233. Memorandum From Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson1
SUBJECT
- Summary of Conclusions of the Report on Viet Nam2
If the objectives of our policy remain the same, the war in Viet Nam is just beginning for the United States. The ultimate needs cannot be estimated, either as to U.S. manpower, costs or time. Prudence requires, however, that we anticipate a doubling and redoubling of U.S. forces in the next year or two. The truth is that we are up against an open-ended military situation which can eventually spread to encompass Southeast Asia and even China. The war has, in fact, already spilled over into Laos and may be on the verge of involving Cambodia.
The end of the road on the basis of present policy is not in sight either in the sense of a military solution or a solution by negotiations. The Communists give no signs of acquiescing in the basic requirement of our present policy which, in effect, is that North Viet Nam either agree to or be compelled “to leave its neighbors alone”. That concept, in any event, is an oversimplified interpretation of the situation. The bulk of Communist manpower in South Vietnam is still South Vietnamese. South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese are all mixed together, on both sides, in this conflict. The disputants are not only “neighbors,” they are also “relatives”.
Any immediate prospects of opening a Conference (and they are slim) are not likely to be realized on the “neighbor” concept but, if at all, on the basis of “cease fire and stand fast.” That would appear to be a necessary preliminary to straightening out the complex Vietnamese relationships in general accord with the Geneva Agreements of 1954. A cease fire and stand fast now, as a practical matter, would leave the Viet Cong in control of most of the rural areas, and the government in control of the cities which probably contain in excess of 50% of the total population of South Viet Nam.
It is not likely that third parties can be of much help in bringing about a Conference any more than they can be counted on for much real assistance in carrying on the war. Almost without exception, the principal concern other nations have, whether in Europe or in Asia, is staying clear of involvement themselves.
The Russians, in particular, are unwilling to help bring about negotiations at this time. Indeed, it may well be that they do not find the present situation at all without benefits from their point of view. The fact is that their principal rivals in the world and in the Communist bloc (the United States and China respectively) are both deeply involved in Viet Nam. The Russians, as of now, are in the clear and have almost a free hand in promoting their position and interests both within the bloc and in the world in general.
The most realistic hope (and it is not much) for a conference in the near future would appear to lie in a direct initiative with the Chinese and North Vietnamese and on the initial basis of “cease fire and stand fast.” A possible approach was outlined to Secretary Rusk in a cable on December [Page 650] 10, 1965.3 If a Conference on this basis could be achieved, the present state of the war in Viet Nam would obviously not give the Saigon government and the United States control of all South Viet Nam but we would still have a substantial position for negotiating purposes.
If a Conference cannot be brought off at this time, the decision which faces us resolves itself into this: Shall we plunge in further militarily, into depths which are unfathomable and could eventually involve war with China or can we hold a more limited position in South Viet Nam by more limited military means until the Communists come around to negotiations? Apart from the costs in lives and resources which have to be considered in this decision, there is the additional factor of the worldwide consequences of a deeper and more widespread U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. In my judgment, these consequences are likely to be very adverse to the position of the United States, particularly with respect to Europe and Japan which are, in fact, the only other two major power-seats in the non-Communist world.
This is a conflict in which all the choices open to us are bad choices. We stand to lose in Viet Nam by restraint; but we stand to lose far more at home and throughout the world by the more extensive military pursuit of an elusive objective in Viet Nam.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, Senator Mansfield’s Trip (Southeast Asia). No classification marking. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum.↩
- Dated December 17. (Ibid.) Printed in part in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 738-740.↩
- Text in Document 227.↩