Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

237. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Saigon, December 21, 1965, 1:35 p.m.

MAC 6569. Reference: JCS 4939-65.²

Part I—General

1. In accordance with reference, commencing 0300 this morning I discussed thoroughly with Lodge and Westmoreland subject President outlined to me last Friday evening.³ I covered the following salient points:

A. The international and domestic pressures on the administration to undertake this action.

B. The desire to bolster our position both at home and abroad by silencing, or at least disarming, critics of our policy in order that we may proceed with solid backing to achieve US objectives in SE Asia.

C. The fact that, for military and other reasons, I had recommended that this course of action not be adopted. The JCS agree unanimously with the foregoing recommendation.

D. That, if this course of action were adopted, I believed the following safeguards, as a minimum, were needed: (1) no public announcement of the fact; (2) continue as flying conditions permit photographic, visual and other reconnaissance over the DRV; (3) continue and possibly increase air reconnaissance, air strikes and armed recce against infiltration routes through Laos; (4) continue and possibly increase ground and air operations in South Vietnam; and (5) continue our military buildup in South Vietnam.

E. That the President had authorized me to consult with General Goodpaster regarding this matter in order further to analyze and evaluate the problem and to inform him, through Goodpaster, of any “alarming or overly-dangerous aspects”.

F. That, in evaluating the problem, we should consider this course of action could be followed throughout the period Christmas Eve through Tet (21-22-23 Jan ’66) unless DRV actions led us to resume pressures on DRV.

2. Upon conclusion of our discussion we agreed that Ambassador Lodge would prepare separate comments. The remainder of this report is arranged accordingly.

Part II—Views of General Westmoreland and General Wheeler

1. We can identify no military advantage to be derived from this course of action except the faint chance that US objectives in SE Asia might be achieved without prolonged armed conflict. In this connection, we note that advocates of this course of action consider chances of this action bringing the Hanoi regime to the conference table are so remote as to be negligible.

2. In theory advantages could accrue if conditions/safeguards could be established on a practical basis. But it is a fact of life that the covert nature of the VC/DRV operations makes it virtually impossible to determine on a day-to-day basis the extent of infiltration of men and equipment. We could therefore find ourselves in a position of ceasing to apply our primary instrument of pressure on the DRV regime without adequate means of proving or determining the extent of continued DRV aggression. Reconnaissance aircraft are reasonably effective in good weather in detecting movement along well established routes. However, we have limited capabilities of determining movement at night or in foul weather. The extent of compliance with our demands can be ascertained to a degree by enemy fire on reconnaissance aircraft. However, this action is completely unrelated to the aggression which we are trying to stop.

3. We consider it a surety that the DRV would use a period of relaxed pressure on the DRV and lessened restrictions on movements of men and materiel to repair and improve LOC’s, to improve the readiness of AA defenses, to increase security of vital installations, and to step up the movement of men, equipment, and supplies to the south. In summary, we believe that our relative military posture could be weakened substantially.

4. Additionally, we consider that there are important political and psychological detriments inherent in this course of action. These are:

A. We could be inhibited from resuming pressure against the DRV by the force of world opinion, by publicized threats or commitments of aid by the USSR and/or the ChiComs which would raise the specter of intervention by one or both, and by lack of clear evidence on our part that the DRV are in fact continuing substantial movements of men and materiel to the south.

B. Inevitably the nature of our action would leak and concern would be created in the minds of the RVN military leadership, which concern would be difficult to dispel. Our actions could be interpreted as a prelude to US unilateral negotiations and as a softening in attitude toward Hanoi while the VC are stepping up their military initiatives and acts of terror.

C. It would seem that we would be in a stronger psychological and political position if we had achieved a more solid military posture with respect to troops, airfields, and logistics prior to any consideration of slackening our military efforts. We believe that we have now stopped losing but have not yet started to win. A winning stance would seem to be essential to any successful negotiations. Can we expect Hanoi to negotiate until she has been convinced that she cannot win?

5. In briefest terms, the “alarming or overly-dangerous aspects” of this course of action are comprised of the following:

A. Finding ourselves inhibited from resuming pressure against the DRV, despite the need to do so for the protection of our forces and to prove to the Hanoi regime the costs of aggression.

B. Allowing our forces to be tactically endangered because of rapid deployment of DRV forces to the south.

C. Encountering increased risks of further confrontation with the ChiComs or Soviets should resumption of pressure against the DRV be required.

D. Risking misinterpretation of our actions by the GVN leadership.

6. In consonance with the foregoing, we recommend against adoption of this course of action for the reasons set forth, which we believe cogent. However, if this course of action is nevertheless adopted, we recommend that the safeguards set forth in sub-paragraph 1D of Part I be established as a minimum.

7. We feel that there is merit in cessation of our bombing campaign in the DRV on Christmas day, on New Year’s eve and New Year’s day, and during the three day period of Tet (21, 22 and 23 January). During these days reconnaissance aircraft should be evident in the skies over the DRV for the purposes of distributing leaflets as part of a psywar campaign and to demonstrate that the GVN/US are calling the shots in this war.

