Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

69. Memorandum From Richard C. Bowman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, July 21, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Goodpaster Study on Vietnam

The attached study was prepared at the direction of the Chairman by a small group working under General Goodpaster. It has no endorsement at the moment, and, therefore, should be treated as a non-study. However, some of the contents could be useful to you as background for the coming discussions on Vietnam.

The study advocates a two-fold approach:

(1) Stepped-up air offensive against transportation and military targets in NVN with later extension to industrial targets as necessary (but no attacks on population).

(2) Use of U.S. and third country forces to eliminate the Viet Cong regular battalions (the 44 battalion force previously recommended was considered probably sufficient).

In furthering the interdiction of supply routes, the study recommends that the route nine type barrier be established as “experience is gained and capability is developed.”

This looks like an excellent military concept, but the other half of the equation is equally important—an intense program to win over the peasant population and the Viet Cong irregulars, themselves.

Dick

Attachment²

Washington, Washington, July 14, 1965.

INTENSIFICATION OF THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM: CONCEPT AND APPRAISAL—REPORT OF AN AD HOC STUDY GROUP

[Here follows a table of contents.]

Directive

This study was prepared in response to an oral directive of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 2 July 1965, to prepare for his use an assessment of the assurance the US can have of winning in SVN if we do “everything we can.”

The study was prepared by an ad hoc staff group under the direction of the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with representation from that office and the Chairman’s Special Studies Group, the Defense Intelligence Agency, J-3, and the Joint War Games Agency.

Summary Report

1. As directed, a study group has assessed the assurance the US can have of winning in SVN if we do “everything we can.”

2. The limitations of the resulting assessment require specific note. It is not final nor is it complete in detail. For operations within SVN, the assessment does not address explicitly the task of providing territorial security, but rather is focused upon operations against VC/DRV battalion-size units. Even for such operations, the military judgment involved in arriving at expected results is as difficult and complex as it is important. Exact, certain solutions cannot be achieved. Time has not permitted discussions with COMUSMACV or CINCPAC. Such should immediately be undertaken, and further work in detail then addressed to the key issues, particularly the results we can expect from offensive ground/air action against VC/DRV battalion-size units in SVN.

3. Nevertheless, a responsive over-all appraisal addressed to the central question can already be given. It amounts to a conditional affirmative, as follows: Within the bounds of reasonable assumptions (particularly as set out below) there appears to be no reason we cannot win if such is our will—and if that will is manifested in strategy and tactical operations.

4. While there are important uncertainties and unknowns, there is little probability that they could invalidate this judgment, providing the assumptions hold true. The key question appears to resolve itself into a matter of means and willingness to use the means. Neither the means visualized, nor the use of these means, appears to go beyond the bounds of reason, realism or prudence. It is possible to outline them with a fair degree of definition.

5. Before doing so, specific note should be taken of the major assumptions which limit the scope of the study and condition the over-all conclusion stated above. They are, in summary, as follows:

a. China and Russia will not intervene with armed forces, overtly or covertly, so long as there is no US/SVN land invasion of NVN.

b. Restrictions on US/SVN use of force do not exceed the following:

(1) No land invasion of NVN by US/SVN forces.

(2) No use of nuclear weapons or chemical weapons.

(3) No mass bombing of population per se.

c. Once the concept envisaged in this study is approved by higher authority, operations within the scope of the proposed strategy will not be subject to restriction, delay, or planning uncertainties. This implies that the GVN will cooperate as necessary to this end.

d. Operational coordination between US and SVN forces meets minimum acceptable professional standards of effectiveness.

e. Neither the government nor the population of SVN turns against the US and demands withdrawal.

6. “Winning” in SVN, as referred to above, involves achieving an outcome somewhere between, as a maximum, an end to insurgency by DRV/VC decision and as an acceptable minimum, containment of the insurgency, except for minor areas and minor acts of violence, with an end to the need for the presence of substantial US forces. This outcome, the assessment indicates, can be achieved. Hopefully, the VC/DRV will become convinced that they cannot win in SVN, that continued efforts will be extremely costly, and that time is on the side of the Free World. But even if they fight on, it should be possible to attain the minimum cited above. (Outcomes such as complete loss of the area, further erosion, “losing slowly,” and “begging down” in a series of beleaguered coastal enclaves or in inconclusive jungle combat are judged to represent failing rather than winning in the area, and are rejected.)

7. To achieve a “winning” outcome in the above sense requires a substantial step-up in the scope and effectiveness of US/SVN operations in the area. Sources for this step-up include the following, all of which are required:

a. Additional forces.

b. Removal of restrictions, restraints and sources of delay and planning uncertainty.

c. Adoption of a strategy for winning the war; such a strategy must be based upon taking the offensive, and gaining and holding the initiative.

d. Adoption of a concept of tactical operations in SVN which exploits the offensive, with the object of putting the VC/DRV battalion forces out of operation.

