Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume
III, Vietnam, June–December 1965
24. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson
1
Washington,
June 27,
1965.
SUBJECT
-
George Ball’s paper on US
Commitments Regarding the Defense of South Vietnam
- 1.
- The attached paper from George
Ball was prepared for your use last Wednesday,2 but we did not get it to
you before your departure Thursday. George asked me to say that he
himself does not think the legal arguments about support for Vietnam
are decisive. The commitment is primarily political and any decision
to enlarge or reduce it will be political.
- 2.
- My own further view is that if and when we wish to shift our
course and cut our losses in Vietnam we should do so because of a
finding that the Vietnamese themselves are not meeting their
obligations to themselves or to us. This is the course we started on
with Diem, and if we got a
wholly ineffective or anti-American government we could do the same
thing again. With a “neutralist” government it would be quite
possible to move in this direction.
[Page 55]
Attachment
Washington,
Washington,
June 23, 1965.
Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Johnson
3
SUBJECT
- United States Commitments Regarding the Defense of South
Viet-Nam
I.
The Nature of Our Legal Commitment
- 1.
- The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, when read
together with its protocol, provides that in the event of
“aggression by means of armed attack” against South Viet-Nam
each party will “act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes.”
- 2.
- The United States has determined4 that there has been such aggression
against South Viet-Nam, which has brought this Treaty obligation
into operation. Although other SEATO powers are providing assistance to South
Viet-Nam, the United States, to the best of our knowledge, is
the only one that has made this determination. There has been no
decision by the SEATO members
to act collectively “to meet the common danger” in
Viet-Nam.
- 3.
- Since South Viet-Nam is not a party to the Southeast Asia
Treaty, our obligation under the Treaty does not run directly to
South Viet-Nam. Authorities on international law generally agree
that only parties (and not “third-party beneficiaries”) acquire
rights under a treaty. However, since the United States has
determined that there has been “aggression” against South
Viet-Nam within the meaning of the Treaty, our assistance to the
South Vietnamese Government to meet that aggression is in
discharge of our treaty obligation.
- 4.
- Our provision of military assistance to South Viet-Nam is
consistent with the United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the
Charter recognizes the inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense—although it does not impose an
obligation of collective defense on UN Members.
- 5.
- In addition to its treaty responsibilities with respect to
South Viet-Nam, the United States has repeatedly promised the
Government of South Viet-Nam to assist it in its struggle
against aggression. These promises have been embodied in a
series of messages and statements, beginning in October 1954
when President Eisenhower
promised to aid “the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and
maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting
attempted subversion and aggression through military
means.”5 The implied—and
frequently expressed—conditions to the provision of United
States assistance have been (a) the continuing request of the
South Vietnamese Government for such assistance and (b) its will
and ability to use that assistance effectively.
II.
Consequences of Withdrawal
- 1.
- The consequences of an abrupt withdrawal of our assistance
from South Viet-Nam should be judged not in juridical terms but
in terms of its effect on the credibility of our commitments
throughout the world. The relevant questions would be:
- a.
- To what extent would such withdrawal impair the
confidence of other small nations on the periphery of
Communist power that the United States had the will and
resources to help them prevent a Communist
takeover?
- b.
- To what extent would such withdrawal shake the faith
of our partners in other security treaties—whether in
Latin America, Europe, the Far East or elsewhere—that we
would and could meet our treaty obligations?
- c.
- To what extent would such withdrawal reduce the
prestige of the United States and hence diminish its
power and effectiveness in its dealings with other
governments?
- 2.
-
The answers to these questions would not depend on the
differences or similarities in the nature of our legal
commitments. Our obligations under the North Atlantic
Treaty, for example, are quite different from our
responsibilities for Viet-Nam under SEATO, since we have
obligations running directly to each of our NATO partners to take action,
including the use of armed force, in the event of an armed
attack on any NATO
power.
Our obligations to West Berlin are covered not only by
Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty but by our
status as an occupying power pursuant to the unconditional
surrender of Germany at the end of World War II.
We are obliged directly to the other American republics under
the Rio Treaty of 1947 to come to their assistance in the
event of armed attack.
- 3.
- In the longer term, we must judge a decision to withdraw
assistance from South Viet-Nam primarily in terms of its effect
on the ability of the United States to maintain its role of
world leadership. That role is not an easy one. France could
withdraw from Indochina or Algeria without wide-ranging
consequences since it was not a great power and other nations
did not depend on France for their own security. The United
States must, however, always act with the consciousness that if
it fails to discharge its role of leadership there is no other
free world power capable of taking its place.
