Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

222. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson¹

Washington, December 7, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Military and Political Actions Recommended for South Vietnam

I. Appraisal of Situation in South Vietnam

A. Non-military situation. There has been no substantial change in the past few months in the economic, political or pacification situation. There is a serious threat of inflation because of the mixture of US force build-up and GVN deficit on the one hand and the tightly stretched Vietnamese economy on the other; the Ky “government of generals” is surviving, but not acquiring wide support or generating actions; pacification is thoroughly stalled, with no guarantee that security anywhere is permanent and no indications that able and willing leadership will emerge in the absence of that permanent security. (Prime Minister Ky estimates his government “controls” only 25% of the population today and reports that his pacification chief hopes to increase that to 50% two years from now.)

B. Military situation. The dramatic recent changes in the situation are on the military side. They are the increased infiltration from the North (mainly on greatly improved routes through Laos) and the increased willingness of the Communist forces to stand and fight, even in large-scale engagements. The Ia Drang River Campaign of November is an example. The Communists appear to have decided to increase their forces in South Vietnam both by heavy recruitment in the South (especially in the Delta) and by infiltration of regular North Vietnamese forces from the North. We believe that nine regular North Vietnamese regiments (27 infantry battalions) have been infiltrated in the past year, joining the estimated 83 VC battalions in the South. The rate of infiltration has increased from three battalion equivalents a month in late 1964 to a high of 9 or 12 during one month this past fall. General Westmoreland estimates that through 1966 North Vietnam will have the capability² to expand its armed forces in order to infiltrate three regiments (9 battalion equivalents, or 4500 men) a month, and that the VC in South Vietnam can recruit and train 7 new battalion equivalents a month—together adding 16 battalion equivalents a month to the enemy forces. Communist casualties and desertions can be expected to go up if our recommendations for increased US, South Vietnamese and third-country forces are accepted. Nevertheless, the enemy can be expected to enlarge his present strength of 110 battalion equivalents to more than 150 battalion equivalents by the end of calendar 1966, when hopefully his losses can be made to equal his input.

As for the Communist ability to supply this force, it is estimated that, even taking account of interdiction of routes by air and sea, more than 200 tons of supplies a day on the average can be infiltrated—more than enough, allowing for the extent to which the enemy lives off the land, to support the likely PAVN/VC force at the likely level of operations.

To meet this possible—and in our view likely—Communist buildup, the presently contemplated Phase I forces will not be enough. Phase I forces, almost all in place by the end of this year, involve 130 South Vietnamese, 9 Korean, 1 Australian and 34 US combat battalions (approximately 220,000 Americans). Bearing in mind the nature of the war, the expected weighted combat force ratio of less than 2-to-1 will not be good enough. Nor will the originally contemplated Phase II addition of 28 more US battalions (112,000 men) be enough; the combat force ratio, even with 32 new South Vietnamese battalions, would still be little better than 2-to-1 at the end of 1966. The initiative which we have held since August would pass to the enemy; we would fall far short of what we expected to achieve in terms of population control and disruption of enemy bases and lines of communications. Indeed, it is estimated that, with the contemplated Phase II addition of 28 US battalions, we would be able only to hold our present geographical positions.

II. Recommendations for Military Deployments

We believe that, whether or not major new diplomatic initiatives are made, the United States must send a substantial number of additional forces to Vietnam if we are to avoid being defeated there. Specifically, to maintain the initiative against the growing Communist forces, we recommend:

1. That the Republic of Korea be requested, at the appropriate time early in 1966, to increase their present deployment of 9 combat battalions to 18 combat battalions (the addition of one division) before July 1966 and to 21 combat battalions (the addition of another brigade) before October 1966.

2. That the Government of Australia be requested to increase their present deployment of 1 combat battalion to 2 combat battalions before October 1966 and that efforts be made to obtain combat forces from other friendly countries—e.g., the Philippines, Thailand and Greece.

