Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

285. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, January 16, 1969, 1200Z.

894. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my seventy-fifth message.

A. General

1. In this, my last message to you as President, I shall try to sum up the progress and the shortcomings of the past year in our effort to move forward toward the achievement of our objectives in Viet-Nam. These I take it to be: A) a just, durable, and honorable peace through negotiations; B) a chance for the Vietnamese people to choose freely the form of government under which they wish to live; C) to help them develop their own stable political institutions and a viable economy; D) to make credible our obligations under the Charter of the U.N. and SEATO to resist aggression; and E) eventually to develop regional organizations through which the Southeast Asian countries can carry on joint undertakings in economic development and mutual cooperation. I shall try to give an overview in the first section, followed by more detailed accounts of political developments, Communist trends, military and pacification activities and the economic situation.

2. 1968 was in many ways a momentous year. Two events which proved to be major watersheds from which much else flowed were the Tet offensive and your speech of March 31.² In retrospect, they were the source of many constructive developments; and although some immediate problems, material and psychological, followed in their wake, I think they can be judged as major factors in stimulating the very substantial progress that took place in 1968.

3. Ironically, from a political point of view, the Tet attacks were a failure within Viet-Nam, and a brilliant success in America. It is true that very heavy material damage was inflicted by the enemy during the Tet and May/June attacks; 150,000 homes were destroyed or damaged, a million temporary evacuees created, substantial damage was done to the industrial plants, the economy set back and business confidence impaired. Yet there was no panic here. The people rallied, not to the Communists but to the government. There were no uprisings, no defections in the armed forces, the Vietnamese military units fought well, the government did not fall apart; on the contrary, it reacted with great determination and vigor. Operation Recovery was carried out with great energy and skill. By September, the million evacuees had been resettled, homes rebuilt and new housing provided. The establishment of a reconstruction fund and war risk insurance made possible the reconstruction of industry, business confidence returned, and in the last quarter of the year, commercial import licensing was running at a record rate. The decline in the relatively secure population, which had dropped from 67.2 percent in January to 59.8 percent as a result of the Tet attacks, was not only made up but at the year end the figure reached a record high of 76.3 percent. The population under VC control dropped from 16.4 percent in January to 12.3 percent at the year end. Even if one discounts these figures, the trend is clearly up and the situation substantially better than a year ago.

4. Your speech of March 31 and the partial bombing halt brought the Vietnamese Government and people face to face with the fact that we would not be here indefinitely and that one day they would be on their own. The realization of this fact and the confidence created by the successful reaction to the Tet attacks tended to inspire the Vietnamese with greater determination, a greater willingness to sacrifice, a new confidence in their own government and armed forces. From this fact flowed other constructive developments. It resulted in general mobilization and an ambitious self-defense program. Military and paramilitary forces now number well over a million men. Of the increase of 220,000 in the forces this year, 160,000 have been volunteers. (A force of comparable size in the United States, based on our population, would require 18 million men under arms.) In addition, more than one million men and women have been organized in civilian defense groups, more than half of these trained, and 100,000 armed.

5. Given the small population base of South Viet-Nam, these figures represent a prodigious effort to mobilize the entire population for the war effort. Coupled with a substantial improvement in RVNAF weaponry and greatly improved performance—General Abrams has said, “They are paying the price, and exacting the toll”—it means that the GVN faces Hanoi today with a military machine greatly superior to the one it had at the beginning of 1968.

6. A further development flowing from the two watersheds I have mentioned was the continued strengthening of constitutional government, the formation of a more popular and more effective cabinet under Tran Van Huong, and Thieu’s consolidation of his constitutional powers as President. The Assembly proved itself by and large a responsible body meeting its constitutional responsibilities while working quite effectively with the executive to meet the demands of recurring crises. The Thieu/Ky rivalry, while not entirely resolved, declined greatly in importance as Ky’s power was reduced and Thieu’s increased. Their relationship today is probably better than at any time since the inauguration of the present government.

7. The large increase in money supply brought about by the impact of general mobilization contributed to inflationary pressures. In spite of an increase of nearly 60 percent in money supply, price increases were held to about 30 percent for the year, a tolerable increase if not a comfortable one. In a year that saw the heaviest fighting of the war, the steady decline in the rice deliveries from the Delta, which had continued since 1963, was finally reversed. The IR-8 rice program was initiated, proving more popular even than had been anticipated, resulting in plans for an accelerated program in 1969. Progress was also made in poultry and other protein production. Recovery from the setback of Tet has been achieved and the economy has resumed its forward movement.

