Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

158. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

New York, September 30, 1965.

We had our first dinner this evening with a second meeting scheduled Friday² evening when he returns hospitality. I will report separately on the dinner table discussions on Kashmir and disarmament matters.

Before dinner Gromyko and I had a private talk with no one else present. I told him that following Harriman’s discussion with Kosygin,³ we had taken Kosygin’s suggestion and had been in contact with Hanoi for the purpose of exploring possibilities of peaceful settlement and counter proposals on Hanoi’s four points.⁴ He was much interested, appeared to have been uninformed by Hanoi, and did not press for details on the nature of the contact beyond asking whether a third government was involved—to which I replied no.

Gromyko refused to acknowledge the basic fact of North Vietnam’s infiltration and other action against South Vietnam, but it was quite clear that he surely understood that we knew about such things even if on policy grounds he could not admit it. He said it was his impression that Hanoi could not possibly enter into discussions on negotiations while bombing was going on. His point was that Hanoi looked upon discussion during the bombings as a plea from a position of weakness. I told him that Hanoi was not denying to us the facts of their intervention or the presence of regular units of the North Vietnamese Army. I told him we were not asking for conditions because we were prepared to talk while the fighting continued or were prepared to have preliminary discussions about circumstances which would permit more formal negotiations to occur. I told him that we had been unable to get from any communist capital the slightest indication as to what would happen if the bombing stopped. We were not asking this question to raise a condition but were simply asking for a simple factual statement as to what consequences any one could see in the direction of making peace. Obviously, if we stopped the bombing and nothing else happened this would be unacceptable.

Gromyko was much interested in whether contacts with Hanoi had been definitively concluded without result or whether such contacts remained open. I told him that it was my impression that both sides were prepared to renew contact if there was anything interesting to say. His attitude seemed to indicate a hope that whatever channel that was involved would remain open. He did not confirm but did not contradict my remark that there seemed to be some differences of views in Hanoi and that some debate might be going on in that capital.

Under the impact of Chen Yi’s Press Conference⁵ he seemed less reticent about acknowledging that Moscow has a real problem with China than he personally has been with me in the past. For example, in response to a question from me, he stated “very flatly” that he was confident that if Hanoi came to a conference at which the Soviet Union and the United States were present that Peiping would not use force to prevent it.

It was significant to me that he showed no bluster or threats about the matter of Soviet support for Hanoi that he reflected in Vienna in May.⁶

[Here follows discussion of Soviet propaganda attacks on the President and India-Pakistan.]

My general impression was that Gromyko did not bring with him any instructions to heat up crises on particular points with us, that he did not expect any major break-through in the direction of agreements on important matters, and that he was prepared to be relaxed but direct and businesslike in discussing any matters in which we both are involved. He did not attempt to apply pressure nor did he use threats or any of the normal language associated with the rugged discussions of 1961 and 1962.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XV. Top Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Also sent to Acting Secretary Ball. There is an indication on the source text that the President saw this memorandum. Rusk and Gromyko were at the United Nations for the 20th session of the General Assembly.
2. October 1.
3. See Document 68.
4. See vol. II, Document 245.
5. Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi’s uncompromising answers to questions on the attitude of the People’s Republic of China to the question of a negotiated peace in Vietnam are printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 902-903.
6. See vol. II, Document 303.