Dear Mr. President:
I have just returned from a ten day trip to Southeast Asia for the
purpose of updating my acquaintance with the area after an absence of a
year and a half and of doing work related to the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.2 In the five days spent in
South Viet-Nam, I talked to our principal officials and visited our
major headquarters.
As a general observation, I would say that, since I left Viet-Nam, there
has been dramatic progress in resolving many of the serious problems
which I knew, particularly those which, in the past, arose from lack of
sufficient military resources to cope with the main Viet Cong threat or
derived from the chronic political instability which marked the period
from the fall of Diem to the
advent of the present Ky
Government. In the enclosure, I have endeavored to tabulate briefly some
of the most notable forms of progress which came to my attention.
Inevitably, in attacking tough problems, we either solve some
incompletely or create new ones. Thus, any observer of the Viet-Nam
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scene, impressed though he is
with the visible advances made, to give a balanced report must take note
of the many residual problems. This I have tried to do in the second
part of the enclosure.
No report is complete without a recommendation. Mine is that your
responsible officials be set to work at once to produce plans to deal
with these residual problems with a view to obtaining maximum results in
1967. Rather than depend on ad hoc task forces or individual
initiatives, I would suggest assigning this task to the Senior
Interdepartmental Group (with the membership adjusted as required) which
was set up last year by NSAM-3413 to do
precisely this kind of work in directing and coordinating complex
governmental activities overseas. In attacking these problems, we should
try to create the atmosphere of a “victory drive” to dispel any tendency
to apathy at home and to exploit the growing confidence which one senses
in Viet-Nam.
Attachment
Washington,
January 30,
1967.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: VIET-NAM VISIT, JANUARY 20–25,
1967
The following are the important impressions which I received during
my visit to Viet-Nam after an absence of a year and a half. For
convenience, the record is divided into two sections, one covering
indications of progress in the principal sectors of U.S. activities
and the second, a short tabulation of principal problem areas which
still require solution.
I. Indications of Progress
The Big War (Search and
Destroy)
It is more easy to identify progress in this sector than in most of
the other areas of GVN/U.S.
activity. It is clear that we have gained and may expect to retain
the initiative against Main Force units of the Viet Cong and the
elements of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Important engagements have been fought and won
along the border of
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South
Viet-Nam. South of the DMZ, in the I
Corps area, the Marines have decisively defeated elements of two
divisions of the NVA in the course
of Operation Hastings. Along the Cambodian border of the High
Plateau in Operation Paul Revere and subsequent engagements, the 4th
Infantry Division has beaten back elements of three NVA divisions which have intermittently
attempted to force their way out of the Cambodian base area into the
Highlands.
Concurrently with defensive operations along the borders, U.S. and
GVN forces have been successful
in actions against Viet Cong base areas which have long served as
logistic sanctuaries, the most conspicuous success being the recent
clearing of the Iron Triangle by the 1st Division and supporting
troops. This operation began January 8 and has just ended. Among its
accomplishments were the disruption of the enemy command and
logistic organization, the seizure of large quantities of supplies
to include the rice needed to feed five regiments for a year, and
184,000 pages of documents, many of which have significant
intelligence value.
There is reason to feel that our forces can continue to be successful
in bringing the enemy main forces to battle by the attack of base
areas which must be defended or abandoned at great loss, by the
exploitation of the improved quantity and quality of information
derived from documents, prisoners and informants, and by giving
better protection to the population against the foraging raids of
the Viet Cong. To live and fight, the latter must have access to the
people and their resources; an effective defense of the population
deprives them of this vital access.
In the course of ground operations, our side has been successful in
inflicting heavy losses on the VC/NVA. General
Westmoreland’s
J–2 estimates their permanent losses in 1966 (KIA, seriously wounded, captured and defected) at about
96,000 and, projecting current trends forward, forecasts that these
losses in 1967 will be of the order of 110,000. These estimates
appear to be conservative because of the low ratio of killed to
seriously wounded, 1 to 1.2, which J–2 uses in computations. The
U.S. experience figure is about 1 to 6 for KIA to all wounded and the GVN figure is approximately 1 to 2.2. The latter would
seem to be a reasonable figure to use for the VC/NVA since the ARVN do not include the lightly
wounded in their WIA reports. In defense of the low ratio which he
uses, J–2 points out that we are surely counting among the enemy
KIA many of those seriously
wounded VS who die shortly in the vicinity of the battlefield.