3. That the US be prepared to increase its deployment of ground troops by the end of 1966 from 34 combat battalions to 74 combat battalions and approve now the initial increments of this deployment. If the 74 US battalions—together with increases in air squadrons, naval units, air defense, combat support, construction units and miscellaneous logistic support and advisory personnel which we also recommend—were to be deployed, it would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 400,000. The end 1965 strength of 200,000 would increase during 1966 at the rate of approximately 15,000 a month. It should be understood that further deployments (perhaps exceeding an additional 200,000 men) may be needed in 1967. Although the 1966 deployments to South Vietnam may require some shift of forces from other theaters, it is believed that they can be accomplished without calling up reserve personnel; however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not believe additional forces can be deployed to Southeast Asia or elsewhere unless reserves are called.

The above program is concurred in by General Westmoreland, Admiral Sharp, Ambassador Lodge and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

III. Budget Recommendations

Decisions already taken together with those recommended above will require increased obligational authority both in FY 1966 and FY 1967.

1. In the January 1966 Supplemental for FY 1966, the Department of Defense, to cover increased Vietnam costs, will require approximately $11 billion³ of new obligational authority to be added to the $1.7 billion authorized in the August Supplemental. The expenditure effect in FY 1966 of these two add-ons will be $4-1/2 billion.

2. In FY 1967 the Department of Defense will require $9.8 billion in new obligational authority and $11.8 billion in expenditures to finance the war in Vietnam.

3. The increases in non-military costs attributable to Vietnam in both the FY 1966 January Supplemental and in the FY 1967 budget can be expected to be somewhat less than $1 billion—whatever is required must be provided.

(The estimates of military costs given above are based on the premise that the war will end by June 30, 1967. As time passes and as actions must be taken to cover war costs beyond that date, additional obligational authority will have to be sought. Thus, it may be necessary to go back to the Congress in June or July 1966 for an amendment to the FY 1967 authorizations and appropriations to take account of those added costs.)

IV. Prognosis Assuming the Recommended Deployments

Deployments of the kind we have recommended will not guarantee success. Our intelligence estimate is that the present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. They continue to believe that the war will be a long one, that time is their ally, and that their own staying power is superior to ours. They recognize that the US reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination to avoid defeat, and that more US troops can be expected. Even though the Communists will continue to suffer heavily from GVN and US ground and air action, we expect them, upon learning of any US intentions to augment its forces, to boost their own commitment and to test US capabilities and will to persevere at a higher level of conflict and casualties (US killed-in-action with the recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000 a month).

If the US were willing to commit enough forces—perhaps 600,000 men or more—we could ultimately prevent the DRV/VC from sustaining the conflict at a significant level. When this point was reached, however, the question of Chinese intervention would become critical.⁴ The intelligence estimate is that the chances are a little better than even that, at this stage, Hanoi and Peiping would choose to reduce the effort in the South and try to salvage their resources for another day; but there is an almost equal chance that they would enlarge the war and bring in large numbers of Chinese forces (they have made certain preparations which could point in this direction).

It follows, therefore, that the odds are about even that, even with the recommended deployments, we will be faced in early 1967 with a military standoff at a much higher level, with pacification still stalled, and with any prospect of military success marred by the chances of an active Chinese intervention.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (A). Top Secret. Sent to the President in Texas in CAP 65822, December 6. (Ibid., Vol. XLIII, Cables) There is an indication on the source text that the President saw the memorandum. This memorandum is a revision of Document 212. A draft of this memorandum with minor revisions and comments by McGeorge Bundy, December 4, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (A). Another draft with significant revisions, December 6, is ibid., 2EE, Primarily McNamara Recommendations re Strategic Actions.
2. They may or may not intend to use their capability—indications are that they will. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The January Supplemental for DOD will total about $12.5 billion, including provision for the military and civilian pay increases authorized by Congress after the original ’66 budget was submitted by the President. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. We are generally agreed that the Chinese Communists will intervene with combat forces to prevent destruction of the Communist regime in the DRV. It is less clear whether they would intervene to prevent a DRV/VC defeat in the South. [Footnote in the source text.]