Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

88. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 8, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Meeting of the National Security Council,² ex President

ATTENDED BY

• McNamara, Vance, McNaughton, Generals Wheeler and Goodpaster, McGeorge Bundy, Cooper, Douglas Dillon, Carl Rowan, Ball, William Bundy, Thompson, Unger, Gaud and McCone

Bundy distributed his memorandum of February 7th on the situation in Vietnam³ and then gave an oral appraisal of the situation.

McCone took the position that more dynamic action was indicated than reprisals. I stated that we should pursue a systematic series of attacks against targets, starting in the south sector of North Vietnam and that we should work toward the north. I emphasized that the capacity for defense by the North Vietnamese would unquestionably increase with the passage of time—and not very much time at that—and therefore we should get going. I therefore questioned whether our posture should be one of reprisal. I emphasized that we should implement Phase II of the agreed plan and if any thing, should step it up. I reported that this had been my recommendation to the President a few days ago in a private conversation.⁴ (Note: The President, talking later with Ball, McNamara, Bundy and myself privately, recalled that I had warned him that some catastrophic event was bound to happen and that he had to take positive actions against the North.)

Bundy generally agreed, indicating that his use of the word reprisal inferred a continuing series of actions, but that they would be “publicized as reprisals.” He said he did not feel that we should just sit back until another Pleiku incident occurred and then start another reprisal. However, it was obvious that Bundy was shifting his ground somewhat as his paper pretty definitely ties reprisals to specific acts of the VC. Bundy warned of the danger of lifting the problem off the shoulders of the South Vietnamese and creating a North Vietnamese-U.S. war situation.

Ball agreed with my concept. He seemed to argue for positive action. He thought that slow action would be costly and quick action on our part and sustained action might very possibly affect ChiCom and Soviet reactions which would be more favorable to our purpose than otherwise.

Dillon stated that faster action may bring us to the conference table earlier than otherwise. Bundy raised the question of whether we should go to the conference table.

Secretary McNamara then summarized the situation as follows:

1. There was no disagreement around the table that more military actions by the U.S. against the NVN were indicated.

2. Actions against NVN would soon bring a confrontation with the MIG’s and we must expect that we would be obliged to take the MIG’s out in 3 to 6 weeks.

After an extended discussion it was agreed that Bundy and McCone were in substantial agreement that the action must be dynamic, must be positive, McNamara’s statement that we would be in confrontation with the MIG’s between 3 to 6 weeks was probably correct and that at that point we would have to take them out.

Thompson issued a word of caution. He thought that further strikes would cause the Soviets to move. He reasoned we should not do anything until the Soviets come in with their response and seemed to be implying that our whole South Vietnamese policy must be governed by what the Soviets say. Thompson reviewed his talk with Dobrynin in which he made the point that the North Vietnamese had mousetrapped the Soviets by conducting this Pleiku raid during Kosygin’s presence in an effort to force Kosygin to make greater concessions to Hanoi. Thompson believed that the Soviets would invite a conference.

General Wheeler then spoke of the improving Air Defense of North Vietnam, the installation of radar and ground control equipment, the MIG’s at Phuc Yen and the possibility of moving them south. Militarily, he said, the cheapest thing would be to take all the MIG’s out right now. However, he agreed that a more gradual approach would probably be more feasible. McNamara then developed what he called the Y Theory, stating that we were now on the lower leg of a Y and would have to decide at some future time which branch we were to go on. Throughout this exchange there was considerable discussion as to the degree of escalation. Ball continued with the position that time increases the risk of outside involvement. Also Thompson entered into the discussion and urged that we not do anything for a couple of days until we see what signals come out of Moscow.

There was considerable discussion of the political stability of South Vietnam. In the final analysis it was Bundy’s opinion and all seemed to agree that our actions could be used to influence Saigon to “pull up their socks.” Bundy reviewed his two meetings with Khanh. The first, upon his arrival which was cold and distant, both kind of feeling their way. The second, after the Pleiku incident at which he informed Khanh of our decision to react, which was a warm, frank and entirely satisfactory meeting. Bundy has considerably more confidence in Khanh than is held by Ambassador Taylor or our Mission. Thompson then raised the question if we should exacerbate the situation in anticipation of the March 1st meeting of the Communist Parties. Throughout the morning he seemed to be raising issues designed to stop action rather than move.

Finally, McNamara stated positively that we should move forward and should keep going.

Bundy summarized the sense of the meeting that without dissent, all agreed to act, that we should apply force against the North, that it should be done against targets out of range of the MIG’s, that we should use this decision to stimulate Saigon to form a government that was viable, that we should be careful and not announce this decision prior to receiving the signal from the Soviets and that the actions should stay at the low level, i.e., should be directed towards targets in the south rather than Phuc Yen Base.

The President entered and heard Bundy’s summary.

The President then raised the question of a stable government, stating that he was concerned that in December we placed the establishment of a stable government as a first priority and things had gone down hill since then, not up. For that reason many of the decisions made in December were not carried out. Bundy confirmed that we had made contingency decisions, that they were very fluid, but nothing was done because of the internal South Vietnam political problem. Bundy then reviewed in some considerable detail the political developments in Saigon in December and January. The President raised the question of how to go about getting the best possible government in South Vietnam and the consensus seemed to be that since Max Taylor’s efforts had been futile probably dynamic action on our part would help. Throughout the discussion Bundy indicated that in his discussions with many people, including Buddhist, Bonzes, Catholics, Military, etc., there was a feeling that perhaps the U.S. was going to pull out. Therefore, he reasoned that action on our part and a restatement of our position would be useful in reestablishing a strong government.

