Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

167. Summary Notes of the 593rd Meeting of the National Security Council¹

Washington, October 31, 1968, 6:40-6:50 p.m.

Vietnam—Bombing Halt

(Messrs. Hardesty, Levinson and Middleton attended this meeting for the purpose of recording the President’s presentation. Their full notes are filed with the President. These notes are merely confirmatory.)²

The President: Reviewed in summary form the Vietnam negotiations since October 9 when the new phase opened in Paris.

a. On October 14 he informed the three Presidential candidates that the DRV was prepared to sit down with representatives of the South Vietnamese government to negotiate.

b. Based on the San Antonio formula, we accepted their agreement to talk with the South Vietnamese. They understand that the talks cannot continue unless the DMZ remains quiet and there are no attacks on urban areas in South Vietnam.

c. We have talked to Soviet leaders.

d. We will go ahead with a bombing suspension and test the good faith of the North Vietnamese.

The President: Said he was going on the air at 8:00 P.M. this evening and would shortly order the bombing of North Vietnam halted at 8:00 A.M. tomorrow.

a. The first meeting with South Vietnam in attendance would be held on November 6, hopefully, or as soon thereafter as the South Vietnamese come to Paris.

b. Secretary Rusk and Secretary Clifford recommended that he proceed with the bombing suspension as proposed.

c. At an earlier meeting, the Chiefs of Staff had approved the proposed suspension. General McConnell, General Chapman, General Palmer, and later General Westmoreland and Admiral Moorer had all approved.³

d. General Abrams had been called back quietly and had subscribed 100% to the proposed suspension.

The President: Said he believed it was worth going the last mile and that he was ready to take the chance involved in finding out whether a bombing suspension under the conditions proposed would get negotiations started to end the war.

a. He wanted to hear now any differing opinions.

b. He must leave the room promptly in order to await a call from Saigon from Ambassador Bunker who would know whether President Thieu would join in an announcement of the bombing suspension.⁴

The President: Asked each person in turn whether he had any doubts as to the action proposed. Every person agreed with the proposed action.

a. Two weeks ago we had a firm agreement with President Thieu to go along with us. Now, however, Thieu was hesitant and we are still in doubt as to whether South Vietnam would make a joint announcement.

b. Hard fighting is ahead of us.

c. He could not wave a wand to end the war in Vietnam.

Note: Following the conclusion of the NSC meeting,⁵ the President talked with several members as he was leaving the Cabinet Room. He explained to General Westmoreland that he had asked General Abrams to come to Washington to ask him face-to-face what had been reported by cable from Saigon, namely, from a military point of view, General Abrams fully supported the bombing suspension. To Air Force Secretary Brown, the President said he did not know why President Thieu had not gone along with us after first agreeing completely with the conditional bombing suspension. He said that members of the “China Lobby” may have gotten to someone in Saigon to suggest that if Saigon would hold out until after the elections, they might receive a better deal from a new Republican Administration.

Bromley Smith

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 5, Tab 75. Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Prepared by Bromley Smith. Those attending the meeting, which was held in the Cabinet Room, were the President, Rusk, Katzenbach, Clifford, Nitze, Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Navy Paul Ignatius, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, Fowler, Helms, Wheeler, Westmoreland, Palmer, Moorer, Chapman, Acting Air Force Chief of Staff General John Ryan, Office of Emergency Preparedness Director Price Daniel, USIA Director Leonard Marks, Rostow, Smith, Deputy Special Counsel Lawrence Levinson, and Staff Assistants Robert Hardesty and Harry Middleton. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) According to the Daily Diary, the meeting ended at 6:48 p.m., at which time photographers entered. A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
2. The notes of these Presidential aides, which are in the President’s Daily Diary for this date, read: “Because of the historical importance of this day and of this meeting, Larry Levinson, Harry Middleton and Bob Hardesty took notes and combined them into the following: The President was attired in a grey suit and grey tie. He spoke in a voice that seemed hoarse. His delivery was rapid and business-like. He stated: ‘We are ready to announce that we are going to stop bombing North Vietnam. We have always held that conferences will not be productive unless the Government of Vietnam is represented; unless the other side refrains from shelling the cities; unless there is no violation of the DMZ. Hanoi has said that it is willing for South Vietnam to sit in on the meetings. We have let them know that any violation of the DMZ will trigger an attack from us. We have talked with the Soviet Union and others and they understand this. We will test their faith and see. I am going on the air at 8 p.m. tonight to talk to the Nation. Just before that, I will order the bombing to stop at 8 a.m. tomorrow. Negotiations will resume on November 6. If they are there, fine. If not, we will go on anyway. I’ve gotten the judgment of my advisers on this.’ (At this point, the President read statements from his advisers: ‘McConnell: Therefore, I recommend that you go ahead and do this. Rusk: I recommend that we proceed. I recommend that we proceed along the course as outlined. Chapman: I think we should go ahead with it. Palmer: Considering everything that has been brought up here, I would go along with making this proposition. Russell: It’s worth a try. Westmoreland: But if the rules of engagement as suggested here are adopted, I see no problem. Abrams: I certainly subscribe to that a hundred percent.’) ‘They must respect the DMZ and the cities. It’s worth the last mile. I’m willing to take that chance. All my advisers support me. If you have any differing opinions, I would like for you to say so. Bunker and Thieu are meeting. We hope to issue a joint statement. But if not, we will go ahead with our own. Do you have any objections?’ (The President went around the table. There was prompt and unanimous agreement among those present. Among the comments: ‘OK’ ‘Absolutely’ ‘Strong’ ‘The thing to do’ ‘The right decision.’) ‘Others who said wait a little while—you’ll get a better deal from the other fellow. We’re doing this to test their good faith. There will be some hard negotiating ahead.’ Secretary Rusk interjected: ‘There will be some hard fighting ahead.’ The President replied: ‘But this is worth a try. There will no doubt be charges of politics aris[ing]. But the next meeting won’t be until November 6.’” (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary)
3. See Document 69.
4. In a note to the President, October 31, 7:15 p.m., Ginsburgh wrote: “Ben Read called. Bunker said Thieu still insists on two changes in the announcement. Sec. Rusk told Amb. Bunker that was unacceptable and the President is going ahead on the basis of the speech at 8:00 p.m. Ben said so we will not have a joint announcement unless Bunker can get him to change; and we Don’t know that he will even try.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [1 of 2])
5. The President’s Diary notes: “At the conclusion of the meeting, Walt Rostow commented—also in a hoarse voice—‘This is the most sustained day and night effort I’ve had since the Cuban missile crisis.’” (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary)