Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

200. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 6, 1968, 0915Z.

42066. For Secretary from Ambassador Bunker. Subj: Thieu’s Decision.

1. I thought it would be useful to set down my thoughts on what transpired here that led Thieu to make his decision not to go with us into the Paris talks. These thoughts are substantially based on evidence and solid impressions, except for Ky’s motivations, where what we say is somewhat speculative. We shall continue to collect and analyze the evidence. However, it is important to start evaluating this performance, which came so unexpectedly, so that we will know better how to deal with its consequences, as well as with Thieu and his government in the future.

2. The key issue on which everything turned was the NLF status in the talks. During the last days nothing we could say, no assurance we could give, was able to shake Thieu from the position that Hanoi had to be made to agree that the NLF was part of its delegation, else he would not come into the talks. This came as a surprise since at several points until the very last day we thought we had the fullest understanding of, and his agreement to, the our side/your side formula and how it would be applied. A second but less persistent theme, but one which has been subsequently emphasized, was that Hanoi had to say it agrees to talk directly to the GVN.

3. If at any point prior to the last crucial days Thieu had given us any inkling that he would break agreements reached, or that he would reopen the formula, or wanted stronger guarantees than those we had given him, we might have had time to overcome his opposition by working further on the joint announcement, adding perhaps even stronger assurances that the GVN will deal with all domestic political matters, a reassurance that we will not press them into coalition, etc., but he did not become utterly intransigent until toward the end.

4. The sudden turn of the final 48 hours of our negotiations with Thieu prompts the initial questions: did Thieu deliberately mislead us earlier? Did he hold back his real (and extreme) position until the very end to extract concessions on the central NLF point? Such a tactic would have been based on the twin assumptions of our anxiety to move into talks immediately and of our not daring to move without the GVN. Thieu was, of course, correct with respect to our anxiety to move, but wrong about our unwillingness to move without him despite repeated warnings. In any case, we believe it unlikely that Thieu was deliberately misleading us; he was, however, misreading us.

5. Our own elections and a possible Nixon victory played an important part in Thieu’s approach to the problem and reflects another miscalculation. He assumed, and we could not persuade him otherwise, that our haste reflects a political motive, namely, to assist Humphrey. He reasoned that a Nixon victory was probable and would be, on balance, more in the GVN’s interest. Thus, if he could prevent our decision to cease the bombing until after the election, pressure from the United States Government might ease. He would then have a new “ball game.” Thieu may even expect that Nixon would follow a “hawkish” policy, possibly even threaten to resume full bombing of the North to force Hanoi to capitulate or, at least come to the conference in a weaker bargaining position. We do not say that this factor was decisive, yet we do not doubt that it was a major factor in his intransigence.

6. But we must give strong weight to additional and more substantive explanations for Thieu’s final turning away from the bombing halt and serious talks. There are two mutually reinforcing elements here: one reflects a sense of gathering success in the war, and the other reflects fear and suspicion of us:

A. Thieu felt strongly that the timing of the bombing halt and serious negotiations was not propitious. We were proposing to do this—and inviting the probability of an immediate subsequent proposal from the enemy for a cease-fire—just at the moment when we were girding to follow up recent military successes with a concerted aggressive drive against the Viet Cong’s control of the countryside. Why rush to a solution at the conference table, which inevitably means compromise, when more and more reports were coming in that the enemy was weakened and discouraged, when the smell of victory was in the air?

B. Thieu’s suspicion of, or at least lack of confidence in, our motives and intentions regarding the talks, was also at work. We have already noted his belief that the timing of cessation was a ploy related to our elections. Much more serious is the fact that conscious as he is of the American people’s determination to wind up the fighting and withdraw, he almost certainly fears that once we have him at the conference table we would lead him step by step into a cease-fire, and then press on him a coalition, if that is the price we have to pay for a settlement. We know now that an intelligence report was in his hands that the NLF intended to press quickly for a cease-fire and coalition and this reinforced his anxiety and fears. The Laos settlement, and Harriman’s association with it, was also in his mind. Certain as he was of a Nixon victory, he saw in that victory the replacement of Harriman in the negotiations. The Lam telegram misrepresenting Harriman² could not have come at a worse time.

C. I would rate suspicion of us and fear of what negotiations will lead to as the second major factor in causing him to back away at the fateful hour of decision. It is an attitude we shall have to keep in the forefront of our thinking in the months ahead.

