Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966

199. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹

Washington, August 2, 1966, 6:10 p.m.

20124. For Goldberg. Dept. has given most serious study to ICRC proposal (Urtel 466).² We commend you for handling discussion with great delicacy. We endorse fully your view that proposal must be handled with great care and that ICRC channel may offer possible fresh avenue to probe Hanoiʼs present intentions.

Onus for any rejection of proposal should rest on Hanoi and not on US. Our willingness to continue to probe possibilities of peace talks through this channel should help our position both internationally and domestically. Note verbale which we providing you is drafted on assumption that at some point, if proposal is not accepted by Hanoi, it might be advantageous to have it surfaced publicly. We fully agree, however, that for the time being this should be treated as a matter of utmost sensitivity.

General posture we wish to strike is appearance of being forthcoming without giving up any points of principle. In particular, we wish assure our response fully accords with frequently stated US readiness engage in unconditional discussions which might help terminate conflict in Viet Nam. We assume ICRC suggestion for broad conference on all humanitarian problems, based on resolution X,³ would logically involve discussion of ways to end conflict.

Recent reports of Hanoi mood and intentions are contradictory but merit further study. On one hand, Hanoi has recently moved one additional division to SVN. On other hand, there appears to be some difference between Hanoi and Peking on continuing validity of Geneva Agreements. Also noteworthy is timing of Hanoiʼs statement that foreign volunteers not now needed,⁴ coming as it does on heels of Bucharest Declaration.⁵ In short, these recent moves might presage some willingness on Hanoiʼs part to decelerate present trend of escalation, and we of course would be interested in probing meanings of these moves in very private and quiet manner.

Following is text note verbale you may give Gonard:

The US Government has studied carefully the note verbale given to Ambassador Goldberg by Samuel Gonard, President of the ICRC, suggesting that a conference be held under the auspices of the ICRC which would not be limited solely to the study of humanitarian problems arising out of the application of the Geneva Conventions as such, “but that its scope should be extended to include also the study of those problems arising out of the methods employed in the conduct of military operations.” Consistent with its position that it is prepared to engage in unconditional discussions, the US would be ready also to discuss all humanitarian problems “over and beyond the strict application of the Geneva Conventions” as suggested by the ICRC.

The ICRC has asked whether the US would be willing to take now certain measures susceptible of facilitating the convening of such a conference. The US looks sympathetically on this request. The ICRC can state unequivocally to the government at Hanoi, that it is satisfied the US is ready to engage in discussions on an abatement of the Viet Nam conflict and would be willing to accept a reduction of hostilities on a reciprocal basis, either prior to or during a conference.

In addition to delivering the above note, you should make the following points orally to Gonard:

1. You should stress that when the US speaks of reduced military activities on a reciprocal basis, we are obviously including bombing of the North as one of the elements. While US cannot agree to a formal bombing pause except as part of a reciprocal reduction of hostilities accepted by Hanoi, you may reaffirm to Gonard that if he decides to pursue matter personally in Hanoi he need have no fear for his safety as far as US bombing concerned. You may add that if his efforts succeed in bringing about a meeting of the type he envisages, we would be prepared to consider sympathetically steps to facilitate such discussions.

Moreover, we would be prepared to consider indications of an informal nature by Hanoi as to what it would do on its side by way of a reduction of hostilities; and would consider carefully indications that Hanoi was in fact reducing its infiltration or other operations, recognizing always that we would have to observe carefully whether such a reduction was in fact taking place and being continued. FYI: We had recent indicationfrom Sainteny report⁶ that some Hanoi leaders recognized that they would have to do something on their side if we were ever to consider suspending or ceasing bombing. However, we have always recognized the difficulty they might face in saying something for the record as to what they would do or were doing. End FYI.

2. We remain concerned that ICRC initiative not result in effort to trade off safety of POWs for cessation of bombings of North Viet Nam. Should we continue discussions on wider issues as outlined by Gonard, we would feel free to discuss all aspects of military activities, including Viet Cong terrorism in South—not just bombing of North.

3. We continue to believe that first step would be for Gonard to go to Hanoi. As you have told him, depending on reaction he receives there, further consideration could be given to question of whether Viet Cong participation in conference is an important element.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Sisco and Buffum, cleared in draft by William Bundy and Harriman, and approved by Rusk.
2. Responding to a question about possible war crimes trials in Hanoi for U.S. prisoners, President Johnson had indicated in his press conference on July 20 that the United States was ready to participate in an ICRC-sponsored conference on the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the Vietnam conflict. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, p. 744) In telegram 466 from Geneva, July 26, Goldberg transmitted a proposal from the ICRC to convene a conference that would seek a more general settlement of the conflict. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, TS/Nodis, vol. III) Rostowʼs notes of the Tuesday lunch meeting on August 2 state: “ICRC language was changed. President uneasy about drafting of that.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Meetings with the President)
3. Resolution X, adopted at the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, encouraged the ICRC to undertake efforts to prevent or settle armed conflicts.
4. Not further identified.
5. In the Bucharest Declaration, issued July 6, Warsaw Pact members meeting in Bucharest proclaimed their readiness to allow volunteers to go to Vietnam if the DRV requested it. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 832–834.
6. See Document 182 for a report on Saintenyʼs trip to Hanoi.