Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

193. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and Vietnam¹

Washington, November 4, 1968, 2119Z.

266372/Todel 1473. Paris for Harriman and Vance. Saigon: Ambassador Bunker’s comments on this cable will be needed by 11:00 a.m. Tuesday Saigon time. This message has not yet been cleared by highest USG authorities.

1. We have weighed carefully the recommendations in Paris 23331, Saigon 41853, and Paris 23348.² Our basic conclusions are that:

a. There must be no wider meeting in Paris on Nov. 6 nor should we now set a firm date of Nov. 13.

b. We should make every effort to go forward with bilateral talks in Paris on procedures for a wider meeting, during the week. This would be designed to open the way for a wider meeting on Nov. 13.

c. We should prepare for the possibility of agreeing to a wider meeting on Nov. 13 or shortly thereafter, on the assumption that the GVN may still not be ready to attend, but that we may wish to go ahead nonetheless and show them that there are certain subjects we can discuss without them, for example, mutual withdrawal and de-escalation in the DMZ.

d. Meanwhile, Saigon should be taking every possible measure to bring the GVN around.

These central conclusions are reflected in the instructions below. They reflect our considered views, but are of course subject to Paris and Saigon comment.

2. Paris has scheduled (at Lau’s request) the next Vance/Lau meeting at 1000 Paris time on Tuesday. We plan now that at this meeting Vance would make the following points:

a. We are not ready for a wider meeting on Wednesday, Nov. 6.

b. We continue to believe that bilateral discussions on procedures are essential, and note that we have never agreed with the DRV that procedures should be worked out in the wider meeting itself, or should be the first item discussed. Indeed, the procedural agreement reached last May expressly provides that those ground rules will continue until we and the DRV agree to change them. (This leaves open the possibility—depending on how the GVN comes around—of ratification or confirmation of the procedures in a wider meeting.)

c. Bilateral discussions on the procedures for a wider meeting should aim to work out agreed procedures so that the first wider meeting could take place in the week of Nov. 11-16. At the same time, we cannot commit ourselves to a date for such a wider meeting until there has been a discussion and at least provisional agreement on the essential procedures.

d. Accordingly, we renew our strong view that there should be a bilateral meeting on Nov. 6 and further bilateral discussions as necessary. We also continue to believe that it is appropriate for such bilateral meetings to take up the question of de-escalation on either side in the DMZ area and what can be done to assure this.

In short, we plan that a meeting on Tuesday³ should definitively knock down any meeting on Wednesday other than a bilateral on procedures.⁴

3. On the task of preparing for a possible wider meeting without the GVN, we would like Paris recommendations on how this should be done including how we should handle the presence of an NLF representative and the topics we would plan to raise. We would also like your judgment on whether Hanoi would accept such a meeting without the presence of the GVN, or what tactics you think Hanoi might employ if we were to appear at such a meeting without the GVN. This is a matter requiring less urgent comment than the instructions above, however.

4. Meanwhile, Saigon should be acting along the following lines:

a. As you deem most effective, the word should be going out to all influential quarters that the American public will not support a situation in which talks are delayed for any significant time by GVN insistence on the kind of assurances Thieu has mentioned, that Hanoi will formally and explicitly agree: -1- to talk directly with GVN and -2- that the NLF will participate only as part of the DRV delegation. We here are already assembling editorial comment that can be used as ammunition in support of this argument.

b. Also as you deem most effective, you should start to get across the idea that, if the GVN refuses to attend on its present grounds, the US Administration will have to proceed with the wider meetings at which it will discuss appropriate issues without the presence of the GVN.

c. On both scores, you should be getting across the idea that this is a matter of American public opinion as a whole, and has little or nothing to do with who is elected President tomorrow. You should also be getting it across that the present Administration, under our system, has decisive responsibility until January 20. (We infer that some South Vietnamese do not understand this rather basic point.)

5. In short, you should be moving to shorten as much as possible whatever face-saving period the more constructive elements in the GVN regard as necessary. (We have noted Thieu’s assistant, Huong, commenting that two weeks would do it. We want to make this less.)

6. In laying out this course of action, we have in mind Saigon’s suggestion (Saigon 41738)⁵ that word from the President-elect may become an important element in bringing the GVN around, after the election. We share Bunker’s judgment that this could be of crucial importance. Obviously, it cannot be done in the next 48 hours, at least.

7. Finally we would like Saigon and Paris comment—on a less urgent basis but hopefully in the next 24 hours—on the following possible variations:

a. An offer to cement the GVN’s “leading role” by explicitly making the GVN the “chairman” of our side. Would this invite Hanoi to make the NLF “chairman” on the other side? Or would Hanoi emphasize NLF independence by retaining “two delegates”? Does it unduly tie our hands into the future? Would it help?

b. If the GVN is unwilling to come to a wider meeting, our attending with private SVN representation—from the Lien Minh perhaps—as a way of showing how we regard the NLF being present on Hanoi’s side.

We emphasize that these are both ideas to probe the possibilities and we would welcome any ideas from Paris and Saigon.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-November 1968. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/HARVAN Double Plus. Drafted by Bundy; cleared by Rostow, Clifford, and Read; and approved by Rusk.
2. Documents 185 and 190 and footnote 3, Document 190.
3. November 5.
4. In telegram 41932 from Saigon, November 4, the Embassy concurred with the strategy and tactics outlined in these first two paragraphs. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Incoming)-November 1968)
5. See footnote 4, Document 183.