While the enemy casualty figures, past and projected, are encouraging
from our point of view, J–2 believes that the enemy will be able to
effect a net increase in his forces during 1967. To do so, he is
expected to infiltrate about 7,000 men a month and recruit another
7,500
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for a monthly gain of
14,500, and a total reinforcement for the year of 174,000. Thus, J–2
is counting on a net enemy gain in strength of about 64,000 for
1967.
I have the feeling, shared by many of the American officers outside
of Saigon, that these J–2 figures are unduly pessimistic. It is
understood that they are based largely on information contained from
documents and prisoner interrogations. As a review of all such
evidence is not feasible, I would be inclined to accept the J–2
estimates for planning purposes but with the feeling that there is
an ample safety factor included in them.
The military progress in Viet-Nam results in large measure from the
success and timeliness of the logistic efforts which have made
possible the introduction and support of the growing number of U.S.
forces. Our troops are magnificently equipped and supplied—if there
is a fault, it is that too much equipment not needed in this theater
has been brought with them.
They are also much better served now than formerly by the
intelligence agencies which now have vast quantities of captured
documents and large numbers of prisoners to provide the information
which was so hard to acquire in previous years. The intelligence
facilities available and procedures employed give the impression of
a high order of professionalism. As always, there is a great deal
that we do not know about such things as enemy intentions and
leadership but our commanders are now far better served than ever in
the past in Viet-Nam.
Revolutionary Development (RD)
In recognition by U.S. and GVN alike
that RD is the weak sector of our
efforts, there is a new intensification of attention and effort
which leads to hope for significantly better progress in 1967. The
causes for the sluggishness to date are numerous and are difficult
to eradicate in the short term. The level of security remains too
low in many areas to permit effective and methodical pacification.
There have been planning and organizational difficulties in
combining the resources of many agencies, GVN and U.S., into effective programs adjusted to the
special needs of the forty-three provinces. There is the chronic
shortage in the paramilitary and police forces needed to exploit the
successes of the search and destroy military operations. While the
59-man RD cadres are expanding toward
a year-end total of some 50,000, they are yet to prove themselves in
action and there is a final target figure of 80,000 to be reached to
meet estimated requirements. Even if this requirement can be met
without a notable dilution of quality, there is still considerable
question as to the capability of these cadres to spearhead the
GVN civil activities in the
fields of local government, self-help and local
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security. It may be that we are
expecting more from them than they will ever produce. At the same
time, because of the exaggerated importance attached to them, there
is the danger that, when these cadres are not available, the
province authorities will use this fact as an excuse for
inactivity.
The province chief is still a vastly overburdened official. While we
are simplifying our organization for RD by setting up the Office of Civil Operations
discussed below, Vietnamese governmental direction and resources
still reach the province chief over many channels. For military help
he must look to the ARVN command
channel; for Revolutionary Cadre, elementary education, agriculture
and public works to the Ministry of Revolutionary Development
(General Thang); for police to the head of the National Police
(Colonel Loan) and for other forms of ministerial support in such
fields as finance, industry, public health and public welfare to a
half dozen other ministers in Saigon. Until the GVN, like the U.S. Mission,
consolidates responsibility for the many forms of civil aid in
support of RD, it will never be
possible to get really efficient administration at the vital
provincial level.
These are serious obstacles which will impede progress in 1967 unless
they are overcome by energetic countermeasures. Among the latter,
the two most promising are the reorganized U.S. civil efforts in the
Office of Civil Operations under Deputy Ambassador Porter and the new emphasis on the
pacification mission of ARVN
forces.
The Office of Civil Operations (OCO)
appears soundly conceived and appropriately designed to achieve its
purpose of integrating all U.S. resources contributing to the civil
side of RD. It has just become
operational and will need several months to demonstrate its
capabilities. Its success will depend largely on the quality of the
individuals staffing the key positions.4 While
there is some skepticism in Saigon as to its ultimate effectiveness,
it is important to give it maximum support and every opportunity to
make good during the coming months. Otherwise, a more drastic
organizational solution must be sought.
