186. Editorial Note
In a conversation beginning at 1:25 p.m. on November 3, 1968, Senator George Smathers and President Johnson discussed Republican actions relating to the Paris negotiations. Smathers noted that he had heard from Republican Presidential candidate Richard Nixon on the issue. He told the President that Nixon was concerned that “you were getting ready to charge him with the accusation that he connived with John Tower and Anna Chennault to bring about the action of the Saigon government not participating.” Nixon insisted that “this was first not supported by the truth, and secondly, unfair, and thirdly, unfortunate.” In fact, Nixon vowed to offer to Johnson “his full cooperation, and he would offer to go to any place that you might want him to go” to bring about a successful resolution of the impasse at Paris. “The problem is not his traveling somewhere,” the President countered. “The problem is the people on both sides of this fence getting the impression that they can get a little more for the house if they’ll wait a week to sell it.” He allowed that the September 30 speech by Vice President Humphrey had seemingly encouraged North Vietnamese intransigence. “But,” Johnson noted, “the former Vice President, his folks get into it, and they say that they know how to deal with these Communists, and they’re not going to be soft on them, and if they’re elected, they’ll see it right on through with them, and that they’ll get a whole lot better deal with Nixon than they will with Johnson.”
The President insisted that he had proof of Republican involvement with the South Vietnamese Government. He had “started personally watching the traffic” and intercepted telegrams revealed that the South [Page 537] Vietnamese were being told “that Nixon is going to win; therefore, they ought to wait on Nixon.” Johnson observed: “So what he’s doing—my judgment is—he was—on the surface he was playing that he didn’t want to undercut me. Under the table, his people—and this I think you can tell him for sure, there’s no doubt about it—his people, A—business-wise, and B—political-wise, were saying that you ought to wait on Dick. Now, that’s got it pretty well screwed up. … And my judgment is we’ll have to wait until Wednesday [November 6], and if he, instead of traveling, all he’s got to do is just go back through the same sources and tell them, ‘You go on, I’m gonna support the President, and you better get on to that damn conference, because these people are not going to support you if you refuse to even go talk when you’ve got a chance to.’ … I may be wrong, but I don’t believe the people of America will support me or Nixon or anybody else if these generals out there won’t talk when we got them recognized.”
Johnson also contended that Nixon had used individuals from his campaign staff to insinuate publicly that the administration was playing politics with the bombing cessation. While Nixon always denied these charges, in Johnson’s mind the damage had already been done. “And that’s dirty pool because I have told him everything and been very frank and honest with him,” he noted. The President had secured a firm commitment of support from all three of the leading Presidential candidates on October 31. Consequently, he believed that the actions of the Republicans violated Nixon’s assurances.
Smathers offered both an explanation for the situation and a defense for Nixon. “You seem to think—your people think—that Tower and Chennault have made these contacts,” he explained. “But he [Nixon] said he doesn’t know whether they have or they haven’t. He doesn’t think that they have. But he said that he didn’t think they had more influence than Bunker and that Bunker should be able to keep everything straight, and that as far as he was concerned, that finished it.” But the President countered: “They want to wait for him, because he will never be soft on the Communists, and I am. … That’s the point.” The President insisted that he knew “that the South Vietnamese have gotten the word that Nixon feels that it’s better to wait on him, and I know their President has taken that and reversed himself. … Now, it’s that simple.” But Smathers assured him that Nixon guaranteed that he “had been playing it straight and he wanted you to know that he was still playing it straight.” The President responded: “Well, you tell him that what I wanted done, I want it just the way it’s always been, as you discussed with me some time before, and as some of his other friends have. He’s got to keep his Finches and his Lairds and his Chennaults and the rest of them from running around and messing up this broth. And it’s messed up—there’s no question about that.” Smathers replied: “ [Page 538] Well, I’ll pass this word back to him, that, goddamnit, you had it set, and that someone—his people—are screwing it up.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Smathers, November 3, 1968, 1:25 p.m., Tape F68.09, PNO 2-3; transcript prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume)