Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

Washington, October 30, 1968, 4 p.m.

The President: When are we stopping it?

Secretary Rusk: Stop at 11:00 a.m.—announced.

The President: Let’s stop it so I can announce at 7 today or at 7 tomorrow.

General Wheeler: We can stop it at 0800 Saigon time or 7:00 p.m. tomorrow. There is nothing to do.

Clark Clifford: Do we have information about Thieu making speech?

The President: Make it the day after tomorrow if possible.

Secretary Rusk: What about the timing?

The President: Announce it at 7 p.m. tomorrow.

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Clark Clifford and Dean Rusk background, perhaps even appear on television.

Orders go out at 12 noon. This means stopping it—cessation—at midnight tomorrow (1 p.m. on November 1, Saigon time).

We would have from 6 to 8 to work on Congress and Candidates.

I talked to Dirksen once before. He wrote an article on how “we could reasonably hope for GVN to be recognized by sitting at talks.”

George Christian: I will send the Press home now.

Clark Clifford: If orders go out at 12 noon tomorrow to stop bombing at 12 midnight, what is the possibility of a leak?

General Wheeler: There is a chance of a leak from Saigon.

The President: It would be 2-3 in the morning.

General Wheeler: You would have a better chance of security. If it goes out at 12:00 Washington time, it is 1:00 a.m. in Saigon.

Secretary Rusk: When do we tell the Hanoi delegation?

The President: I would tell them as late as possible.

Secretary Rusk: Say to them: “The President is ordering a complete halt in the bombing at ____ time.”

The President: Why not hold off on issuing orders until I made speech?

Secretary Rusk: Orders issued when?

The President: At 8 p.m. I speak Thursday2 (EST). Make issue of orders at 8 p.m. Thursday. Make effective 8 a.m. Friday.

Secretary Rusk: We should notify Hanoi tomorrow morning.

We can guarantee there won’t be a leak out of Paris. Tell them we Don’t expect incidents.

General Wheeler: 12 hours will do it.

The President: I thought Hanoi already agreed to it.

Have Vance call them now. Tell them we have 8 allies, candidates and Congressmen to deal with.

Tell them we are going to proceed at 8-9 o’clock, early evening if we can understand that you are aboard.

I want all of you to go on television.

Secretary Rusk: (“Today”)3

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Clark Clifford: (Joseph Benti)4

Let’s concentrate on our embassies, Saigon and Hanoi between 6-8, or 7-8.

Secretary Rusk: Times will be “ungodly” in Australia, New Zealand.

Walt Rostow: 6 p.m. EST = NZ 11 a.m. Cambodia 9 a.m. Korea 8 a.m.

EST 5 p.m. is 7 a.m. in Korea

Secretary Rusk: We’ll have trouble with Park.5

The President: Nobody is notified 3 hours before announcement.

The President: I want to say reason I did what I did on March 31 was, as Clark Clifford said, to “test the good faith” of North Vietnam.

“I have determined tonight to give a fair test to that good faith.”

Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Although the meeting, held in the Cabinet Room, actually began at 3 p.m. with Rusk, Clifford, Wheeler, Rostow, McPherson, Christian, and Tom Johnson attending, these notes cover only the period from when the President joined the meeting at 3:56 until it ended at 5:18. The President, McPherson, and Christian met earlier that day from 12:27 to 1:40 p.m. to work on McPherson’s draft of the President’s speech. Christian and McPherson continued to work on another draft of the speech until the 3 p.m. meeting. The President approved a version of the speech at 4:55 p.m., and he asked Staff Assistant Charles Maguire to review the speech at 5:50. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.↩
October 31.↩
Reference is to the morning news and variety television show.↩
Journalist Joseph Benti.↩
South Korean President Park Chung-hee.↩