Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

195. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, November 5, 1968, 8:30 a.m.

Gossip on election—the surprising tightness/closeness. CMC’s disgust with Nixon’s TV shows.

Comments on SVNam—Thieu’s “treachery”—his desire to keep on fighting to keep us there. CMC repeats his frequent comment that Thieu wants the war to go on forever. His gov’t is getting richer &richer. CMC mad &wants us to get out.

His hope, however, being reasonable, that cessation of bombing will lead to a very much lower level of combat.

We should get on with the negotiations &start pulling out. Thieu will just “pee away” our substantial military victory.

Warnke points out 2 utterly opposing schools of thought in U.S. Gov’t

• —one saying we shld root out the infrastructure (Rostow, Max Taylor, Rusk, JCS).
• —other, be satisfied with stopping hostilities (CMC, Warnke, etc).

CMC + Warnke: We’re for “Ceasefire in place”—we see no reason “to try to make the whole country safe for Thieu.”

CMC wants to get out now; [Thieu’s] not ready to fight until we’ve secured the country for G.V.N.

The problem is—as we all admit—this is not U.S. Gov’t policy! The hard-liners—Walt Rostow is the major apologist for the S.V.Nam gov’t. LBJ has had a confused conglomeration of motives—he’s seen it as a war—“Nail the coonskin to the wa[ll]”—he doesn’t want be to be the 1st Pres. to “loose [sic] a war.” The concept [is] wholly wrong. He still thinks in terms of wars—like WWI &WWII. (He’s never understood the complexities of the situation.)

CMC then talks again of the Republican Party efforts to sabotage any progress—the FBI telephone taps, the intercepts of messages from Bui Diem to Saigon, the surveillance &taps on Mrs. Claire Chennault, etc.

Warnke, points out the real issue is—Does U.S. remain in Asia?

—Whether or not we win in S.V.Nam, this is the long-term future.

CMC: “Excruciatingly unbearable awful advice” to LBJ for 5 years, for us to have gotten in so deeply, without realizing what our national interest is.

Let these countries learn to work together. Let’s us draw down, as we did in Korea, to the “limited partner” role.

(CMC thinks aloud at length—15/20 minutes—on future of U.S. in Asia.)

[Omitted here is discussion of Israel.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2]. No classification marking. This was a regular meeting of Clifford’s “0830 Group” of senior Defense Department officials. The complete list of participants is not indicated.