312. Editorial Note
In a 34-page draft memorandum for the President, November 17, 1966, Secretary McNamara recommended that a supplemental appropriation request totaling $12.4 billion be submitted to Congress in January 1967. He also recommended that “forces totaling 469,000 be approved, for planning and budgeting purposes, for deployment to SVN [Page 851] by June 30, 1968.” A copy of Secretary McNamaraʼs memorandum is in the Johnson Library, Warnke Papers, McNaughton Files, McNTN VII. A substantial portion of the first 22 pages is printed in The Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, volume IV, pages 133–135, 365–385. In explaining the operational concept that underlay his recommendations, Secretary McNamara first discussed “Military Strategy in Vietnam” (pages 7–17) and then “Consolidation and Extension of GVN Control” (pages 17–22), incorporating and developing many of the points made in his October 14 memorandum to the President (Document 268). In a final section (pages 23–24), he provided his reasons for specific program recommendations and the costs by major area of activity.
The opening paragraphs of Secretary McNamaraʼs discussion of “Military Strategy in Vietnam” read as follows:
“The war in Vietnam has two highly interdependent parts: (1) the ‘regular’ war against the main force VC/NVA battalions and regiments, and the interdiction of their men and supplies flowing down from North Vietnam, and (2) the ‘Pacification’ or revolutionary development war to neutralize the local VC guerrillas and gain the permanent support of the SVN population.
“The infiltrated men and supplies serve to bolster the regular units whose function is to support the local VC guerrillas and infrastructure by defeating the GVN forces in the area and generally exposing the GVNʼs inability to protect the rural populace. The local guerrillas and infrastructure maintain a constant VC presence in their area and support the offensive efforts of the regular units by providing intelligence, terrain guidance, supplies, and recruits. In addition, the guerrillas conduct many of the thousands of incidents of terror, harassment, and sabotage reported each month. The principal task of U.S. military forces in SVN must be to eliminate the offensive capability of the regular units in order to allow the GVN to counter the guerrilla forces and extend permanent control over areas from which regular units have been cleared.
“We now face a choice of two approaches to the threat of the regular VC/NVA forces. The first approach would be to continue in 1967 to increase friendly forces as rapidly as possible, and without limit, and employ them primarily in large-scale ‘seek out and destroy’ operations to destroy the main force VC/NVA units.
“This approach appears to have some distinct disadvantages. First, we are finding very strongly diminishing marginal returns in the destruction of VC/NVA forces. If our estimates of enemy losses (killed, captured and defected) are correct, VC/NVA losses increased by only 115 per week (less than 15%) during a period in which we increased friendly strength by 160,000 including 140,000 U.S. military personnel and 42 U.S. and Third Country maneuver battalions. At this rate, an additional 100,000 friendly personnel deployed would increase VC/ [Page 852] NVA losses by some 70 per week. Second, expanding U.S. deployments have contributed to a very serious inflation in South Vietnam. Prices increased 75–90% in FY66. An extra 100,000 U.S. forces would add at least P9 billion to our piaster expenditures, doubling the 1967 inflationary gap in SVN. Third, the high and increasing cost of the war to the United States is likely to encourage the Communists to doubt our staying power and to try to ‘wait us out.’
“The second approach is to follow a similarly aggressive strategy of ‘seek out and destroy,’ but to build friendly forces only to that level required to neutralize the large enemy units and prevent them from interfering with the pacification program. It is essential to this approach that such a level be consistent with a stable economy in SVN, and consistent with a military posture that the United States credibly would maintain indefinitely, thus making a Communist attempt to ‘wait us out’ less attractive.
“I believe that this level is about 470,000 U.S. and 52,000 Free World personnel and less than half of the ARVN.* The remainder of the ARVN, plus a portion of the U.S. force, would give priority to improving the pacification effort. The enemy regular units would cease to perform what I believe to be their primary function of diverting our effort to give security to the population. This, plus the effects of a successful interdiction campaign to cut off their other support, would effectively neutralize them, possibly at the cost of far fewer casualties to both sides than the first approach would allow.
“*Admiral Sharp has recommended a 12/31/67 U.S. strength of 570,000. However, I believe both he and General Westmoreland recognize that the danger of inflation will probably force a 6/30/68 deployment limit of about 470,000. [Footnote in the source text.]
“I believe it is time to adopt the second approach for three reasons: (1) if MACV estimates of enemy strength are correct, we have not been able to attrite the enemy forces fast enough to break their morale and more U.S. forces are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future; (2) we cannot deploy more than about 470,000 personnel by the end of 1967 without a high probability of generating a self-defeating runaway inflation in SVN and (3) an endless escalation of U.S. deployments is not likely to be acceptable in the U.S. or to induce the enemy to believe that the U.S. is prepared to stay as long as is required to produce a secure non-communist SVN. Obviously a greatly improved pacification campaign must be waged to take advantage of the protection offered by the major friendly forces. Alternatively, if enemy strength is greatly overstated and our ‘seek out and destroy’ operations have been more effective than our strength and loss estimates would imply—a possibility discussed below—more than 470,000 U.S. personnel should not be required to neutralize the VC/NVA main force.”