Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume V,
Vietnam, 1967
309. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Wheeler) to the
Chiefs of Staff of the Army (Johnson) and
Air Force (McConnell), the
Chief of Naval Operations (Moorer), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps
(Greene)1
CM–2630–67
Washington, September 9,
1967.
SUBJ
- 1.
- I have read with great interest and very substantial agreement the
attached memorandum written by General DePuy regarding the aftermath of
the war in Vietnam. Just the other day I related to you an anecdote
concerning General Jacquot, a distinguished and very senior French
general who at one time was CINCENT, as to the effects of the French
Wars in Indochina and Algeria upon the morale and stability of the
French Armed Forces. At that time, I expressed the apprehension that
the American Armed Forces could lose the support of the American
people in pursuing the war in Vietnam.
- 2.
- General DePuy’s
memorandum carries my thought a bit further, because I was thinking
in terms of the present while he is thinking in terms of the
aftermath of the Vietnamese war. Nevertheless, I [Page 762] think his points are well taken and
should be earnestly considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Attachment
Memorandum From the Special Assistant for
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (DePuy) to the Director,
Joint Staff (Goodpaster)
Washington, September 8, 1967.
SUBJECT
- The End of the War in Vietnam and Its Aftermath
- 1.
- Without debating the desirability of the matter I am convinced
that the war in Vietnam will be brought to a close at US
initiative sometime within the next 18 months. I am further
convinced that a major effort in this direction will be mounted
no later than the traditional Christmas cease-fire in December
of this year.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services, and the
country as a whole, should be greatly concerned about the
after-taste. If US disengagement
has the flavor of a military defeat, or even military
frustration, it will take years to repair the damage to morale,
the traditions, and even the concept for employment of military
forces in the national defense.
- 3.
- We have lived through one such experience in the case of
Korea. Without reopening the details of the debate which took
place at the end of the Korean war, it can be said that public
attention was not focused on the successful defense of South
Korea but instead was focused on the restrictions and
inhibitions on the use of military force. The after-taste which
persists to this day was that the military operations had been
frustrated and were therefore not successful. However, for
reasons political and psychological, the war was terminated by
the highest authorities in the land.
- 4.
- It is not difficult to visualize a similar denouement in
Vietnam. The fact is, that the North Vietnamese have been
clearly and unmistakably prevented from taking over South
Vietnam by military force. We now are faced with the choice of
describing this as a military success or a military failure.
This is not an easy choice to make and it may even be impossible
to make such a choice, but there are some powerful reasons why
the matter should be addressed and carefully thought [Page 763] out by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff themselves and by the services individually and
collectively:
- a.
- Many brave lives have been spent and the families of
those soldiers, sailors, air men and marines deserve to
be told that these lives were not spent in vain—that
they were spent in the process of achieving a very
important national military objective—the very objective
we set out to attain in the first place.
- b.
- If the after-taste is not one of success from a
military standpoint, one can foresee enormous problems
in the post-war period in connection with the rationale
for military forces. In short, there will be many who
say that military forces are not able to cope with wars
of national liberation and that therefore, such forces
need not be maintained.
- c.
- The organization, tactics and techniques of the
military forces will be thrown open to question and
doubt as a part of the same reaction which pertains to
paragraph 4b above.
- d.
- American military forces have a tradition of success
on the battlefield from which stems much of their
strength, discipline, and effectiveness. It would be
tragic if this tradition were to be sacrificed through a
misinterpretation of the military outcome of the war in
Vietnam.
- 5.
- It is already clear that the pressures of an election year
will cause partisans of various kinds to accentuate any
differences, real or imagined, between the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and the Administration on the conduct of the war. However
well-meaning these attempts may be, and disregarding the
substance of the issues, there is a very real danger that the
net effect will suggest a military failure where in fact there
has been none.
- 6.
- What I am suggesting is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff might
find it highly desirable in the long range interests of the
United States and the armed forces to accentuate the positive in
their discussions and testimony, not so much in terms of future
prospects but in terms of concrete accomplishments already
evident from both a strategic and tactical standpoint in
Vietnam. In short, and given the limited nature of the war, the
main military objective has already been accomplished.
- 7.
- I recommend that you discuss this with the Chairman so that he
may, if he sees any merit in the proposal, in turn discuss it
with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
W. E.
DePuy
Major
General, USA