309. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army (Johnson) and Air Force (McConnell), the Chief of Naval Operations (Moorer), and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (Greene)1
Washington, September 9, 1967.
- Attached Memorandum
- I have read with great interest and very substantial agreement the attached memorandum written by General DePuy regarding the aftermath of the war in Vietnam. Just the other day I related to you an anecdote concerning General Jacquot, a distinguished and very senior French general who at one time was CINCENT, as to the effects of the French Wars in Indochina and Algeria upon the morale and stability of the French Armed Forces. At that time, I expressed the apprehension that the American Armed Forces could lose the support of the American people in pursuing the war in Vietnam.
- General DePuy’s memorandum carries my thought a bit further, because I was thinking in terms of the present while he is thinking in terms of the aftermath of the Vietnamese war. Nevertheless, I [Page 762] think his points are well taken and should be earnestly considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Earle G. Wheeler
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Col. R.N. Ginsburgh’s Reports. Secret; Eyes Only. In a September 23 covering note to the President, Rostow wrote: “Bob Ginsburgh made this sensitive in-house document available to me on a personal basis. It reflects a real anxiety among our best military; although they may be over-impressed with the Fulbrights and Galbraiths of this world.” The notation “L” on the covering note indicates that the President saw the memorandum. The memorandum can also be found at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Close-hold #3, 372–391.↩