89. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Acting Secretary of State Ball1
SUBJECT
- Soviet Reaction to Attacks on North Vietnam—Information Memorandum
We are inclined to expect a hard Soviet reaction to the North Vietnam strikes, despite the fact that Soviet propaganda has been rather mild thus far. (On important issues Soviet propaganda tends to be moderate and imprecise until a governmental decision has been taken.)
[Page 198]We believe that the Soviet Government will feel that it has received a direct insult and challenge because of Kosygin’s presence in Hanoi. The Soviets will probably feel that their prestige has been seriously damaged and that they must take some positive action to save face. Moreover they will be impelled in the same direction by their desire to wean North Vietnam away from China, and by their need to prove to smaller Communist states that Soviet commitments are valid and Soviet protection dependable. Finally, the USSR would appreciably reduce its voice and influence in all of Southeast Asia by failure to respond to what the Communists must consider a challenge. The USSR could scarcely save its prestige if it failed to act, when Kosygin only the day before repeated the Soviet Government’s commitment: “We sternly declare that the Soviet Union will not remain indifferent to the destiny of a brotherly socialist country and is ready to give the Democratic Republic of Vietnam all necessary assistance if the aggressors dare to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”
The possibility that the Soviet Government will be angry with the North Vietnamese for getting them into this uncomfortable position does not reduce the pressures for action outlined above.
The Soviet reaction, we believe, will take two forms. First on the ground itself the Soviet Government will probably grant extensive and impressive military assistance to North Vietnam, particularly defensive and perhaps also offensive air armament. The USSR will also find its arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute weakened and be compelled to adjust itself, at least superficially, toward the Chinese viewpoint. This is not to suggest, however, that the Soviet Government will increase its risk of its own forces’ involvement in the Far Eastern conflict.
Secondly, we believe U.S.-USSR bilateral relations will be affected adversely. The Soviet leadership will undoubtedly consider as a personal challenge the fact that the U.S. chose the moment of Kosygin’s visit to attack North Vietnam, and will be little swayed by the argument that provocation was given. It is difficult to estimate how serious and widespread will be the damage to our bilateral relations. Obvious possibilities are the cooling off on the exchange of high level visits, demonstrations against our Moscow Embassy, a slowing up of cultural exchanges, or a recall of their Ambassador for consultation. Even increased harassment in Berlin can not be excluded.
In order to reduce the impact of these developments on our bilateral relations we suggest that we should attempt to be as forthcoming as possible on non-vital issues in those relations during the next few weeks. For example, we might make an extra effort to obtain ratification of the Consular Convention as soon as possible (if the temper of Congress is not too adverse). Any action on our part which would enable the Soviet Government [Page 199] to point to concrete gains for its “peaceful coexistence” policy would help to blunt the Soviet reaction to the North Vietnam attacks.
Since the above was typed we have received the text of a Soviet Government statement2 which tends to reinforce some of the foregoing points. In speaking of the effect on U.S.-USSR bilateral relations the statement says:
“This process is incompatible with aggressive manifestations in politics, capable of cancelling out various steps undertaken in the interests of improving Soviet-American relations.”
The statement concludes:
“In the face of the above-mentioned U.S. actions, the Soviet Union will be forced together with its allies and friends to take further measures to safeguard the security and strengthen the defense capability of the DRV. No one should doubt that the Soviet Union will do this, that the Soviet people will fulfill its international duty to the fraternal socialist country.”