Part III—Views of Ambassador Lodge Herewith my comments on the proposal for an indefinite suspension of bombing, said suspension to begin at Christmas, bombing to be resumed if infiltration from North Viet-Nam is continued, the purpose being to bring North Viet-Nam to the negotiating table.

Comment:

1. I recognize current political realities and the appeal of this idea to some persons. Yet it rests on fundamental misconceptions as to the real nature of Communist governments and would, if carried out, tend to defeat its own purpose.

2. Actually a proposal like this will lead the Communists away from negotiations because it will be interpreted by them as being a sign of weakness and indecision. The proposal assumes that the Communists are like us; that they are in effect like misguided Americans who will reciprocate our kindness and our toleration and our sense of fair play when every experience we have had with Communists, whether at the United Nations or Panmunjom, or in Berlin, shows that the reverse is the case and that they can only be induced to follow a certain course by the application of pressure. They are in truth indifferent to human life and are always probing.

3. The way to end this war, therefore, is by the application of U.S. force. If talks should ever begin, they must be held to the accompaniment of the application of force or else they are foredoomed to failure. We should not forget that there were more people killed after the peace talks began at Panmunjom than there were before because we overlooked this simple principle. I believe the proposition, therefore, as stated, looks at the Vietnamese situation through the wrong end of the telescope, and that it would achieve the opposite result from what its sponsors intend.

4. The fact is that our bombing of North Viet-Nam must be equated with the Viet Cong aggression against South Viet-Nam—and not merely the infiltration aspect. Indefinite cessation of bombing without cessation of the Viet Cong aggression would leave the Viet Cong free to devastate the south with impunity while we tie our hands down in the north.

5. Cessation of bombings should be equated with withdrawal of North Vietnamese units through international checkpoints to the north; unimpeded access of the GVN to any part of its territory; a significant reduction of incidents; cessation of infiltration of men and materiel; and an agreement that at any talks which would be held the matter of an inspection system and enforcement devices would be the first item on the agenda.

6. There is, to be sure, in the proposal no mechanism wherewith to check infiltration or withdrawal of North Vietnamese units. Suppose we started bombing again on the basis of intelligence information, the source of which we could not reveal. Would not the uproar among the wishful thinkers be even greater than it is now? Would we not be in an interminable wrangle over resumption?

7. As far as the GVN is concerned, the Fanfani talks had a devastating effect here because the GVN thought for a moment that we were negotiating their very life behind their backs. It threatened to destroy much that had been built up here in the way of confidence and good feeling. An open ended, unequated suspension of bombing could, I think, either bring about the collapse of the government or its determined opposition. It would also collapse morale in the ARVN.

8. Finally, it would destroy the very big political accomplishments which the President’s policies have brought about. Let us not forget that the strongest thing in Viet-Nam is not seeing the B-52s overhead; it is not having the Seventh Fleet come circling in; it is not the huge expenditures by USOM. It is faith in American steadfastness. It was when the Vietnamese saw the American soldier on the ground that they were persuaded that we were committed, and said to themselves: “If the Americans can commit themselves, then I can commit myself.” It is on this belief that the government, which no one thought would last more than three weeks, has lasted as long as it has. This was a big political accomplishment before our troops even fired a shot. When they distinguished themselves in battle, of course, it added to the confidence.

9. An open ended, unequated cessation of bombing would destroy the tremendous political accomplishments President Johnson has wrought, and for which American fighting men sacrifice themselves—some of them, their lives. This is a very serious thing to do without a real chance that the objective of peace will be achieved—a chance which I do not see.

10. A variant of the main proposal is that the bombing be stopped for Christmas, New Year, Tet and during bad weather. It might be possible to do these things without a public announcement and not do too much harm, although I believe we should tell the GVN, as they would certainly find out about it.

11. I recognize the President’s very grave problem.He is the one who must cope with the Senate and with public opinion. Yet he deserves to know what his representatives on the spot in their heart of hearts think of the consequences. I shall, of course, loyally support his decisions.

Appendix:

I believe steps should be taken to educate public opinion about the nature of the problems involved in negotiating with Communists; for example:

That NBC or CBS make a TV documentary based on Admiral Joy’s book about negotiations with the Communists at Panmunjom.⁴

That Professor Henry Kissinger, who is extraordinarily well informed and persuasive on this subject, having taken part in the Berlin negotiations himself, have private conversations with Senator Mansfield, Senator Fulbright, and so forth. He would not be suitable for television but he is very persuasive in private with intelligent, well-informed men.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIV, Cables. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Goodpaster.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., Papers of William C. Westmoreland, Eyes Only File)
3. Wheeler met with the President from 5:50 to 6:47 p.m. on December 17. (Ibid., President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.
4. C. Turner Joy, How the Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1955).