Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

202. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, November 7, 1968.

NOTES ON FOREIGN POLICY MEETING

THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING

• The President
• Secretary Rusk
• Secretary Clifford
• General Wheeler
• General Taylor
• CIA Director Helms
• Walt Rostow
• George Christian
• Tom Johnson

The President: What do we have from Saigon?

Secretary Rusk: A new peace plan. Thieu won’t see Bunker until tomorrow.² We should see how Nixon can get out of this as soon as possible. Bill Bundy or I could go down to Key Biscayne.

I would be opposed to Nixon going to Saigon. He may want to send an emissary like William Scranton.³

He may want to send a message to Thieu. I can’t imagine Nixon wanting to stand in the way.⁴

The President: Are things quiet along the DMZ, Bus?

General Wheeler: Absolutely quiet on the DMZ. Only 2 incidents on the first day—mortar fire. Nothing since that time.

There were a couple of small attacks against small population centers in the last 24 hours.

The President: I figured they would do this to save a little face.

General Wheeler: The North Vietnamese understand about Saigon, Hue, and Danang.

The propaganda from Hanoi stresses attacks against “military facilities.” No action against any reconnaissance planes—drones or manned reconnaissance planes. Apparently they have passed the word.

General Taylor: I agree we should play it loose. We are trying to protect urban population centers.

CIA Director Helms: We have had 24 attacks since November 1.

Secretary Rusk: I would draw a distinction between isolated attacks and major attacks.

General Taylor: We have trouble defining what attacks are.

General Wheeler: Bunker blames attack on Saigon for Thieu backing off.

The President: I think Hanoi has done unexpectedly well. I don’t trust them, though. If it’s not calculated, substantial attack I would do nothing more than talk a hard game. I think it has been a good trade.

I was amazed with the disapproval it got throughout the country. The polls show 65% against it. The telegrams against it—mail is running 50-50.

Chuck Robb said every man approved of it.

General Wheeler: The message Abrams sent showed the men in I Corps applauded it.

Secretary Clifford: I have a memo on the increase in bombing in Laos. Our men are going about their work with great will.

Walt Rostow: Don Hornig⁵ has a memo on new interdiction devices for use in Laos—including laser bombs.

The President: I was proud of all of you on backgrounding—particularly Dean Rusk, Clark Clifford and General Wheeler.

Secretary Clifford: The bombing in Laos up from 181 sorties to 405-456 between November 1 and November 5.

• November 1—181
• November 2—393
• November 3—407
• November 4—456
• November 5—405

Walt Rostow: They will feel it in Laos.

The President: Let’s point out how quiet it has been in the DMZ and the cities.

It justifies our action on the bombing.

Secretary Clifford: Our casualties are up.

The President: The Marines are out there chasing them.

Secretary Rusk: They are from our own initiative.

George Christian: A lot of casualties were a result of one booby-trap.

General Wheeler: Marine engineers were caught in a trap.

The President: We had a party last night for the military people from Randolph and Bergstrom [Air Force Bases]. I am proud of their dedication to duty.

Told story about one fireman whose father worked in a coal mine. Said his father did it: Saw the ocean, rode in airplane, met a President.

Secretary Rusk: I would like all of us to go out to Andrews [Air Force Base] and thank them.

Secretary Clifford: We are under pressure to get the New Jersey back to [Subic] Bay.

The President: I have been thinking about how to handle Nixon. I think he wants both Rusk and Humphrey in his Administration. (laughter)

I think Rusk should talk with him. You may want to go down or talk with him on the phone.

I will see Dirksen this afternoon.⁶

Secretary Rusk: It is a question of how Nixon communicates with Thieu.

A. Send Cable.

B. Call Bui Diem—telling him he will send a messenger to Saigon.

Secretary Clifford: At some stage the President and Nixon should talk. We should by then have a set course of action for President Thieu to take.

Now we are getting a lot of stalling.

The President: The message is the first thing we should get through.

How are we with troop-contributors?

Secretary Rusk: We have marginal problem with Thailand and South Korea—because of Thieu. We need to get this thing ironed out before all of them are called together.

The President: I agree. The Press would have a field day otherwise.

What is our situation in Paris?

Secretary Rusk: There is not much they can say until Thieu is aboard.

I am inclined to let Paris mark time while we are getting Thieu aboard. The NLF are getting all of the news.

Secretary Clifford: During the next 70 days—if the GVN still won’t go—can we go into bilateral meetings?

