46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
41. It may be that in coming weeks we will wish to establish some indirect contacts, probably through cutouts, with NLF in order to get better reading than provided by present random reports of Front’s state of mind and intentions. We have in mind particularly recurring suggestions that in Front there is significant element of Sudiste thinking which, if properly nurtured, might draw at least part of NLF/VC away from Hanoi domination toward some accommodation with GVN on terms which not too unacceptable.
Realize such contact, no matter how carefully managed and covered, may be leaked in such a way as to reach ears of GVN and raise with them acute worries about our intentions. While we presume there are numbers of avenues by which certain GVN officials themselves maintain more or less clandestine contact with Front, if it was learned that US maintaining such contact there would be immediate assumption we were looking for way out and intended to impose at least coalition government on SVN if not scuttle GVN outright in favor of NLF. Therefore if leaks occur we would deny categorically to GVN officials and also publicly if necessary that we have been in contact and contacts will of course have to be managed in such manner that our denial credible.
[Page 122]Depending on what these contacts reveal and how over-all political situation develops we may later conclude it advisable to bring GVN into picture to some degree. In that case we will first wish to examine with you whether and how this can be done so as to avoid precipitating sharp and perhaps decisive loss in GVN confidence in our intentions.
In order get dialogue underway with NLF and establish basis for efforts to alienate them from Hanoi we would contemplate approaching indirectly those individuals who are accessible and considered less enthusiastic about dependence on Hanoi and receptive to Sudiste appeal. We envisage approach taking following line, being conducted, of course, by someone who disclaims any official connection and whose reference to official US views would be in terms of his impression of thinking in Washington, to which he would claim to have some access:
- (1)
- You (NLF/VC) after years of fighting and privation are still getting nowhere and widening daily the gulf between yourselves and your brothers in the South.
- (2)
- Since Hanoi persists in pressing always harder in its effort to take over the South, using you in the process, and rejects all reasonable efforts which US, GVN, many neutrals and Afro-Asians and others have made to come to some peaceful settlement, you face dismal prospect.
- (3)
- Wonder to what extent we all find ourselves in this situation because there may be real misunderstanding of why US in South Viet-Nam and what it is seeking, or because we may not fully understand your true objectives.
- (4)
- Contact welcomed to see if misunderstanding can be reduced or removed for mutual benefit both our countries.
- (5)
- Central aim US is simple: a neutral Viet-Nam which is dominated by no outside power, whether from the North or elsewhere, and which can choose its own government and policies through consultation with all of its people.
- (6)
- US seeks no alliances or bases in South Viet-Nam. Persuaded US means to withdraw its forces the moment it becomes clear that efforts of North Viet-Nam to dominate and dictate to the South are at an end.
- (7)
- Do not believe you any more than we wish or consider it in your interest to make South Viet-Nam more of a bloody battleground than it already is or to be further used by the Northerners against your brothers in the South who also seek peace for your country. Hope therefore our contact can promote fruitful discussion.
Your comments on foregoing plan for approach to NLF urgently requested.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Unger and approved by Ball.↩