The President then re-asserted his determination to get the best possible government. He also re-asserted his determination to get the dependents out. He said that we were standing on shaky ground and he wished to avoid a rapid escalation and therefore favored a gradual approach. He summarized the choices as follows:⁵ Get out of the area through a Conference. He stated that in his opinion this was not the time as we would be admitting defeat; therefore hoped that by careful and sustained responses we would gain strength essential to stay in South Vietnam or gain an appropriate position for a Conference. The President recognized the problem of delaying until after Kosygin left Hanoi but he believed that Kosygin was there to give the North Vietnamese substantial help. He then raised the question of what specific instructions were to go to Taylor. Should it be the December Phase II decision, or this decision plus some more. He asked whether we want to commit regardless of what the Soviets say. All agreed to the course of action discussed above.

At this point I expressed very strong opinion that I felt that our actions would not be positive enough, and would not be taken in a sustained and consistent manner. I urged that we organize to strike every day or at least every second day and that we carry it on regardless of what the Soviets say or what the Chinese Communists say or what anybody else says. In other words, my differing with the proposals of Bundy was that I proposed a more rapid cadence of the operation; furthermore I agreed that we should make a final effort to improve the government.

In summary of this part of the meeting, it appeared to me that starting with the idea of “reprisals” which would be taken against specific acts such as another Pleiku, the sense of the meeting turned in the direction of sustained action which I advocated and others fell into line although I am not sure from the discussions which ensued when the Leadership appeared, that the President is fully committed to this course of action.

Then Senators Mansfield, Dirksen, Ford and McCormack entered. All others remained except Dillon, Gaud and 3 or 4 staff people. McNamara summarized the situation as mentioned above.

Ball mentioned the political problems such as Kosygin’s presence, belief that the North Vietnamese mousetrapped Kosygin and stated that Stevenson had addressed a letter to the Security Council. Thompson reviewed his meeting at his residence on Sunday morning with Dobrynin, at which time he gave Dobrynin the estimate that Hanoi had acted to pressure Kosygin during his visit.

The President then reviewed the studies made in November-December, the instructions given to Taylor to (1) create a strong government, (2) remove dependents, and (3) to proceed with the courses of action agreed to and approved last November.

Bundy then made a report on his trip, emphasizing that things have been going down hill; that one of the serious problems was the doubt in the minds of a great many people concerning the U.S. intentions. He emphasized disappointment in SVN that the Tonkin Gulf incident, which gave a great lift, was not pursued further and this caused the SVN leaders to look over their shoulders at what was really the U.S. intention and long-range purpose.

The President then questioned General Wheeler about the security of our bases. He asked for an explanation of why better security could not be provided. Wheeler stated that security was in the hands of the SVN; long-range mortars had about a 2–1/2 mile range and the shorter range mortars about a mile or mile and a half range. He said the SVN had border patrols, but that they had been successfully evaded. He wound up by stating that in a guerrilla-type war it is impossible to protect an installation, particularly an airfield.

Action: I don’t believe this is true. I think that the Clandestine Services might play a part here. It seems to me that we could create a net of informants in the villages around each one of the airfields and this might cost some money but would be so set up that we would be advised. I have spoken to Helms about this and wish to see if it is at all possible to work out a plan.

Dirksen then asked if the Vietnam troops were well trained. Goodpaster said, “Yes, generally, although there are some variations.” Ford asked if Bundy’s recommendations involved merely the carrying out of the operations agreed upon in December. All agreed. Ford then asked if more money and men are required. McNamara said, “not in the initial stages,” but he reserved his position and stated that if any escalation beyond that expected developed, a supplemental would be called for. The President supported him in that. Ford then asked if our action was in response to North Vietnamese action. The President made it clear that this was what the case was. Dirksen asked what was the effect of the removal of the dependents on the morale. McNamara responded that he thought there would be some deterioration but it would not be bad because of the method that was being employed.

Dirksen then asked about the results of a U.S. pullout from South Vietnam, indicating that this would be hotly debated both in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and on the Floor. Bundy outlined the consequences which were the standard argument.

The President then wound up the meeting by stating that it was incumbent upon him as President to conduct our activities in South Vietnam in order to stop aggression and to destroy the aggressor if necessary but in any event to take such actions as might be required in support of the free peoples of South Vietnam.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285, Meetings with President, 1 Feb-30 Apr 65. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office.
2. This memorandum for the record covers the following meetings: the meeting in the Cabinet Room prior to the time the President joined the group at 9:48 a.m.; the continuation of that meeting from 9:48 to 10:30 (see Document 86 for another record); and the formal NSC meeting that began at 10:30 upon the arrival of Senators Mansfield and Dirksen and Representatives Ford and McCormack (see Document 87 for another record).
3. Document 84.
4. Apparently a reference to McCone’s meeting with the President at 3:25 p.m. on February 3; see Document 61.
5. There was apparently some confusion at this point in the dictation and transcription of McCone’s memorandum.