32. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
4434. For the President. Whatever one may think of General Ky, he seems to be serious about fulfilling his campaign promises to stir up the country and get it on a war footing. Impetuous as some of his actions have been, they seem to have the honest intent of energizing an apathetic people and creating an atmosphere of urgency where day-to-day routine has been the rule. With his hip-shooting tendencies, Ky is likely to continue to take ill-advised actions from time to time such as his breach of relations with France but it is just possible that he will be able to create a new outlook favorable to getting things done.
The unhappy event of the week was, of course, the execution of Sergeant Bennett on June 24 and the bombing of the My Canh restaurant on the following day. In combination, these two events constitute the bloodiest Viet Cong atrocity which we have suffered and forecast a new technique of further brutalities with the perpetrators shielded by threats of reprisals against U.S. prisoners. It was this prospect which led the U.S. Mission to recommend that Hanoi be held responsible and be made to pay a price for this incident. It seemed to us that the enemy had escalated [Page 78] and by the rules of the game we should respond—otherwise we would seem to accept this kind of thing as an inevitable new way of life. I have not yet received an indication of the countervailing reasons which led to the contrary decision in Washington but hope to receive them in due course.
Military activities picked up during the week with renewed indications of Viet Cong offensive intentions in Kontum Province. Commanders in that area are being faced with the difficult decision of abandoning minor towns under attack or of sending relief forces into areas favoring the ambushes of the enemy. While the former decision is most distasteful to a military commander, there will be cases, I am sure, when the shortage of ARVN units will angle [argue?]strongly for it.
While the number and intensity of Viet Cong incidents were increasing, Viet Cong harassment of communications routes continued to the point that all major routes leading into II Corps are now closed. As a result, we will be obliged to use airlift to assure the delivery of essential military and civilian supplies.
Up to now, General Ky has only been aware of the air war and is now learning the hard facts of the ground campaign. As I reported in Embtel 4422,2 he has appealed to me for additional U.S. ground forces to tide over the monsoon offensive period. I have agreed to have General Westmoreland and the Vietnamese High Command make an estimate to determine where we want to be militarily at the end of the calendar year and what forces will be required to get us there. This should be a useful planning exercise requiring the Vietnamese to face hard facts which they have sometimes preferred to ignore.
As suggested above, the economic situation is becoming difficult in the face of Viet Cong interference with road and river transport. This situation, added to the hoarding activities of rice merchants, has presented the new government with a threat of a serious rice shortage. It appears to have won a short-term victory by threatening the profiteers with shooting and at the same time offering modest price increases, a deal which has obtained the promise of delivery of 50,000 tons for the government stockpile. This action meets the immediate problem but Mr. Killen will wish to discuss the longer term aspects during his consultations in Washington next week.
While the economic outlook for the government is far from clear, we are impressed by the competence and motivation of the economic members [Page 79] of the new Cabinet. If they are kept in place a few months, we think we can make progress with them.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 6:16 a.m. and passed to the White House. McGeorge Bundy sent a copy of this telegram to the President on June 30 with a covering memorandum in which he noted that the important aspects of the message were the “hard military and economic questions” outlined by Taylor. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXV, Memos (C))↩
- Document 29.↩