Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

191. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, November 4, 1968, 8:40 a.m.

62.5% critical wires to W Hse, LBJ upset. That’s why last Sat’s calls to leading Congressmen was so impt.

CMC tries to figure our meaning of Wash. Post editorial today.

CMC reads aloud a proposed message from LBJ to Gen. Abrams that Rostow sent to his house Sunday.² LBJ urging Abrams to get out & “sell” U.S. commanders on what was done last week—saying LBJ not going to sell SVNam down the river.

GME speaks out—so do Pursley & Goulding—too late, too little “me thinks the lady doth protest too much”.

CMC, it turns out, agrees with us. He’s against it—he’s worried—this proposed message is one more manifestation of Rusk & Rostow’s desire to fight on & on & on so long as Saigon wants us to.

The mess we’re in now is wholly of Saigon’s making—& is solely due to Republican pressure on Viet Nam thru Bui Diem (SVNamese ambassador to U.S.).

(Republican channel is Mrs. Claire Chennault. Chinese-born widow of Gen. [Clair Chennault], whose code name for this action “Little Flower”!!)

CMC thinks he’s got it stopped.

0900—CMC turned to Nitze: who opens with an oral report on reconnaissance over N. VNam since the bombing halt.

0901—Walt Rostow phones to argue for the message. CMC arguments:

1) The action LBJ took on 31 Oct was one he had been trying to take for 6 months & was no surprise—no departure from what LBJ has been saying, in effect, since San Antonio in Sept ‘67.³

2) LBJ shldn’t be defensive about his decision. Thieu had agreed to this—worked out a joint communiqué.

3) Message is apologetic—Nothing to be apologetic about!

4) LBJ has not suggested he was changing his position on any fundamental point—it looks as though he has by this defensive message?

(Rostow whams back for 6 mins. while CMC listens in silence)

Then CMC opens up again: It’s all wrong for LBJ to try to get to Thieu by a message via Abrams to SVNamese generals. It’s a screwy way to get out & do business.

Finally, LBJ & Nixon have talked. If Nixon is elected, then a jt. message from those 2 could go. That’s the way to press Saigon—not an apologetic, defensive message from LBJ to SVNamese via Abrams.

CMC notes that only reason Nixon went along with the deal of LBJ’s because LBJ tricked him into it by telling him—lying—that Thieu had agreed; Thieu had never agreed.

That’s what Nixon’s staff is now telling all reporters!!!!

Nitze opens up discussion:

• —We’re fuzzy on what constitutes a strike on a city—& how we retaliate.
• —As of now, the talks on [November] 6th in Paris are off because we can’t agree.

LBJ told Dirksen we knew the score & Dirksen told Nixon & so Nixon called LBJ at Ranch. Nixon promised LBJ support & did so publicly.⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, George M. Elsey Papers, Van De Mark Transcripts [1 of 2]. No classification marking. This meeting was a regular meeting of Clifford’s “0830 Group” of senior Defense Department officials. The complete list of participants is not indicated.
2. The draft message to Bunker and Abrams from the President, as transmitted to the President by Rostow in telegram CAP 82658, November 3, and received at the LBJ Ranch at 11:40 a.m., reads: “From here it looks as if it might be useful for Abe to call in the senior U.S. and ARVN military commanders to make the following points: I’ve personally talked with the President and want to pass directly to you how he views the situation. He is not going to sell out what we—the U.S., ARVN and other Allies—have won on the battlefield. He will have no part of imposing a coalition government on the South Vietnamese. He will live by the Honolulu Communiqué which promises a leading role in the negotiations to the GVN. You and I know that militarily we’ve got a good deal: (A) During the bad weather over the NVN panhandle the bombing halt doesn’t hurt us; we’re going to put a maximum effort over Laos; (B) Enemy observance of the DMZ is a net military advantage to us; (C) Our job is easier if cities like Saigon and Danang are free from attack. So, as soldiers, let us go on about our job while the diplomats try to do theirs—in confidence that our strong military position won’t be thrown away at the conference table—with the knowledge that early diplomatic success depends on our keeping maximum military pressure on the battlefields. You, in Saigon, of course, must be the judge of whether such an approach would be helpful.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. IV [2 of 3])
3. See footnote 6, Document 35.
4. See Document 187.