Secretary Rusk: Hanoi might object to public meetings.

Secretary Clifford: We might have leverage to meet bilaterally with Hanoi—not suck up to Saigon.

Kosygin might help.

General Taylor: We can’t sit 70 days and let Saigon hold us up. We should start moving after a reasonable period of time.

Secretary Clifford: Fundamentally, we are faced with the fact that we and South Vietnam have different goals.

We—want to finish fighting, get peace and get out.

I believe they prefer fighting go on:

a. Winning militarily.

b. Keeps the government going.

c. Keeps them from facing tough negotiating problems.

d. Psychologically important.

Secretary Rusk: During the GOP administration, the North Vietnamese began to roll in Laos. During the GOP administration, Vietnam was divided.

In 1960 Eisenhower said we would never let a Communist regime be established in this hemisphere. At that time we had on Ike’s desk an intelligence report that Cuba was Communist.

Secretary Clifford: I reported on my last trip to Vietnam that the GVN did not want the war to stop.

1. They are content to have the U.S. present.

2. No danger.

3. The flow of money goes on. Thieu and Hong are honest, but there are a lot of them with their hands in the till.

4. We are equipping, arming and training the South Vietnamese army.

We do have separate goals.

We have prevented subjugation of South Vietnam by force; we have strengthened the government.

The President: What do you think of briefing all leaders?

Secretary Clifford: It’s profitable to keep them informed.

[Omitted here is discussion of a meeting of NATO Ministers, relief for Biafra, and efforts to secure Senate approval of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting, which was held in the Family Dining Room of the White House, lasted from 1:05 to 2:30 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) Read’s agenda for this meeting is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164, Presidential Luncheon Memoranda. Notes of the Secretary of Defense’s “0830 Group” meeting on the morning of November 7 by George Elsey read: “CMC—Luncheon agenda 1:00 W.Hse. today all revolve around how to get Saigon into line? The problem: Thieu followed instructions from Republicans not to agree but he has taken such a strong stand. The problem—How to get talks started—Really, only Nixon &Kosygin can help. The Pres. needs to get a good stiff message to Thieu &be able to say it has Pres. Elect Nixon’s blessing. ‘I don’t know what Nixon’s game is going to be. He’s scored his points by screwing up LBJ’s deal. Maybe LBJ can get Nixon to stop here on his way back up from Florida.’ Also Kosygin might help by taming Hanoi’s propaganda machine down. Also, get all the Troop Contributing Countries to put pressure on Saigon—except it’s doubtful they all will.” (Ibid., George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2])
2. See Document 203.
3. Former Governor of Pennsylvania.
4. Rostow sent the President a draft letter by Nixon in telegram CAP 82724, November 6. The letter read: “Dear President Thieu: President Johnson and Secretary Rusk have now briefed me in the greatest detail on the evolution of the negotiations in Paris over recent months and on the consultations and the negotiations with the Government of Vietnam and its constitutional leaders. This review included especially the discussions and agreements with your government from October 15 through the negotiation of the draft joint communiqué on October 28 and the subsequent withdrawal of your government from that agreement. In the light of this knowledge, I wish to urge you, with all the emphasis I can, quickly to resolve whatever problems may remain in getting your delegation to Paris and finding ways, in collaboration with the Government of the United States, to come to grips promptly with substantive issues on which a peace settlement depends. You should know that I fully share President Johnson’s concern that any further delay on this matter could endanger public support for the Government of Vietnam in the United States and thus endanger the struggle for the independence and freedom of South Vietnam and for a stable and honorable peace in Southeast Asia. As you know, I share President Johnson’s view that in the Paris talks there will be, from our side, no recognition of the NLF as an independent entity; and that the U.S. Government will not attempt to impose on South Vietnam a coalition government with the NLF. I have also reviewed with President Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the military situation in Vietnam, including reports from General Abrams in the field. It is my impression that, if we proceed with present military plans, there is no reason that we cannot move forward in Paris from a position of negotiating strength. But, I would emphasize again, this requires an appearance in Paris of a GVN delegation within the next few days, ready to go to work seriously in the search for an early and honorable peace. In short, I can see no gain and potentially much loss from any efforts by your government to postpone decisions with respect to the Paris talks until January 20, 1969.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. V)
5. Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology.
6. The President met privately with Dirksen in the Oval Office from 6:05 to 6:26 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found.