Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

304. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, November 12, 1966, 2:02 p.m.

83699. For Ambassador from Secretary, SecDef and Komer. Ref: (a) Saigonʼs 10204; (b) Stateʼs 78865.²

1. We appreciate your views in reftel (a). Your review of organizational problems has been helpful to us.

2. We would like now to proceed immediately with measures on US and GVN side to get RD program moving forward effectively.

3. Re para 20 reftel (a),³ realize you were not in position discuss our proposal in sufficiently wide circle. You are authorized now to discuss this and reftel (b) with Ambassador Porter and General Westmoreland and, once plans mature, inform members Mission Council.

4. Following steps need to be taken promptly if we are, in the time available, to give adequate test to organization which is intended to keep RD civilian functions under civilian management, an objective to which we know you attach considerable importance. These steps have already been discussed reftel (b) which should continue to serve as general guide. We would like you to prepare articulated plan to put these measures into effect as soon as possible, carefully delineating and defining US civilian and military responsibilities, with particular attention to most effective relationship among Ambassador Porter, his new military deputy and Gen. Westmoreland and his new RD/P deputy or special assistant.

A. Mission directive should be issued providing that Ambassador Porter, working under your general supervision, should, pursuant para 1 reftel (b) take explicit operational charge of all personnel and programs carrying out RD/P civilian functions, including public safety, province reps and any other pertinent USAID elements; JUSPAO; CIA cadre and other RD/P programs; and military to the extent that civilian functions have been assigned to them.

B. Mission directive should include new organizational pattern at regional, provincial and district level, putting premium on effective coordination with each province of all activities related to RD/P.

C. Mission directive should also reiterate that Ambassador Porter is freed of any Mission duties other than RD direction and that provision is made for the direction of all other Mission business during your absence (for example, during your coming leave) by a designated officer, whether or not it is considered essential that Ambassador Porter be nominally in charge. Same directive should create staff for Ambassador Porter adequate to support him in discharge of these responsibilities.

D. You and Ambassador Porter will wish to work out with General Westmoreland most expeditious means of accomplishing following, calling on Washington for additional authority or funds as necessary:

(1) Assignment of principal deputy and executive officer to Ambassador Porter, being general officer of two or three-star rank. This would require immediate consultation with General Westmoreland to secure most appropriate officer.

(2) Designation by General Westmoreland of separate Deputy or Special Assistant for Pacification to MACV.

(3) Preparation of realistic and detailed plan by MACV with assistance Ambassador Porter for bringing about change in mission for bulk of ARVN to responsibility for local security and coordination of such activities with RD Ministry priorities and plans. This should utilize MACV relations with leading GVN military officials, including use of all leverage provided through MAP and Adviser Program, and should draw on maximum support as necessary from yourself and high-level officials Washington. We are aware of resistance among top-ranking GVN military, including Corps Commanders, but believe time has come to take on this problem and find successful way to press ARVN to devote sufficient military muscle to accomplish this task, which, as you say, is the foundation of the RD/P program. This is task for entire Mission. Load inevitably falls most heavily on MACV and on you who must keep heat on Ky and Thieu. Your election analogy (para 8 reftel (a))⁴ suggests that when Vietnamese wish to take on task analogous to what we are advocating, they can do so.

(4) Should either you or General Westmoreland have reservations concerning these actions, please raise specific alternatives with us immediately.

(5) Re para 3 reftel (a), we understand General Westmoreland plans use of limited number US forces in buddy system principle to guide and motivate ARVN in RD/P. However, we have serious doubts about any further involvement US troops beyond this in straight pacification operations. We fear this would tempt Vietnamese to leave this work more and more to us and we believe pacification, with its intimate contact with population, more appropriate for Vietnamese forces, who must after all, as arm of GVN, establish constructive relations with population. Hence we believe there should be no thought of US taking on substantial share of pacification. The urgent need is to begin effectively pressing ARVN.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Unger; cleared by McNamara, Helms, Gaud, Marks, and Komer; and approved by Rusk and Katzenbach. In telegram 85196 to Saigon, November 15, Rusk told Lodge and Porter that telegram 83699 “was discussed today at highest levels, who wished to emphasize that this represents final and considered decision.” (Ibid.)
2. See Document 290 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. In paragraph 20, Lodge requested authority to discuss the proposal in telegram 78865 with the “heads of the different mission agencies involved here.”
4. In paragraph 8, Lodge noted how U.S. troops, working in conjunction with South Vietnamese forces, provided protection for voters on election day, September 11.