8. Of these, strategy sets the framework. The strategy contained in the study and outlined below envisages establishing in Southeast Asia a heavy preponderance of US/SVN military power over the VC/DRV, provides a concept for the employment of these forces in the next six to eight months, sets forth objectives and weight of attack for an integrated, interrelated effort involving operations against North Vietnam and operations in South Vietnam, together with action against infiltration in Laos and elsewhere, and indicates broad factors of timing, priority, and coordination between these principal courses of action. This strategy, which is considered feasible and well-calculated to give high assurance of winning in SVN, is set forth in essential outline below. It presupposes the removal of restrictions, delays and planning uncertainties, as well as the completion of preparatory coordinating arrangements at governmental and military level with the South Vietnamese and, to the extent required, with the Thais and Laotians.

9. The basic concept is that allied forces (US, SVN and third country), by aggressive exploitation of superior military force, gain and keep the initiative both in SVN and against NVN, keeping the DRV and VC at a disadvantage, keeping the tempo such as to deny them time to recuperate or regain their balance, progressively destroying the war-supporting power of North Vietnam, and pressing the fight against VC/DRV main force units in SVN to run them to ground and destroy them. The object is to cause them to stop the war, or to render them ineffective if they seek to pursue it. The operations combine to compel the VC/DRV to fight at higher and more sustained intensity with resulting greater logistical consumption and concurrently attack his LOC to limit his capability to resupply forces in combat at this scale.

a. Operations against North Vietnam. The object is two-fold—to bring about a DRV decision to stop the war or, failing this, at a minimum, to cut down and limit sharply the support by the DRV of VC/DRV forces in SVN at the same time being prepared to limit the introduction of additional DRV forces into SVN, if attempted, in order to permit containment of the insurgency in the south. By sustained air action the following main categories of targets should be attacked, with timing as indicated:

(1) Prior to the initiation of large-scale offensive operations by US forces in South Vietnam, transportation throughout the DRV should be attacked in all its components, to include attack on LOC (including locks) and vehicles, attack on POL, and mining of harbors. In addition, attacks should be conducted on military supplies and equipment, to include attacks on depots, arsenals, barracks and service installations, together with attacks on electric power facilities.

(2) If the DRV and VC continue the war in South Vietnam after the foregoing attacks have been accomplished, the attack should be extended to include industrial facilities and, to the extent feasible, agricultural resources.

(3) At any time required to prevent interference or threatened interference with the above, US/SVN forces should attack the DRV counterair capability, to include radars, AAA,SAMs, MIGs, and IL-28s. (In this connection, it should be noted that strong factors even now weigh in favor of such strikes.)

b. Action against infiltration routes. With the object of cutting down the numbers of men and quantities of supplies moving into SVN, the following major operations should be conducted:

(1) The present surveillance operation should be intensified and increased surveillance of waterborne traffic from Cambodia should be instituted.

(2) Air attack should be intensified against land infiltration routes in Laos and border areas of SVN, to include attacks on lines of communication (roads and bridges, depots, truck parks, bivouacs and rest areas), attack of vehicles and of troop units in movement or deployed for security of the LOC. Intelligence efforts should be intensified and restrictions removed (e.g., defoliation should be experimented with), with the object of determining route locations and gaining timely information on vehicle and troop movements.

(3) Ground action should be undertaken against land infiltration in Laos and SVN, expanding operations toward an effective barrier as experience is gained and capability is developed. As feasible, blocking positions should be established, supplies seized or destroyed, and DRV/VC route security forces harassed or destroyed.

c. Military operations in South Vietnam. The object is to put VC/DRV battalion forces out of operation, i.e., to destroy them or cause their disintegration as fighting forces capable of interfering with SVN pacification (territorial security) operations. Basing action primarily on offensive land and air operations of US, RVNAF and third-country forces, the concept is to locate and destroy VC/DRV forces, bases and war-supporting organizations in SVN. For the present, the area of such operations will be the zones of the I Corps and the II Corps, and the northern portion of the III Corps zone, with initial priority of effort to those areas most critical to the success of the offensive. Concentrations of VC forces should be aggressively sought out and attacked by mobile land forces employed in coordination with air forces utilized for close support operations or for general preparatory attack. Maximum effort will be made to avoid piecemeal reaction to VC attacks, thus exposing forces to ambush, and instead to place primary emphasis on launching coordinated attacks to destroy VC units. Maximum effort should be applied to monitoring VC activities, employing all intelligence techniques, to include indigenous sources as well as more sophisticated surveillance techniques, including large-scale, light-plane spotter activity.