7. I think all the elements of paras 4-6 were present in Thieu’s thinking, but it is an open question to what extent each one entered his calculations. There were times during the last 48 hours when he seemed clearly to move with no sense of urgency, repeating the same argument in a score of different guises, instead of seeking a way out. His argument that the army and the country would “disintegrate” because the other side claimed to have two delegations, however illogical this may seem to us, because it made no allowance for his and our ability to combat Hanoi’s propaganda with our own, was a real concern of his as well as the members of the Security Council. The Prime Minister repeated this same concern yesterday. I pointed out that this concern seems to us to be greatly exaggerated but, in the atmosphere of emotion and suspicion, it was difficult to deal with this argument by an objective weighing of its validity. The argument also betrays a deep sense of insecurity and fear of coming to a quick decision that involved some elements of a domestic political criticism.

8. This brings us to the contributing factors of Thieu’s style and the matter of “face.” Thieu does not generally make quick decisions. He tends to delay the big decisions, especially when he feels insecure. The overreaction to the coup scare of October 8 provides evidence of that persisting sense of insecurity. In this context we confronted Thieu with the biggest decision of his administration. We put him under tremendous time pressure and under bonds of secrecy preventing adequate consultation with his senior colleagues. He was unable to prepare and educate them for the plunge. Although he was on clear notice that we would move quickly once we had Hanoi’s agreement, Thieu himself was mentally unprepared for the fact that on the day after we had obtained agreement on a joint declaration, we would come to him with the news that the bombing would stop the following day and negotiations begin three days later. Moreover, Vietnamese, we should remember, are not as efficient as we in lining up their political forces, making contingency plans and waiting with “execute” messages. They require some time to thrash things out and line people up and talk matters over. They are perhaps not alone in this. If we had been less concerned with avoiding discussion with his senior colleagues, perhaps Thieu might have brought his Parliamentary and other opinion leaders along. As it turned out, the pressure also ultimately involved the ever present question of face, so important in this part of the world. I do not wish to exaggerate this point but merely add it to the list of factors. Standing up to the Americans, resisting their imposed deadlines, demonstrating Vietnamese sovereignty became, if not an end in itself, at least a welcome by-product of the affair. I deal with this phenomenon in more detail in paragraph 14 below.

9. I have not thus far mentioned Ky’s role. It is a difficult one to assess and one is tempted to raise provocative questions. We must assume that some of the same considerations which passed through Thieu’s mind also passed through Ky’s. Ky is far more suspicious of us than Thieu. He is far more reckless, and he sets great store by a Nixon victory. He asked us several times, “What’s the great hurry?” yet told us he would do what he could to persuade Thieu and the Security Council to go with us. But did he?

10. Our early reports of the first NSC meeting show him taking a hard line, which later became equivocal. One, and probably two factors were at work:

A. We think Ky was pretty certain we would not dare to move unilaterally, although he had no reason to make this miscalculation. And if we did not move, then President-elect Nixon could come into the picture on the side of toughness. He therefore acted in such a way as to reinforce Thieu’s hesitations and the serious doubts of those on the National Security Council, instead of counteracting them.

B. But there may have been a second factor. The suspicion inevitably arises that he saw in Thieu’s stand an opportunity to destroy Thieu as a result of Thieu’s break with the US. If this was indeed his plan, then he certainly miscalculated, for in the short run Thieu’s defiance of us has vastly increased Thieu’s stature in the country. From the start Ky took the position with us that in principle they are opposed to the NLF presence, but that one must be realistic and face the fact that they will be present. He has consistently said he can handle Hanoi and the NLF; he has no fear of talking with the enemy; he can bargain with them and make concessions, for he is known as a hawk and is trusted. He was ready and anxious to go to Paris, yet in our meetings with him and Thieu his interventions were neither helpful nor constructive.

C. Was it because he wanted Thieu to box himself in on this issue? Was it because he sensed that while the initial emotional reaction may support Thieu, there will be many who will later come to think that Thieu has made a colossal mistake in failing to go with us in pursuit of a settlement, and that Thieu will be discredited and forced to resign in favor of Ky? We do not know, and we tend not to believe that Ky’s ambition would carry him to such lengths. Still, we will be on the alert for rumors emanating from Ky and his entourage condemning Thieu for his refusal to join the talks and his break with the US at a time when Ky was quite willing to go to the talks and deal with the NLF or anyone else.

