197. Memorandum for the Record1
In my farewell call on President Thieu2 I made much of my firm conviction that we were steadily winning the war. I recalled to Thieu that he had some months ago told Ambassador Bunker how the enemy was headed for military defeat and would have to switch soon to a political phase.
However I didn’t waste much time on generalities. I told the President that the greatest weakness in his arsenal and ours in this critical juncture lay in the propaganda field. When the enemy was losing, he claimed he was winning. When we were winning, we acted as if we would lose. I severely criticized the psyops and information agencies of both our governments here in Vietnam. I said that I had recommended to General Abrams that the psychological aspect of our new accelerated offensive should receive command rather than staff supervision; I would make the same recommendation to the President. He listened intently and took several notes. Encouraged, I pressed the need for themes which would convey “the smell of success”, which I attributed to General Abrams.
Secondly I told the President that our one mistake was to undershoot the mark on the special pacification offensive. Practically every province had indicated it could upgrade security in many more contested hamlets than its quota. I urged that if by 1 December the offensive seemed to be moving nicely, double the ante to at least 2,000 hamlets by Tet.3
Third I strenuously urged an order of the day, or speech by the President (or PM), or TV broadcast to officially launch the special offensive, and to describe all of its facets—including Phung Hoang, self-defense, Chieu Hoi, etc. I said I felt that many province and district officials were confused by the bombing halt, etc. What was needed was a strong, clear call by the top leadership of the GVN to consolidate the victory we were well on the way to winning.
[Page 570]The President took notes on all of the above points. He seemed particularly interested in my propaganda proposals and an order of the day or speech on the special offensive. He ended by expressing warm appreciation of my help to the GVN and presented me with a fabulous piece of lacquer and an inscribed picture of himself.
- Source: U.S. Army Center for Military History, DepCORDS/MACV Papers, Pacification Program (Planning): 1968. Confidential. Copies were sent to Bunker, Abrams, and Colby.↩
- Komer was appointed Ambassador to Turkey October 28.↩
- Beginning with a declaration on November 1, Thieu implemented an accelerated pacification campaign, which he called the Le Loi campaign in honor of a Vietnamese patriot. The ostensible goal of this broad effort was to increase rapidly the percentage of the South Vietnam’s population under the control of the GVN. Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 154-207, provides additional information.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