A similar comment may be made with regard to the RD mission of the ARVN. The decision has been taken at
the senior ARVN level to make
available roughly half of the infantry battalions for use at the
provincial level in support of RD,
and a training program is in progress to prepare these battalions
for this assignment. There are doubts among some Americans with
regard to the eventual success of this project. Much will depend
upon the loyal acceptance of the mission by the general and
field-grade officers of ARVN. There
is no question about the
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need for these troops on RD missions
and it is essential that all U.S. influence be put behind this
decision of the Vietnamese high command to assure its effective
implementation.
While we are justified in being dissatisfied with current progress in
RD, there has been some forward
movement. Ambassador Lodge
estimates that some 59 percent of the population is now securely
under government control in contrast to the 54 percent which was
considered secure a year ago. In appraising progress, it is a
mistake to expect in the short term rapid and dramatic advances in
the RD programs. By its nature, this
kind of development will be slow. Much depends upon military success
in achieving the necessary minimum levels of security. Progress also
depends on the development of able administrators, a class which is
in critical short supply in Viet-Nam, and is not easily
improvised.
We should recognize that, in a sense, RD is a form of growth which will never be completed.
Rather, it will blend imperceptibly into the nation-building process
from which will evolve the Viet-Nam of the future. Thus, it eludes
precise measurements of progress made against short term goals.
Bombing of the North
There is no doubt in the minds of U.S. representatives in South
Viet-Nam as to the effectiveness and essentiality of the bombing
campaign in the north. They are convinced that it impedes
infiltration and imposes an ever increasing burden on the economy
and government of North Viet-Nam. The big question among the U.S.
military is how to intensify the air campaign and increase its
contribution to an early settlement. They are convinced that there
are still untouched targets which, if struck, would add materially
to the effectiveness of the present program. Such targets include
key elements of the North Vietnamese power system (such as the Hanoi
transformer); steel, cement and chemical plants supporting the war
effort; untouched components of the transportation system (locks on
the inland waterways and railroad yards); and, in high priority, the
port of Haiphong. Our commanders believe that if allowed to attack a
target system restricted only to avoid significant civilian
casualties, they could achieve greater results than now in a shorter
time and with fewer airplane losses.
Political Progress
In this sector, progress as represented by the work of the
Constitutional Assembly and the movement toward constitutional
government and presidential elections, has been most encouraging.
While there are still unresolved problems in drafting the
constitution, U.S. observers expect its promulgation on schedule in
March. Thereafter, they look to presidential elections a few months
later, probably about September,
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and hope for as successful an election as that
of September, 1966, when the delegates to the Constitutional
Assembly were elected by a vote of 80 percent of the eligible
voters.
While not ruling out the possibility of a civilian President,
American official opinion in Saigon tends to regard Generals
Ky and Thieu as the most
likely candidates. There is a difference of opinion as to which one
would make the stronger candidate. Thieu is regarded as the more
desirable in terms of experience and stability but he is not
generally popular and suffers politically from being a Catholic and
an alleged Dai Viet. Our U.S. representatives agree that it would be
most unfortunate to have a campaign in which both generals run in
competition but are inclined to believe that the military themselves
will see to it that this does not occur.
A point of complete agreement is that the USG should keep its hands off the presidential election
and allow an uninhibited expression of Vietnamese choice.5
Economic Progress
On this complex subject, it is sufficient to say that, following
devaluation, prices have tended to level off and that the pressures
of inflation, while remaining strong, appear to be under control for
the moment. The government gold reserves are about $300 million, and
we are trying to get GVN agreement
to reduce this reserve to $250 million. The Saigon Port remains a
problem but with the completion of Cam Ranh Bay and the improvement
of auxiliary ports, we have been able to meet military requirements
and to carry out an assistance program totalling $455 million in
1966. The anti-inflation line has been held but the battle is still
on and a final victory has not been won.
Progress Toward a
Settlement
There is a general feeling among our senior officials in South
Viet-Nam that progress toward a settlement is good in the sense that
we have scored successes, political and military, which create a
situation
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conducive to
successful negotiations. However, there is general uneasiness over
our negotiating positions (or lack thereof) with regard to many of
the important matters which must be dealt with in a settlement. In
Embassy Telegram 7630, October 3, 1966,6 the Embassy was authorized to undertake a
commitment to the GVN which contains
the following language:
“… the U.S. will not withdraw our troops before security is
assured or GVN is able to
cope with terrorism or while the Viet Cong infrastructure
remains intact; South Viet-Nam will not be left without
protection.”
