Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

107. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, August 5, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Another Pause

A New Element

Last night’s attack on the POL facility at Danang has introduced a new factor into the considerations of a pause.

If a pause is to have the desired propaganda and political effect, it must be abundantly clear that we have voluntarily held back our vast power. While the attack on our POL storage facilities in Danang will, in fact, have no effect on our capabilities to bomb the North, the Communists can make a good case that any early pause was merely making a virtue of necessity. (You will recall that the VC and Hanoi proclaimed that our earlier pause was dictated by a lack of fuel and the need to repair our planes.) Thus, this overnight development might detract somewhat from the propaganda effect of an early pause. But the political signal we will be sending will not necessarily be muted; Moscow, Hanoi, Peiping and even the VC know that our logistic capabilities in the Far East cannot be significantly reduced by the destruction of a few POL tanks, and they know that we have sufficient capability within the 7th Fleet alone to destroy everything of value in North Vietnam. If they are waiting for a signal, they can still read this one loud and clear. In any case, a few news stories about our large POL reserves in the area and our impressive resupply capability, a continuation of our bombings on the North until the pause, and a heavy bombing program in the South might jointly remove much of the air from the propaganda balloon.

Timing and Announcement

If we decide on a pause (pros and cons are discussed below), I think we should implement it soon enough so that it appears to be part of the President’s package of July 28,² i.e., within a week or so. There are other advantages to doing it sooner rather than later:

Ambassador Lodge will still be here, and it will be easier to deal with any Communist responses and U.S. counter-moves on the political/diplomatic front when he is in Washington. Of lesser importance, but still worth noting, is that a pause prior to Nkrumah’s trip to Hanoi (if, indeed, he decides to go) would give us propaganda points in Africa; a pause prior to Sukarno’s 17th of August speech³ might tone him down a little; a pause at this stage of the disarmament conference might also help the atmosphere at Geneva.

My own view would be to stop the bombing without a prior public announcement, but with prior confidential discussion with key allies and the USSR. If possible, the DRV and VC (but not the Chinese—let’s keep them stewing on the outside) should be informed through trusted intermediaries. Obviously, a day or two without bombing will arouse great curiosity. In answer to queries, we can state that we are testing the atmosphere, following up on the President’s statement, giving Nkrumah a leg up, etc., etc. We should make no commitments in public or private about the duration of our suspension.

The Pros and Cons

The Case for a Pause:

1. It will continue the momentum toward settlement created by the conciliatory portions of the President’s press conference statement; the fact that a pause is taking place in an interval of military build-up and after additional sizeable military appropriations should minimize a possible interpretation of “weakness”.

2. It will create, specifically, the most favorable possible climate for Nkrumah’s exploratory trip and should increase the pressure on Hanoi for a more conciliatory response to Nkrumah.

3. It will ease the mounting domestic pressures on our allies (above all, the Japanese, whose difficulties are becoming severe, but also the British, Canadians, and Australians).

4. It will meet the persistent objections of friendly unaligned nations and leaders (primarily U Thant, the Indians, and the Yugoslavs).

5. Even if a pause produces no response, it can increase our own room for maneuver within our military track by establishing early an understandable pattern of strikes and pauses; in this regard, each week that passes without a second pause compounds the significance—and the controversial nature, in the U.S. Government and general public—of the pause concept itself. We need to de-fuse this issue in order to free our hands.

6. It will improve the atmospherics, although having no effect on the substance, of the Geneva disarmament talks.

7. It will meet one persistent demand of our domestic critics and waverers.

8. It will further dramatize the good faith of our quest for a negotiated solution.

9. It will permit a more careful testing of Hanoi’s interest in negotiations, if any such inclination exists.

10. It may allow Moscow increased leverage in pressing Hanoi toward negotiations, if any such inclination is present within the Soviet leadership. At the same time it may develop strains between Hanoi and Peiping and develop yet additional strains between Moscow and Peiping.

The Case Against a Pause:

1. It may cause deep apprehensions regarding U.S. determination within the already-weakened GVN.

2. An extended pause will permit the DRV to catch its breath, repair damaged communications, and increase its assistance to the Viet Cong.

3. It will appear to the Communist side an admission of the ineffectiveness of the bombings and an indication of U.S. desperation for “negotiations now”.

4. It will arouse strong criticism among domestic proponents of toughness—particularly among Republicans who are looking for a way to make capital out of any signs of Administration softness in Vietnam.

5. It might make a return to air strikes difficult in the context of predictable international pressures to keep the suspension permanent (although resumption of bombings after the last pause was not that difficult).

6. It is a move to which such intermediaries as the Yugoslavs wistfully refer, but not with fierce conviction; it is not a move that the Soviets are pushing with vigor.

On Balance

I favor a pause starting in the next week or so. However, I also think we should give some urgent attention to what sort of signal from Hanoi or the VC we would regard as significant. (Surely we don’t really expect the DRV to withdraw its Division from South Vietnam during the period of cessation. On the other hand, we should expect something meaningful in terms of a drop in the scale of VC military activity or a clarification or modification of Communist talking terms.) We should also give thought now to the problem of communication with the other side after the initiation of a pause. None of the would-be intermediaries (the French, the Algerians, etc.) are entirely trustworthy or satisfactory for such a serious and delicate task. This raises the inevitable question of direct U.S. access to the DRV and the VC. We should now identify the best sites and channels for such direct conversations (this problem will be the subject of a subsequent memorandum).

C

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVIII, Memos (B), 8/1-12/65. Top Secret.
2. See Document 98.
3. Sukarno addressed the 20th Anniversary Celebration of Indonesian Independence August 17 in Djakarta; his address is printed in part in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 757-758.