that Hanoi wishes to make some progress in the negotiations and sees them as an important element in its strategy.2
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/OHIO. Secret; Nodis; Ohio/Plus.↩
- The Norwegians deemed as a positive development the seriousness placed upon the Ohio channel by the DRV. (Telegram 6838 from Oslo, October 1; ibid.) In telegram 22112 from Paris, October 9 (retransmitted as telegram 253256 to Oslo, October 10), Harriman and Vance suggested sending a message to the Government of Norway thanking it for its assistance and noting that “the conversations also assisted the USG in assessing North Vietnamese thinking.” (Both ibid.) Lyng later said of the Ohio channel: “It is quite difficult to evaluate what this Norwegian contact has meant. But I can imagine in the first phase when this was going on that perhaps it had some significance.” (Telegram 7231 from Oslo, November 4; ibid.)↩