11. Does Thieu realize the full magnitude of the complications he has created for himself and for us, and the way he has isolated himself from foreign support? We think the answer is a qualified yes. Thieu thinks clearly, and said at one point he knows he will be vilified and castigated in US and in world opinion if he does not join the talks. Does he realize that if he persists in his absence he may drive the US to negotiate unilaterally? This I made clear to him, although I did not press it.

12. He must certainly have thought about it, and he received from us ample indications of how American opinion could react and what might happen. But he may see us trapped here, or still see in Nixon’s possible election hope of eventual relief from these pressures. Or he may be gambling that Hanoi will come to his rescue by attacks on the cities and across the DMZ. Alternatively, he must realize that he cannot hold out indefinitely, and is buying domestic political support for a future move to the conference table at the cost of a short-run alienation of the US and his foreign friends. A risky and shortsighted course, but one he may have thought necessary.

13. What will Thieu do next? He has made his speeches to the legislature and to the nation. And while he went far out in his conditions, he stopped just short of using the precise words on which he bargained with us, “Hanoi must admit that the NLF is part of its delegation and must admit that it will talk to us.” He is also keeping a lid on anti-US demonstrations.

14. Many Vietnamese have observed after his Assembly speech of November 1, Thieu “has really become our President.” Some have said, “He is greater that Diem.”³ It was profound emotional experience for the Assembly and for the country at large. Thieu shed the image of the American-appointed, American-supported chief executive and became a leader in his own right. By catering to a relatively low denominator of nationalism, he has acquired the aura of a courageous patriot who is standing up to the foreigner. By the same token, if he moves wisely and firmly Thieu has perhaps now acquired a freedom of action and an image of independence in the matter of GVN participation that he did not have before. He is now better able to accept a face-saving formula that would permit him to claim that his conditions had been met. And he may now be better able to handle the man in Viet-Nam against whom he harbors the deepest suspicions—Ky.

15. Can Thieu be persuaded to change course—and hopefully soon? We think this may be possible. The essential element is that the President-elect, especially if it is Nixon, will have to make clear to him that GVN attendance at the conference is essential to a continuation of American public support of our Viet-Nam policy. A TCC summit conference thereafter with a carefully worked out and agreed joint communiqué beforehand could be the vehicle for bringing him to Paris with a minimum loss of face. There are already signs of leaders here having second thoughts, and there are reports that Ky is picking his delegation.

16. As a footnote to the above, the three rocket attacks on Saigon during the night of October 31/November 1, while we were in session with him, while not a major factor in his inflexibility during these crucial hours, certainly made him more stubborn. He said, “You say they are ready for serious discussion. But look what they are doing tonight.”⁴

Bunker

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, HARVAN/Double Plus, Vol. VI [2 of 2]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Received at 5:10 a.m. Repeated to Paris for Harriman and Vance. On this copy of the telegram, which was sent to the President, Rostow wrote: “For the President From Walt Rostow—Herewith Bunker’s cool and thoughtful analysis of factors that made Thieu draw back at last minute.”
2. See Document 149, and footnote 7 thereto.
3. Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam, 1955-1963.
4. In a November 5 memorandum for the President, Rostow conveyed the language of telegram CAP 82707, which was sent to Bunker in accordance with the President’s instructions: “You should know that the President does not easily enter into relations of confidence nor does he easily withdraw confidence once given. The President believes he established with Thieu and Ky a basis for confidence over these difficult years. You should also know—and they should know—that the President’s confidence in them is deeply shaken—very deeply shaken. Specifically, the President is in no mood for reassurances to them. If a viable relation is to be re-established, it is their task—and they should set about it promptly—very promptly. You will know best how to convey this message without any ambiguity.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [1 of 3]) Bunker planned to see Thieu on November 6 but the meeting was postponed when Thieu claimed to be “too busy” to see Bunker. He did agree to meet with him on November 8. (Telegram 42029 from Saigon, November 6; telegram 42172 from Saigon, November 7; telegram 42270 from Saigon, November 8; and telegram 42329 from Saigon, November 8; all ibid., HARVAN/Double Plus, Vol. VI [2 of 2])