Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

163. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, October 9, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Refugees

The Refugee Situation

There is no accurate estimate of the current number of refugees in Vietnam. Best guesses hover around 600,000 and more (possibly as much as 400,000 more) by December. Although there are refugees in virtually every provincial capital, the major concentrations are in I and II Corps.

Refugees have flowed in from a variety of causes: floods, VC repression, rice shortages, and the destruction of villages by military (VC and U.S.-GVN) action. If one can generalize at all, the refugees are largely apolitical; the vast majority are children, women and elderly folk with no special skills.

Conditions in the refugee camps are probably not too bad from the physical point of view when compared to the general standards of the country as a whole, which is not to say that there aren’t serious problems of food and shelter. But it is the political-psychological aspect of the problem which needs careful attention; the refugees represent a potential source of disaffection and unrest exploitable by the Viet Cong.

The GVN Approach

Despite the enormity of the problem and the prodding of the U.S. Mission, there is a lack of interest, planning and action at the top levels of the GVN. This is reflected in uncertainty and confusion at the province level. The Commanders of I and II Corps regard the refugee problem as a tactical one and take the view that additional refugees should be turned away from the existing centers and that resettlement of those in the centers should be undertaken immediately.

In a country where poverty and misery are so widespread and where social welfare resources are spread so thin, it is not unnatural that refugees are regarded as an unnecessary burden by the government. Moreover, there are many instances where refugees in well-run and well-supplied centers are much better off than non-refugees nearby. The Government is justifiably concerned that “model” centers will simply attract “rice refugees”.

The GVN’s Ministry of Social Welfare is the executive agency for the care of refugees and in terms of its resources and capabilities, is doing what it can. But it is not big enough for the job. Enter the U.S.

The U.S. Program

The U.S. Mission has been concerned with the refugee problem since the major floods of last April. With the increase of Viet Cong activity in II Corps and the stepped-up military activity of late spring and summer the refugee rolls began to swell and U.S. AID and private efforts expanded. During the summer USOM established a Refugee Task Force and a coordinator for refugee matters was appointed until AID could recruit a refugee expert. Several Task Force teams were dispatched to the principal refugee centers.

In September a Refugee Relief Division was established in USOM and a Vietnam relief coordinator was appointed in Washington. Sixteen specialists in relief and refugee problems have been recruited for the Relief Division and most are already in place. The Chief of this Division (Ed Marks) and I have had two useful sessions; he will leave this weekend for Saigon.

At least as important, is an overall policy and program which was developed in consultation with the Ministry of Social Welfare. (It is hoped that General Ky will soon announce his Government’s interest in and policy toward the refugee problem.) The operative concept for USOM is to “advise and recommend”, but also to be ready to compensate for gaps in GVN capabilities. We must, however, make sure that this is basically and conspicuously a GVN program.

The Voluntary Agencies

The principal agencies now operating in Vietnam are CARE, the Church World Service (primarily Mennonites), the Catholic Relief Service, and the Friends. Each of these agencies, with our urging and encouragement, are expanding their activities and some agencies not now active in Vietnam (notably the Lutherans) may soon undertake programs there. Most of these agencies intend to intensify their fund-raising activities (CARE has already launched theirs) to finance these expanded programs.

In my own contacts with them, in their testimony to the Kennedy Subcommittee, and in discussions with AID officials, the voluntary agencies have revealed a great sensitivity to coordination by a new “umbrella” group and infringement of their sovereignty in fund raising. They are taking steps to increase their coordination effort (which the more candid admit has been thus far unsatisfactory) through their trade association, the American Council of Voluntary Agencies.

Representatives of about 7 key Voluntary Agencies will leave for Vietnam in about a week for a five-day investigation. They are scheduled to return to Washington before Senator Kennedy arrives in Vietnam in late October.

The Kennedy Subcommittee

This group, a non-legislative subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, became interested in the Vietnam problem in late June. It has held a large number of hearings, but transcripts are hard to come by (I have obtained several involving the Voluntary Agencies). According to Committee staff members, the Report will be prepared around mid-November following the Senator’s return from Vietnam. I suggest we get a reading on Senator Kennedy’s thinking before he leaves and before we get too deeply into our Foundation. Should I endeavor to do this? (Yes__ No__)²

Problems Ahead

—Any programs undertaken in the refugee field by the Foundation should clearly be of the kind the Voluntary Agencies are not doing and cannot do. Examples: Statistical data; large-scale medical assistance; family tracing service; orphan care and adoption services (Cherne is ready to fold in his program); assistance in resettlement and training.

—Whatever the USG or American voluntary agencies do it must appear, as much as possible, to be a Vietnamese effort. This will become increasingly difficult as American efforts expand.

—The GVN must be encouraged to take a greater role and especially to proceed with political orientation, training and sound resettlement programs.

—The U.S. military logistics capability must be geared closely into U.S. and GVN relief efforts; this is the only way the increased quantities of relief goods can reach refugee centers in timely and adequate fashion.

—Coordination, especially in Saigon, of U.S. voluntary efforts must be strengthened.

C

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI, Memos (A). Confidential.
2. A note on the source text in McGeorge Bundy’s hand reads: “I want to call Ted Kennedy on this on Monday [October 11]. McGB.” No record of the Kennedy-Bundy telephone conversation has been found.