8. Beside these very substantial achievements of 1968, I set forth some important shortfalls, weaknesses, and hazards. Thanks to his safe havens and external support, the enemy probably still retains the capability to prepare and mount further attacks. Pacification gains would be inevitably set back if the enemy proved able to mount another even partially successful offensive. Such an offensive would also have adverse effects on American opinion, probably its main purpose, since the enemy must be aware of the fact that any real military success is no longer possible.

9. On the political side, very little progress has been made toward the development of a strong and united nationalist political organization. While the Thieu/Huong alliance has resulted in the best and most effective Vietnamese Government in many years, the GVN is still plagued by inefficiency and corruption. While popular support for the government has improved, it is still not strong enough.

10. Probably as important as the major accomplishments and shortcomings of 1968 are the chief political trends of that eventful year. While all of those trends may not continue into 1969, I believe it is reasonable to expect that most will. I think we can identify at least four:

(a) Increasing Vietnamese recognition that the American commitment is not open ended. This in turn has led to a growing Vietnamese willingness to accept a political settlement, and also a realization that it will be necessary to deal with the NLF in some way. At the beginning of the year, most nationalist leaders still felt it was impossible even to talk about negotiations in public. Now they are not only openly willing to negotiate with Hanoi, but they are thinking—often out loud—about how to talk with the NLF. I think Thieu must be given much credit for bringing people gradually to the awareness that the contest will change some day from a predominantly military one to a predominantly political one.

(b) Decline in confidence in the strength of the U.S. commitment. While most responsible leaders do not believe the U.S. will deliberately turn its back on Viet-Nam, many have grown doubtful of our determination to stay the course long enough to achieve an honorable peace. This, of course, is a critical factor which could affect everything else.

(c) Increasing Vietnamese willingness to make sacrifices and carry a heavier war burden. The Tet attacks, general mobilization, the threat of American withdrawal, and growing confidence in their own capabilities led to a significant increase of involvement of the entire population, urban and rural, in the war effort.

(d) Increased SVN military and political strength. With the development of democratic institutions and the consolidation of Thieu’s power, the political stability of South Viet-Nam has increased markedly. The growing strength and improved performance of RVNAF complemented and increased SVN political strength. Improved political stability was also coupled with a marked decline in the influence of the military in the making of policy and the administration of the government.

11. Adding up the plusses and minuses, I think we can say objectively that 1968 has been a year of very substantial progress. We have seen the development of a government that is more stable and effective than any since the early days of the Diem regime. The military situation has greatly improved, the RVNAF has made significant progress in leadership, morale, and performance. At the same time, there are growing evidences of the decline in enemy morale and leadership. Security has improved and pacification accelerated; so has the Chieu Hoi program and the attack on the VC infrastructure. In almost all areas, the government is moving with determination and vigor. In the last half of the year, progress has accelerated in almost all areas. It is my view that if, as a result of the present negotiations, a true, verifiable, and properly supervised mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese and allied forces can be worked out, the Vietnamese Government and people will be capable of handling their internal domestic problems with the Viet Cong on their own. A true withdrawal obviously will be a difficult undertaking involving as it will not only verification and supervision, but among other things identification of North Vietnamese in Viet Cong units, and prohibition against the use of the Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries. It is nevertheless a hopeful situation.

[Omitted here is Bunker’s report on political issues, areas of shortcomings, the Paris negotiations, possible Communist strategy, pacification, and military and economic issues.]

I. Conclusion

35. I believe it can fairly be said that substantial progress toward the objectives I mentioned at the beginning of this message has been made during the past year. An encouraging element is the fact that this progress has accelerated, especially in the last half and even more particularly during the last quarter of the year.

Determination on the part of the Vietnamese Government to maintain the momentum is evident. Plans to sustain the tempo of the pacification program and for a dramatic land reform program in 1969 have already been announced. The Vietnamese Government has made clear its intention to assume an increasingly large share of the war effort. With a modicum of patience, I believe that the goals and objectives we have set for ourselves will be reached. Whatever success we in the American Mission here, civilian and military, may have had has been due to your steadfast and unswerving support and your determination to stay the course. For this all of us are deeply grateful.

Bunker

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Repeated to Paris for the Vietnam Mission. Printed in full in Douglas Pike (ed.), The Bunker Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 636-652.
2. For documentation on the Tet offensive of 1968, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume VI. President Johnson’s speech announcing the partial bombing halt and reporting his decision not to seek re-election is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book I, pp. 469-476.