216. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Goldberg) to President Johnson 1
Dear Mr. President:
I have today had a long conversation with Dean Rusk and George Ball regarding the situation in Vietnam.2 I know that you will be faced with some further difficult decisions in the coming days ahead in light of the report made to you by Bob McNamara on his recent trip. Dean and George will convey my views in detail to you at your meeting on Tuesday.3 However, I would like you to know that I strongly favor an early pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, perhaps for 3 or 4 weeks, with a new indication of our willingness to negotiate. I come to this conclusion even though I realize that there is risk that if a pause leads to negotiation it would be difficult to resume bombing North Vietnam as long as those negotiations continued.
My reasons are as follows:
- 1.
- If further escalation is in prospect, such a move would help tremendously in carrying world opinion with us.
- 2.
- From my talks with the Secretary General and with many UN delegations, I am convinced that such action would be welcomed and strongly supported all over the world as further confirmation of the earnestness and sincerity of the United States’ determination to leave no stone unturned in trying to move the Vietnam problem from the battlefield to the conference table. A pause would be a concrete act adding immense reality and weight to your statements calling for unconditional discussions. Such a decision, despite no positive signals from the other side, would be viewed as an undisputed act of statesmanship, an act only a great and strong nation could take.
- 3.
- The same is true as regards American domestic opinion. The recent statement of the National Council of Churches is only one sign of mounting concern among responsible citizens as a result of our increased commitment of manpower and the additional American casualties being incurred. A pause would increase the confidence and assurance of the preponderant majority of the American people that while we [Page 602] intend to honor our commitments in Vietnam, you will exhaust every means to make our willingness to negotiate unmistakably clear.
- 4.
- Such a proposal would put the Communists further to the test and would intensify pressure on them to negotiate.
- 5.
- It would make it less difficult for the Soviets to abandon their present passive attitude and actively to seek to bring Hanoi to the conference table, even in the face of continued opposition from Peking. At least it would offer hope of a more fruitful Soviet-American dialogue on this subject.
- 6.
- It would place Hanoi and Peiping in a defensive position in relation to the non-aligned world; it would reassure our friends and supporters and reinforce their domestic position; it would restore the initiative in this matter where it properly belongs, to the leader of the greatest power in the world, the US.
The impact of such an announced pause would be enhanced if coupled with a strong personal reaffirmation on your part of our willingness to go anywhere, at any time, at any level, to negotiate. You might well link this with a restatement of our peace aims in Vietnam.
If you approve this course of action, I would strongly urge you to make such an announcement in the UN General Assembly, before the Assembly closes on December 21. This would have the maximum dramatic effect and would be consistent with your desire to use the UN to the utmost.
I have set forth these views of mine which I strongly hold in rather brief and summary fashion, but I shall be very glad to elaborate upon them if you so desire.
Respectfully submitted,
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLIII, Memos (A). Secret.↩
- According to Rusk’s Appointment Book, Rusk left the briefing by Hughes and Whiting at 11:08 a.m. (see footnote 5, Document 214) for discussions with Goldberg and Sisco, which lasted until 11:31 a.m. Rusk rejoined Goldberg, Sisco, and Ball from 12:30 to 12:55 p.m. (Johnson Library)↩
- December 7; see Document 223.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