Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

264. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹

Saigon, December 29, 1965.

2308. For the Secretary from Lodge. Herewith some comment on ideas in your 1805.²

A. Your para 8. No one will applaud more than I your efforts to secure support from the homefront. With homefront support we cannot fail. Without, we cannot win.

B. Your para 5 statement that “assuring South Viet-Nam without major bloodshed” is obviously of capital importance in bringing about steadfast homefront support. For this reason, I urge that USG in its own mind be clear as to what it regards as a satisfactory outcome of this war since some outcomes may require more bloodshed than others.

C. Let me think aloud purely for illustrative purposes. It is obvious that if we define a satisfactory outcome as 1.) seeking out and utterly destroying the North Vietnamese military main forces and potential, or 2.) seizing the Laos panhandle and the valley of the Mekong, or 3.) as meaning a state of affairs in which elections free from any intimidation can be held in every one of the 2, 658 villages in all 43 provinces, we may be taking on jobs which cannot be done without major bloodshed.

D. If, on the other hand, we define “satisfactory outcome” as the U.S. Mission tried to do it in our 1377,³ this is, hold the delta and the coastal plain, the provincial capitals and the roads, push out durably, even though slowly, within South Viet-Nam through the kind of pacification-countryside rebuilding which Lansdale is promoting and ward off the North Vietnamese aggression so as to make possible the achievement of the above, perhaps we could hold on for a long time without “major bloodshed”. I realize that even this may cause bloodshed too.

E. Your para 4. There is no doubt of the intense interest which public opinion polls must hold for all of us in government, and I do not question the authenticity of the Harris Poll. It does, however, point up the need for us who are in the work of foreign relations to educate one [our?] public at least in two respects:

First, that a cease fire, unaccompanied by a verified withdrawal of forces in effect confirms the Viet Cong aggressors in all the places where they are now. It also denies the sovereignty of the Government of Viet-Nam. In a very real sense, therefore, it gives the Viet Cong the victory before negotiations have been started. In fact, had our Christmas truce offer been accepted, we might have been in an extremely critical situation for the above reason. Therefore, we should first consider educating public opinion about what constitutes an honest and a dishonest cease fire, and it was in that connection that I suggested that a television documentary be made based on Admiral Joy’s book about negotiations at Panmunjom.⁴

Secondly, the public needs to be educated on the fact that Hanoi and Peking do not react like Americans, and that over-eagerness on our part is interpreted by them as a sign of weakness. Therefore the 72 per cent who favor “renewed effort for a cease fire” in the belief that it would promote the chance of peace are actually defeating their own purpose and are hardening the resolve of the enemy.

I believe that sooner or later we are going to have to make these things very clear, and, of course, I will do everything I can to help.

F. I am also interested in your paragraph 6 about differences existing between the Viet Cong and Hanoi. As my conversations with Palmas have shown, we suspect this also.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission; the telegram was received at 4:35 a.m.
2. Document 255.
3. Document 176.
4. See footnote 4, Document 237.