109. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

SUBJECT

  • Contact with the NLF

This is not an argument for or against contacts with the NLF (although I can’t resist the opportunity to cast an affirmative vote). Rather it is an attempt to explore how best to make such contacts, on the assumption that a decision is taken to do so.

There are four key questions:

Where should the contact be maintained?

Whom should the USG rely on to undertake such contacts?

How and to what extent should the GVN be cut in?

How can we insure that the contact is legitimate rather than a Communist propaganda ploy?

The Front Abroad

The Front maintains representatives in Cuba, the UAR, Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, East Germany, China and the USSR. In addition, [Page 306] there appears to be a floating delegation of uncertain stature in France and some slightly irregular and clandestine representation in Cambodia. None of the places where the Front maintains an office seems ideal for discreet contacts, and some of them are patently undesirable. To complicate the matter further, we know very little about the calibre, status and personality of any of the individuals in place. It is likely, however, that once we decide on a locus of contact and once the Front is convinced we are ready for serious talk, the NLF will see to it that their man is suitable at least from their point of view.

There are several reasons why Algiers, at this moment at least, seems to be the best place for contact:

The NLF man now in place, Huynh Van Tam, is personally known to some Americans (see the attached account of Gottlieb’s recent conversation with him).2

Of all the places where the Front now has representation, Algiers is probably the “loosest”.

Willy, nilly, we may find ourselves (hopefully unofficially) in contact with Their Man in Algiers. We are still awaiting some word on how (or even if) the VC and the Algerians want to deliver Hertz. It is clear from my talks with the Algerian Ambassador that whatever the precise details may be, the essence of the plan will be to exploit the exchange for at least a propaganda U.S.-VC contact and hopefully for a more substantive relationship.

The Means of Contact

I assume that whatever direct contact we may wish to maintain should be unofficial, very low key, and deniable. This obviously eliminates our Embassy and, in my view, the press. It still leaves three kinds of people: Academic types, Responsible Professional Peaceniks, and just plain Private Citizens. I will, if you desire, shake up some possible candidates in the first two categories (Lucien Pye comes immediately to mind in the Academic field, possibly Gottlieb in the Peacenik area). But I have an inspiration within the 3rd category: Burke Hertz—who, if we can deliver his brother, on the Algiers track, will have ostensibly good reasons for an occasional chat; he is an able bright lawyer, a liberal Democrat, and by now fairly sophisticated in the care and feeding of the Viet Cong. He will need an interpreter since he doesn’t speak French, but I think Bill Colby can find one.

Obviously, whoever is chosen, he will have to be someone who the VC thinks has an official ear, if not an official voice.

[Page 307]

The GVN Problem

It would be prudent to cut the GVN, at least the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, in on the fact that some American is talking to a Front man (the consequences of it being leaked to them would be more difficult and delicate to handle than a frank admission at the outset). We have a tricky path ahead in our relations with Saigon, and we should tie them to us as we take each step. This is not to say that we have to admit much official interest or direction to the contacts.

The Propaganda Trap

This is the most difficult aspect of the problem. As far as the Front is concerned, its purposes may be well served by publicizing the fact of the contact and distorting the substance of the talks. Perhaps our only protection here is to insure that we can make a credible case for denying any official sanction or character to the talks. This means that both the instrument and his channel to U.S. policy makers will have to be ready to be the patsies.

Chester L. Cooper 3
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVIII, Memos (B), 8/1-12/65. Top Secret.
  2. Attached but not printed.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.