10. The concept of tactical operations for the offensive within SVN is, at the present time, the heart of this problem, and the uncertainties that exist must be squarely recognized and acknowledged. With limited and local exceptions, the course of the war to date in SVN does not provide experience directly approximating what is now visualized. Lacking such operations, we cannot assert with certainty that tactics can be devised and operations conducted that will, in fact, put the DRV/VC battalions out of operation and keep them so. Nevertheless, several avenues of operation which are available permit a high order of confidence that such can be achieved:

a. Operations to locate and attack VC/DRV units to destroy them or render them ineffective as fighting units.

b. Operations to clear and occupy the base areas from which VC/DRV units operate and are supported.

c. Operations to establish major areas of strength, for example, in the central highlands or other major infiltration avenues, to interdict DRV support for the VC.

11. Closely connected with the foregoing concepts is a further assumption not previously stated: recognizing that it is necessary both to put the VC/DRV battalion-size units out of operation, and to provide security to the territory and the people of SVN if we are to win, it is assumed that if the US, SVN and third countries succeed in accomplishing the former, the SVN with no more than advisory assistance and limited support from the US can achieve and maintain the latter. These assumptions appear reasonable, but they warrant closer study by our top commanders and officials in SVN.

12. The heavy preponderance of force required for this strategy can only be achieved with substantial additional US and third-country ground forces. Forces adequate to initiate such a strategy can be provided from SVN forces plus the 44 battalions of US and ROK forces under consideration for deployment within the next few months. These should be able to establish superiority and turn the tide of battle in favor of the US/SVN. Whether they will be enough to sustain the offensive to achieve the “winning outcome,” or whether such a result will require the commitment of further US and third-country forces, is a question that cannot be answered at this time. It is dependent in part on whether the DRV introduces added forces into SVN, upon the evolving total requirement as the number of surviving VC/DRV battalions declines, and upon the ability of the SVN to shift added forces to this role as such a decline occurs. Rough estimates suggest, however, that additional forces amounting to 7-35 further battalions could prove to be required, depending upon whether the US/SVN operation can be limited to a zone such as that of the I, II, and III Corps, or must be extended to cover the delta region as well.

13. A parallel increase in tactical air forces is also required. Several months will be required to deploy the added ground forces and commit them to combat, and it is appropriate to phase in the tactical air for close air support on a comparable schedule, thus permitting earlier concentration on the air campaign against NVN—as is tactically desirable in any event. On this basis, a requirement is foreseen for the 4 additional squadrons now planned as soon as bases are available, for 6 to 9 additional squadrons within the remainder of this year, and for a substantial increase in the B-52 force available in the Western Pacific for conventional operations. Analysis of capabilities for rapid building of additional air fields, employing aluminum matting, indicates that additional bases adequate for at least 9 of these 10 to 13 squadrons can be made operationally ready by the end of this year.

14. The end results that can be expected to be achieved in NVN, along the infiltration routes, and in SVN through taking action along the lines presented in this study are estimated to be as follows:

a. Air operations against NVN. The stepped-up program of air strikes should reduce in major degree the ability of the NVN to support the insurgency in SVN. The SAMs, MIGs, and IL-28s can be effectively eliminated. By attacks against the planned target system, particularly POL and railroads, roads, and waterways, together with mining of harbors, the DRV will be sharply limited in their ability to support VC/DRV forces in SVN at the intensified level of combat envisaged, and will in particular be limited in their capability to reinforce the VC with effective units of division size.

b. Attack against infiltration routes. When the intensity of combat operations in SVN is raised to the extent envisaged and the logistical requirements for VC/DRV forces have been correspondingly increased, the combination of more effective surveillance of sea routes, together with air and ground action against the routes through Laos, should materially limit the ability of VC/DRV forces to move personnel and supplies to SVN, and to withstand the pressure of attacks within SVN. One effect will be the delay of overt introduction of DRV forces into SVN by requiring such movement to be conducted at reduced march rates over long distances.

c. Military operations in SVN. Presently organized and planned GVN forces, except for reserve battalions (possibly including a limited number of ranger and infantry battalions), would retain control over areas now held, extend pacification operations and area control where permitted by the progress of major offensive operations, defend critical installations and areas against VC attack and seek out and eliminate VC militia units. US,SVN, and third-country forces, by offensive land and air action, would locate and destroy VC/DRV forces, bases and major war-supporting organizations in SVN. The cumulative effect of sustained, aggressive conduct of offensive operations, coupled with the interdiction of DRV efforts to provide the higher level of support required in such a combat environment, should lead to progressive destruction of the VC/DRV main force battalions.

[Here follows the full report.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII. Top Secret.
2. Top Secret. The full report is 128 pages long. For information on the background of the report and reactions to it, see William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part III: January-July 1965 (Princeton, N.J., 1989), pp. 359-365.