41. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1
2322. For the President. I am afraid that we have overwhelmed Washington in the last 24 hours in reporting the action of the Armed Forces Council in withdrawing confidence in the Suu-Huong government and in charging General Khanh with responsibility “for solving the present political crisis.”
While it is still too soon to evaluate with confidence the gains and losses of this latest “coup de force”, my colleagues of the U.S. Mission [Page 94] Council agree with me in believing that several conclusions are valid even at this time. For one thing, it is evident that the overthrow of Prime Minister Huong has been brought about through an alliance between Khanh and the Buddhist Institute leadership. It is not clear to what extent the other senior generals supported Khanh with any real conviction in this action although he seems to have got a large majority vote at the conclusion of a long policy debate last night. Another conclusion is that the overthrow of Huong is clearly a victory for the Buddhist Institute leadership and places it in a position of dominant power and influence in the country. Khanh no doubt hopes to share this position with the Buddhists and use them to his advantage. Based upon our past experience, we are inclined to believe that it will be the Buddhists who will use Khanh.
The most sinister aspect of this affair is the obvious danger that the Buddhist victory may be an important step toward the formation of a government which will eventually lead the country into negotiations with Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. The Institute-Khanh combination is a union—albeit perhaps a temporary one—of two elements adverse to U.S. interests.
While reasonably sure of the validity of the foregoing conclusions, we cannot be sure where we are until the announced procedure for forming the government is carried out. Historically, this procedure sets back the clock to last August when the military under Buddhist pressure, turned the power over to the civilians. The same institutions and procedures are being reconstituted to start moving once more down the road toward elections in late March for a national assembly. It remains to be seen whether we ever reach that destination or whether we are on a treadmill.
Until we see more clearly the form of the new government to emerge, I am of the opinion that we not commit ourselves publicly with regard to the action of the Armed Forces Council. I have recommended elsewhere2 that we should restrict ourselves for the time being to a simple statement that it is premature for us to comment on these events until we see more clearly their implication.
I know that the question of the evacuation of our dependents is constantly on your mind as it is on mine. We have been very much concerned during the last three days for the safety of our dependents—indeed of all Americans—in Hue area. While that danger appears to have subsided, these events in the North have been a reminder of the ease with which anti-American emotions can be whipped up. At the meeting of the U.S. Mission Council today, I found for the first time all members in agreement as to the need to evacuate dependents although [Page 95] none of us yet has a really satisfactory formula to overcome the very dangerous psychological problems in initiating this action. I believe that this latest change of government offers us a possibility to link evacuation of dependents with our acceptance of a new regime. I will forward recommendations on this score as soon as the governmental situation clarifies.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received in the Department of State at 9:31 a.m. Although the source text indicates 9 a.m. as the time of transmission, this was apparently an error, given the time of receipt in the Department of State and the contents of the telegram.↩
- In telegram 2316 from Saigon, January 27. (Ibid., POL 1 US-VIET S)↩