Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969

121. Notes of Meeting¹

Washington, October 25, 1968, 12:38-1:20 p.m.

NOTES ON MEETING WITH FOREIGN POLICY GROUP

THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE

• The President
• Secretary Rusk
• Secretary Clifford
• General Wheeler
• General Taylor
• Walt Rostow
• Tom Johnson

General Taylor: This looks like a phony to me.²

The President: You fool the world with this. You do it with no conditions attached whatsoever. That old dog won’t hunt.

Secretary Rusk: Hanoi would surface this secret message on “without conditions” if we had to resume bombing.

General Taylor: It’s tricky.

Secretary Clifford: Is it a condition?

The President: Credibility would be a word of yesteryear if this happened.

Secretary Clifford: We could say we can’t go on with talks if they attacked cities or moved across the DMZ.

If they are peaceful, we’ll be peaceful. If they aren’t we won’t be either.

Walt Rostow: Backgrounding would say they held their concept on “unconditional”; we held our language in terms of facts of life. Plus we could say we gave Abrams standing orders.

Secretary Clifford: What did the President get for halting the bombing? The presence of the GVN at the negotiation table.

Secretary Rusk: We could say you will have to wait a few days to see on the other things except the GVN at the table.

The President: I don’t believe we can sell it that way.

Secretary Clifford: We proceed on the assumption they won’t take advantage of the cessation. We could say this would be our assumption.

I would take out the words “without conditions.” This is a fallback position.

General Wheeler: The escape hatch is “on the basis of our discussions.” I agree with Clark and Dean. I would not let negotiations fail on that point.

General Abrams’ execution order could be printed on the front page of the Washington Post.

• —If they come across the DMZ, he destroys them.
• —If they use artillery, he attacks sites.

A commander is always responsible for security of his troops. In instructions, reprisals are permitted.

General Taylor: Hanoi will see this as a victory for them, not as a victory for us.

The President: Read UPI Ticker item (UPI 61:12:09) Attachment A.³

The President: We won’t stop the bombing unless—GVN is at the table, and they respect the DMZ and they won’t shell the cities.

You can’t say I don’t have conditions. I think they will do it just to make asses of us—accept this—then hit us—and force us to resume the bombing. I think they are trying to use this to affect the election.

We must have a reason to believe the GVN will come in. While that is going on, they will respect the cities and the DMZ. Secretary Rusk: They said they could be at the meeting on November 2.

We must stay with this if we go with it. Time is putting pressure on them. Let’s keep this language out.

Secretary Clifford: If this deal goes through, could you have a cable from Harriman and Vance that:

a. The GVN will be at the table

b. That there is a chance for productive talks.

We have told Hanoi if they shell the cities and take advantage of the DMZ, we must protect ourselves. They could say that on the basis of our discussions we believe this.

I am not sure it is more than a hope.

Secretary Clifford: We misled the President on the 19th parallel. You aren’t giving up much with the weather like this.

Take out “without conditions.” What about Dean’s suggestion of using “without preconditions.”

Secretary Rusk: We lay out the three facts of life. They attack, we resume the bombing.

What do we tell the leadership?

The other side knows we won’t keep bombing off if they attack.

The President: I have had one of three conditions.

Walt Rostow: We said to the Candidates: The facts of life are:

1. GVN

2. The Cities

3. The DMZ

The President: I am not sure Hanoi knows this.

Walt Rostow: Cy said he had done it eight times.

The President: Take out the condition stuff.

Secretary Rusk: I would say that we do not recognize the NLF by just listing them.

Secretary Clifford: I would not put in the line about recognition of the parties.

Secretary Rusk: South Vietnam is concerned about our recognizing the NLF.

The President: We imply recognition.

We’ll have a hard time explaining this between now and the election.

Secretary Clifford: It’s a test of good faith.

The President: Reads UPI ticker on LeMay. (Attachment B)⁴

1. Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) A full transcript of the meeting is ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
2. Reference is to the joint draft minute; see footnote 4, Document 116.
3. Not attached. The reference is likely to the President’s statement in a news conference the previous afternoon that “there has been no basic change, no breakthrough” in the Paris negotiations. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, Book II, p. 1064.
4. Not attached. General Curtis LeMay, running mate of independent candidate George Wallace, made several statements during the last week of October implying that a bombing halt would be ineffective in bringing about an end to the fighting in Vietnam. See The New York Times, October 23-27, 1968.