Office of the Historian

311. Memorandum From the Presidentʼs Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson1

Washington, November 17, 1966.

Pacification Organization Moving at Last. Your Tuesday blast led Rusk to send a tough cable2 which finally unfroze Lodge and Porter (I did a few back channel words to the wise myself).3

Lodge is now in with three long replies (attached)4 which essentially buy our proposals. Suggest you read only sidelined portions. The only significant resistance is that Westy refuses to assign a top Deputy for pacification but is otherwise strengthening his staff. I donʼt worry about this because Westy is really turning around and will in time see the logic of a Deputy. He told me privately he intends to put Major General Weyand (whoʼs tops) in as J–5 on pacification—a big step in the right direction.

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I hope youʼll forgive me if I feel pretty good about all this. It took four months of backstairs wheeling and dealing to get us even this far (plus some bruised feelings), but the fact that you showed everyone you backed me turned the trick.

I think (as you do, judging from your latest letter to Lodge)5 that even the new civilian organization wonʼt really be able to do the job, and that if we want solid results by end-1967 weʼll have to give it to Westy.6 But at least weʼve already gone 25% of the way in the right direction. Your letter will set Lodge himself to thinking about whether to go the rest of the way.

If he doesnʼt, the time to take the next bite may be when Lodge leaves. Iʼm sure heʼd like to switch no later than next spring (heʼd dearly love Rome and the Vatican as a reward), though I believe him when he says heʼll stay as long as his Commander-in-Chief wants him. However, I strongly believe that decisive results in 1967 demand an Ambassador who can take hold and manage that sprawling empire. Iʼm sure McNamara would agree.

If you switched Lodge next February (after the 90–120 days are up), this change in ambassadors could cover up the shift of pacification responsibilities. I wish I could offer you a top notch name (a McNamara, Mac Bundy, or Katzenbach type). Iʼll keep thinking, as I doubt that youʼll have any more important appointment to make before November 1968. If Iʼm getting over my head, just tell me so.

R.W. Komer
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Memos to the President. Secret. The source text is marked with an indication that the President saw the memorandum.↩
  2. Telegram 85196 to Saigon, November 15; see footnote 1, Document 304. The President presumably delivered his “Tuesday blast” during his luncheon meeting on Tuesday, November 15, with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Komer, and Moyers. The meeting lasted from about 2:05 to 3:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) No record of the discussion has been found.↩
  3. See footnote 1, Document 310.↩
  4. Attached but not printed are telegrams 11124 and 11125, November 17. The third telegram from Lodge has not been identified.↩
  5. Document 310.↩
  6. In telegram WDC 13803 to Westmoreland, November 23, General Johnson stated: “The more I ruminate about the rate of progress in Vietnam and the inevitable relationship to our own elections in 1968, the more convinced I am that you will be given full responsibility for the program [revolutionary development] sometime after the first of the year.” (Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files)↩