163. Information Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1
Mr. President:
Suppose Thieu does not go along today.2 I suggest that you consider the following:
- —first, have in Nixon alone. Give him the evidence—of which we have an important additional item—that the South Vietnamese are thinking that they can turn down this deal and get a better deal after the election. While sharing the information with Nixon, tell him flatly that you are confident that he has had nothing whatsoever to do with this;
- —then give him the views of Abrams, the JCS, etc., on the deal;
- —then give him the evidence that Hanoi may in fact be thinking of winding up the war very quickly indeed;
- —you might remind him of the trouble that President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, and Sect. Dulles had when Syngman Rhee kicked up his heels towards the end of the Korean war;
- —finally, tell him that it is your considered judgment that if it becomes known that Thieu is holding up a deal which would lower U.S. casualties and bring peace near, the basis in the United States for support of the enterprise would dissipate:
- —in the government, including the military who are “disgusted;”
- —in the Congress, even among pro-Vietnam leaders;
- —in our public.
We simply cannot let these inexperienced men snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
Therefore, you would ask him to join in a private message to Thieu, with the other candidates, along the following lines:
“We, the three Presidential candidates in the United States, have been kept fully informed on what the U.S. Government has been seeking in the negotiations in Paris.
[Page 472]“We have just been briefed by the President and other responsible officials of the Government, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are convinced that what has been negotiated in Paris is exactly what the President told us he intended to achieve.
“We are also convinced that the consultations with your Government have been full and candid and the President had reason to believe that he could proceed with the support of the responsible leaders of the Government of Vietnam.
“We believe it would be most ill-advised, under these circumstances, for your Government not to participate in the Paris talks promptly. We believe the American people will not understand what will appear as an effort to protract the war at a time when movement towards peace with honor may be possible. The bases for Congressional and public support for Vietnam in the United States might be gravely weakened. /s/Nixon, Humphrey, Wallace.”3
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Memos to the President/Bombing Halt Decision, Vol. III [1 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive. The notation “ps” on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.↩
- In a memorandum to the President, October 31, 11:50 a.m., Rostow noted the following intelligence report: “President Thieu’s older brother told the South Korean Ambassador to South Vietnam that he believed that it would be better to deal with the next President, no matter who is elected, on issues pertaining to the peace conference. The South Korean Ambassador informed his government that, according to rumors, the U.S. did not expect President Thieu to take such a stubborn attitude.” (Ibid., Memos to the President/Walt Rostow, October 29-31, 1968)↩
- See Document 166.↩