Since that time, there have been statements like the Manila
Communiqué7 and passages in public
addresses of senior officials which appear to Saigon to be
incompatible with this commitment.
Other causes for concern include an apparent lack of comprehension in
Washington of the problems of arranging a cease-fire on acceptable
terms and a fear that we will cease our bombing of the north either
as a price for the initiation of negotiations or in exchange for
unverifiable assurances of some sort from Hanoi. There is no
agreement as to how we would behave if the enemy should avail
themselves of the so called “fade away” option. The feeling is that
we should move rapidly to develop positions on these points before
we are surprised by Hanoi initiatives.
II. Problems
Our principal remaining problems in South Viet-Nam are those arising
from the inadequacy of progress made to date in the sectors
discussed above. On the Big War front, a primary question is how
best to use U.S. ground forces during the coming year. MACV has indicated in the 1967
Campaign Plan the intention to continue the primary effort of U.S.
forces against the Main Forces of the VC/NVA and to intensify
that effort by continuous aggressive actions against enemy units and
bases with priority given to areas which contain 77 percent of the
population of South Viet-Nam. At the same time, the plan recognizes
the necessity for supporting RD
without specifying the level of U.S. effort. This is a mission
which, if uncontrolled, could generate requirements for large
increases in U.S. forces and, hence, needs to be carefully
monitored.
For the moment, four U.S. infantry battalions are earmarked to
support RD in the old battleground of
Long An Province southeast of
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Saigon. This will be as a test of the effectiveness of U.S.
forces operating against small guerrilla bands deeply imbedded in a
heavy rural population. Until firm conclusions can be drawn from
this experience, I would hope that we would not commit any more of
our forces in this kind of static mission.8
To avoid further demands for U.S. troops on this kind of duty, we
have the problem of getting an adequate return from the ARVN units committed to the new
pacification mission. RD is
essentially a Vietnamese job and we will make a great mistake if we
try to take it over.
Our best contribution to RD can be
made through an efficient execution of the mission of the OCO. By example, we must induce the
GVN to tidy up its organization
for RD, something fairly easy to do
if General Thang’s Ministry for Revolutionary Development were given
broader powers. But if we can never entirely perfect the GVN performance in this field, there is
no excuse for ineffectiveness of the U.S. effort. Henceforth we have
two large U.S. organizations working side by side, MACV representing our military
resources and OCO representing the
non-military. Together, they must work out and implement
interlocking plans which will keep the civil effort geared in place
and time to the progress of the military campaign. Too often in the
past, the latter has run away from the former so that military
success has resulted in no permanent gain in RD. It would seem reasonable to give OCO about six months to prove itself
and then review the situation.
Although I have mentioned the favorable progress toward
constitutional government, success in this field is so critical that
all remaining problems related to it should be watched closely to
assure timely resolution. But too much zeal on the U.S. side can be
harmful. To have maximum lasting effect, this must be a genuine
Vietnamese success without direct U.S. influence or involvement in
shaping the outcome.
In preparing for a settlement of this conflict, we have the problem
of eliminating the uncertainties and of firming positions on the
points mentioned in the discussion above. Specifically, we need
answers to such key questions as the following:9
- a.
- What price should we exact for the cessation of bombing in
the north?
- b.
- What forms of verification are essential to protect
ourselves against unfulfilled Communist promises or the
traps of a phony de-escalation?
- c.
- What role in negotiations will we concede to the GVN and to our allies who are
contributing military forces?
- d.
- How will we avoid a stalemate in negotiations on the
pattern of Panmunjom?
- e.
- How can we prepare U.S. and international public opinion
for the tough positions which the U.S. must take in any
settlement which will achieve our basic objective of an
independent Viet-Nam free from aggression?
There is an overall problem which is the critical one—how to make
1967 the year of victory in Viet-Nam. There is a fair chance to do
so but it will require a maximum, simultaneous effort across the
whole range of U.S./GVN activities.
We must do better in our ground operations in the south, raise the
level of the air operations in the north, inaugurate a
constitutional president, hold the line against inflation and show
significant progress in RD in the
principal areas of population. If we can do these things in Viet-Nam
while conducting ourselves at home in such a way as to show that,
regardless of pressures, the U.S. will not change its course, I have
the feeling that the Vietnamese situation may change drastically for
the better by the end of 1967.
