Office of the Historian

408. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, November 20, 1967.

JCS Recommendations, with OSD positions, and recommended State position:

1.
Remove restrictions on all militarily significant targets in NVN.
  • OSD—No
  • State—No
2.
Mine NVN deep water ports.
  • OSD—No
  • State—No
3.
Mine inland waterways and estuaries in NVN north of 20oN.
  • OSD—Yes, with prohibition against mining within 5 miles of any deep water ports and within 25 miles of Chinese border.
  • State—Yes
4.
Extend naval surface operations (Sea Dragon).2
  • OSD—Yes
  • State—Yes, but with careful restrictions.
5.
Use US SAMs (TALOS)3 from ships against combat aircraft.
  • OSD—Yes
  • State—No
6.

Increase air interdiction in Laos and along NVN borders.

  • OSD—No (since present arrangements with RLG are adequate)
  • State—No

Sullivan—believes more should be done, especially during the next two months, but under present arrangements with RLG. Notes that Souvanna would favor such an increase.

7.

Eliminate operational restrictions on B–52s with regard to Laos.

  • OSD—Yes
  • State—check with Sullivan

Sullivan—Yes on night-time overflights, selected daylight bombing subject to clearance, and limited penetrations subject to clearance; No on blanket bombing authority or “indiscriminate” day-time overflights.

8.

Expand operations in Laos (Prairie Fire).4

  • OSD—Yes “Examine sympathetically,” have MACV and Sullivan coordinate on a selective basis.

  • State—Have MACV and Sullivan work out, subject to final approval here.

    Sullivan—prepared to work with MACV, but wishes to retain final Washington approval; indicates clearly negative attitude on battalion- or company-size operations. No to the Gung-Ho warriors; and keep Washington involved as restraint.

9.
Expand operations in Cambodia (Daniel Boone).5
  • OSD—No.
  • State—No, at least for the present, but could be subject to review depending on Sihanouk behavior.
10.
Expand and reorient NVN covert programs (Footboy).6
  • OSD—Yes (as means of getting more intelligence)
  • State—Yes in principle, but need more information to be sure proposals do not raise political problems.

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Top Secret WPB Chron., Nov.–Dec. 1967. Top Secret.↩
  2. Operations along the North Vietnamese coast up to the 20th parallel.↩
  3. A specific type of surface-to-air missile.↩
  4. Guerrilla and reconnaissance operations in the part of Laos closest to the border with Vietnam.↩
  5. Clandestine ground reconnaissance into an area in Cambodia within 20 kilometers of the South Vietnamese border.↩
  6. The overall program of clandestine operations against North Vietnam; formerly known as Operations Plan 34-Alpha.↩