191. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, in Texas1
CAP 65666. Dean Rusk has asked me to send you at once an extremely interesting cable from Lodge and the answer which we have [Page 530] sent to him. Lodge’s cable reports a possible feeler from the National Liberation Front that might look toward an end of fighting by them. Rusk’s answer authorizes a very cautious probe of this feeler. None of us knows how much substance there is in this, but it is barely possible that it represents the beginning of a major change in our favor.
Control: 5676.
Received: November 7, 1965, 2:45 a.m.
From: Saigon.
Action: SecState priority 1605.2
Date: November 7
Top Secret November 07.
Nodis. Eyes only for Bundy.
The Secretary of the Apostolic Delegation called the Political Section to arrange an appointment for Archbishop Palmas to see me. The date was set for Monday afternoon.3
Saturday afternoon I heard rumors of dissatisfaction among some of the Vietnamese Catholic clergy and decided to see Palmas sooner and called at his residence Sunday morning.
He wished me to know the following:
A “former Vietnamese Cabinet Minister” who, he said, is well known to me, who is reputable and intelligent, and whose name Palmas did not wish to divulge, had called a week ago to say that a “duly accredited” representative of the “National Liberation Front” who had “proper letters of credentials” wished to talk with me. Under questioning from Palmas the former Cabinet Minister said that the purpose of this was to approach me “on the basis of Vietnamese nationalism.” When Palmas asked why they did not wish to speak to the Government of Vietnam, the answer was that they did not trust the Government of Vietnam and that they thought that it was composed entirely of military men who would not perceive political factors. The aim in talking to me would be as Vietnamese nationalists who had achieved independence from the Communist domination of Hanoi. In short, the visit would reflect a desire of the nationalist element in the “National Liberation Front” who apparently were now independent of Hanoi to cease their military activities in the south.
Palmas said that obviously if this were what it appeared to be on its face it was a capitulation and was of greatest significance. On the other [Page 531] hand, he was extremely skeptical about it and thought it probably would amount to nothing.
Palmas called on Tran Van Do two days ago and, as he said, out of curiosity, asked Do what his reaction would be if someone representing the nationalist element in the so-called “National Liberation Front” were to propose an end of the war. Do’s answer was that such a thing was inconceivable and that the Viet Cong was completely under the domination of Hanoi.
My only answer was that I would have to report this to the US Government and await instructions.
Comment: I obviously agree with Palmas that if this were what it appears to be on the surface or in fact a capitulation it would be of the greatest possible significance. But I also share his skepticism. As far as my talking with this individual is concerned, I foresee considerable difficulty due to the fact that I am under constant observation twenty-four hours a day. For one thing the Government of Vietnam follows me around with four men in a jeep wherever I go. In addition I am sure the Viet Cong observe me too. If therefore such an individual were to come to my house or to come to the Chancery it would surely be observed.
I asked Palmas what he meant by “duly accredited” and having “a letter of credentials”. I wanted to know who had signed the letter but he said that he did not know, that those were the phrases which his Vietnamese informant had given him.
It seems to me highly probable that they would themselves use a relatively junior officer for an initial feeler (hence the need for credentials) while hoping that we would respond at my level. Anything involving me, however, would of course entail severe risks and dangers for us which would require careful study.
Therefore, in my judgment, we should first insist, through Palmas, on seeing copy of letter and if satisfied on that point we could consider arranging meeting without me at relatively junior level purely for “size-up” purposes. At that point, we would be in a better position to assess the validity and usefulness of this feeler, without having exposed ourselves in the meantime. Obviously there could be many things which such people would say to no one but me.
I am aware that we could be entering a period of such feelers and caution and wariness are needed though no opportunity should be over-looked. Lodge.
[Page 532]Top Secret.4
AmEmbassy Saigon. Priority; Nodis.
Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Embtel 1605.
- 1.
- Agree with you that reported approach could be of utmost significance. Whether or not it could mean capitulation—of which we, like you, are highly skeptical—it might at least mean opening wedge in reaching non-Communist nationalistic elements of NLF. Contacts could provide real indication of how significant such elements are and, by careful handling, we might induce some degree of controversy and split within NLF-Hanoi relations. Even if only result is defection of one or more key individuals, this could be of immense psychological significance.
- 2.
- We therefore concur wholly in your proposed course of action, asking to see copy of letter and thereafter, depending on contents, arranging meeting at relatively junior level for “size-up” purposes. You should proceed on this basis. While we leave this to your judgment, are inclined to think officer should not be from Lansdale group or identifiably from CAS.
- 3.
- Danger obviously exists that approach is on “agent provocateur” basis designed to trap us into dealings with NLF that could be publicized as recognition by US or, perhaps more likely, leaked in GVN circles to drive wedge between US and GVN. This danger is far outweighed by constructive possibilities.
Please keep us informed Nodis.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret; Eyes Only;Nodis. The President was at the LBJ Ranch.↩
- The Department of State copy of telegram 1605 is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.↩
- November 8.↩
- This is telegram 1257 to Saigon, November 7. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