Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

54. Telegram From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, July 7, 1965, 11:52 p.m.

DEF 5319. Exclusive for Ambassador Taylor. From SecDef signed McNamara. The main purpose of our visit will be to receive from you your recommendations for the number of US combat battalions, artillery battalions, engineering battalions, helicopter companies, tactical aircraft, and total military personnel to be assigned to South Vietnam between now and the end of this year; the time schedule on which such forces are required; the results which we can expect to achieve with such force levels compared to those of alternative programs; the probable requirements for additional forces next year; and the program of political contacts which you propose as a complement to your military actions—we will wish to discuss possible additional political initiatives of our own, third party initiatives, our dealings with the Soviets, and the possibility of some form of contact with DRV and/or NLF.²

The two most basic questions we will ask in relation to your recommendations for expanding US forces will be:

A. Assuming your proposals are fully accepted, what assurance do we have that with the resulting force level we can³ prove to the Viet Cong they cannot win, and thereby force them to a settlement on our terms?

B. Will large increases in the number and involvement of US combat units and military personnel in South Vietnam cause the Vietnamese Government, and especially the Army, to let up; will it create adverse popular reactions to our presence in the country?

Subsidiary questions will include:

1. How did you determine the number of US and ARVN battalions required to effectively counter the current or prospective Viet Cong forces?

2. Where do you propose to station US combat units and where and how will they be used; what casualties do you expect?

3. How long do you think it will take with your recommended forces (a) to seize the initiative, (b) to prove to the Viet Cong that they cannot win, and (c) thereby to force them to a settlement on our terms?

4. ⁴ Would it be wise to withdraw GVN military and paramilitary forces from certain outlying or exposed positions in order to concentrate in positions of strength and to reduce the penalties of the serious shortage of Government troops?

5. What reaction to the expansion of US and third-country forces do you expect from the VC and the DRV?

6. Is the currently approved construction program adequate for the expanded force?

7. Is the current MAP program adequate?

8. What command arrangements do you propose for the expanded US force when engaged in combat?

9. What program of military pressure (bombing, mining, etc.) against North Vietnam, in terms of the types of targets, level of effort, etc., do you propose for the next six months as a complement to your plan of action in the South?

10. How effective has been the bombing of the Laotian infiltration routes; what Laotian bombing program do you recommend for the future in terms of specific targets and level of effort?

11. How effective have been the B-52 strikes; assuming 800 B-52 sorties are available each month, what bombing program do you recommend for the future in terms of specific targets and level of effort?

12. Exclusive of B-52 sorties, how many strike sorties and how many reconnaissance sorties per month do you recommend against targets in South Vietnam during the next six months; are all of your current requirements being met; if not, why not; should we be planning on additional airfields for South Vietnam and if so, by what date are they required and where should they be placed?

13. What has been the trend of each of the major indicators (population control, area control, desertions, weapons losses, terror incidents, price level, etc.) of the success or failure of the counterinsurgency campaign over the past year?

14. How does the freedom of movement today over the railroads and the major highways and waterways compare with that of a year ago?

15. What measures do we have of the success or failure of our efforts to prevent infiltration of men and equipment by sea; has the recently expanded program reduced such infiltration; if not, why not; are additional forces required?

16. Outline and appraise the effectiveness of alternative plans (including a barrier across the 17th Parallel) for the use of US troops in Laos for the purpose of preventing infiltration of men and equipment through that country into South Vietnam.

17. If you think it is possible militarily to cut off or very substantially cut down the infiltration of North Vietnamese personnel and materiel from the North to the South, when do you believe it will begin to have an important effect on VC activities and how decisive will that effect be?

18. Has the Hop Tac Program⁵ succeeded; if, as it appears to us, it has not, review the program in detail to throw light on the causes of its failure?

19. Outline the original plan for the expansion of the GVN military, paramilitary and police forces; the progress to date against that plan; and changes, if any, which you propose for the future.

20. Do you concur in the conclusions of the recent RAND study of the morale of VC forces?⁶

21. How important is the monsoon to military operations and to the military balance, and how should we expect military prospects to change when the monsoon ends?

22. Would it be possible to implement the Acheson Plan⁷ in the near future, starting in the 4th Corps; is it feasible to initiate such a plan in a particular area before it has been proven to the Viet Cong that they cannot win?

23. After the deployment of the recommended US forces, how would the GVN react to an extended pause (six or eight weeks) in the bombing of the DRV?

24. Should we consider the imposition of press censorship after the expansion of US forces?

25. What contacts do the South Vietnamese now have with the NLF and the DRV; what additional contacts would you recommend that they or the US have with those parties or the Soviets; how should such US contacts be initiated and with what notice to the GVN?

Assuming our party remains in Vietnam 4 or 5 days, certain members of the party, including myself, probably should visit an aircraft carrier, the major US bases at Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Phu Bai, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Chu Lai, and Cam Ranh Bay, the 2d Corps Headquarters in the highlands; and the Hop Tac area.

We hope it will be possible for us to avoid large ceremonial dinners. Instead, we should like to dine with small numbers of Vietnamese, US or third-country nationals in an atmosphere so informal that they will feel free to provide us their personal comments on the Vietnamese scene.

Upon our return, we expect that important policy decisions will be made. These may well require major legislative and executive action (including possibly the declaration of a national emergency, the calling up of reserve forces, large additions to the Budget, etc.) for which we wish to be fully prepared.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-LOR, Vol. II(A). Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McNamara. Repeated to CINCPAC with instructions to pass to General Westmoreland, who was visiting CINCPAC headquarters. The source text contains handwritten revisions by McNamara; see footnotes 2–4 below.
2. Before it was revised by McNamara, the latter part of this sentence read as follows: “we will wish to discuss measures, including possible additional initiatives of our own, third party initiatives, our dealings with the Soviets, and possibility of some form of contact with DRV and/or NLF for psychological warfare and other purposes.”
3. At this point, McNamara deleted the phrase “in a reasonable time.”
4. McNamara deleted the original paragraph 4 and renumbered the subsequent paragraphs. The original paragraph 4 read as follows: “4. How good and timely is our intelligence as to VC locations and activities in SVN and in the corridor, and how can it be improved?”
5. Reference is to a plan developed by General Khanh in 1964 to concentrate military resources in the Saigon area and progressively clear areas radiating outward from the capital.
6. See Document 27.
7. See vol. II, Document 287.