Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

203. Situation Report By the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read)¹

Washington, November 8, 1968.

Secure Phone Calls, 9:30-10:30 a.m.

Sam Berger

1. Berger informed me that Bunker had been unable to see Thieu at any time on November 8 before or after Thieu’s public statement. An appointment had been requested for tomorrow but no definite time had been set.

Ambassador Vance

1. Vance gave me Harriman, Habib and his preliminary views about the Thieu public proposal for two “unique” delegations with the GVN heading our side and the DRV heading the other side. Our delegation believes that Thieu’s proposal is “unacceptable and unworkable” from the point of view of both sides in Paris.

(a) The Thieu proposal is untenable from the USG viewpoint because if the GVN were Chairman of our side the GVN representative could take a variety of steps and actions which could prejudice our interests and over which we would not have control, e.g., “breaking up” a meeting, giving fast reactions to DRV/NLF views on matters of basic concern to us without adequate “consultation”, etc.

(b) The reference by Thieu to inclusion of TCC representatives on our side “if necessary” would raise a number of complications if our allies chose to take advantage of it in the early stages of expanded talks.

(c) The proposal is almost certain to be rejected by Hanoi because it purports to dictate how Hanoi will organize its side of the expanded discussions. The DRV is apt to note that the GVN proposal is inconsistent with the views expressed by Saigon just a few days ago which insisted on two delegations on our side and one on the other.

2. For consideration at Secretary Rusk’s 11:30 meeting today² at the Under Secretary’s request I asked Vance for his and Harriman’s views on the question of whether the DRV would be willing without the NLF being present to negotiate substantive bilateral questions with us (e.g., mutual withdrawals, prisoner exchanges, Laos), if it became evident that the GVN would not come to Paris on an acceptable basis.

Harriman and Vance believe that if they put this proposition to the DRV representatives as hard and persuasively as possible Hanoi’s initial response would be that circumstances had changed and they would not be prepared to go ahead bilaterally with us, although they were prepared to sit down with us on such issues with the NLF representatives present. Harriman and Vance think that the DRV would cling to this pattern for “a considerable period”.

Benjamin H. Read ³

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. In an attached covering note transmitting a copy of the report to the President, November 8, 1:15 p.m., Rostow wrote: “As background, you may wish to have the fact stated by Berger in a phone call plus Harriman-Vance views on Thieu’s latest.” The notation “ps” on the covering note indicates that the President saw the report.
2. See Document 204.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.