Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

40. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, January 27, 1965.

SUBJECT

• The Situation in South Vietnam: the Quiet Coup²

During the morning of January 27, Vietnamese Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief General Khanh, with the support of at least some of the other generals, initiated a series of actions to take control of the government of Chief of State Suu and Prime Minister Huong. Strong indications of Khanh’s intentions were evident in reports from the US Mission in Saigon at least during the preceding 48 hours.³

1. At about 10:00 a.m. on January 27 (Saigon time), the Vietnamese Armed Forces Council issued a communiqué stating that in view of the inability of Chief of State Suu and Prime Minister Huong to cope with the current political crisis, the Council withdrew its confidence in the government and entrusted General Khanh with the task of solving the crisis. Khanh would immediately establish a 20-man council representing the armed forces, major religious groups, and regional interests and responsible for “advising the government in making important decisions.” An announcement by Khanh shortly thereafter reiterated the actions and stated intentions of the Armed Forces Council. This was followed by a statement by General Dong, Commander of the Capital Military District, that (a) the proposed military-civilian council was the equivalent of the High National Council dissolved last December, (b) the new council would choose a Chief of State who in turn would appoint a Prime Minister, and (c) the Buddhist hierarchy had agreed not to interfere in politics and to send its leading three monks, including Thich Tam Chau and Thich Tri Quang, out of the country.

2. Khanh had indicated to the US Embassy and to MACV the previous day that he planned a “solution” along these lines. US protestations apparently did not dissuade him, but he agreed to inform Ambassador Johnson prior to proceeding any further. However, Khanh in effect presented the US with a fait accompli by informing General Westmoreland (through an intermediary) and requesting merely to talk with Ambassador Johnson at the Vietnamese General Staff headquarters virtually at the very moment Khanh was proceeding to execute his plan. Khanh then proceeded to outline his “solution” in greater detail to Ambassador Johnson, noting that (a) his proposed military-civilian council would probably reappoint Suu as Chief of State, (b) the Chief of State’s selection of a new Prime Minister would have to be approved by this council, (c) there would be minimum changes in the government and military officers currently in the cabinet would remain, (d) Deputy Prime Minister Vien would serve as acting Prime Minister in the interim, and (e) the Armed Forces Council would be the supreme governmental body until these measures had been completed whereupon it would then revert to its function as the “executive body within the military.” Khanh also stated that the Buddhist leaders had agreed to refrain from politics and that Tam Chau and Tri Quang would leave the country.

3. In subsequent talks with Suu and Huong, Ambassador Johnson confirmed that both Suu and Huong were not disposed to oppose Khanh’s moves and that Suu had agreed to remain in a caretaker status at least until a new Chief of State was selected. Beyond this, Suu wished to wait and see “what kind of a government” would emerge before accepting reelection as Chief of State. Both Huong and Suu, as well as Deputy Premier Vien who confirmed that he agreed to serve as acting Premier, advised the US also to “wait and see” what develops, expressing concern nonetheless with the apparent alliance between Khanh and the Buddhists and with the political orientation of future developments.

4. Khanh’s assumption of power was achieved without any fighting or public disorder. The coup was completely bloodless and, with the exception of some security forces apparently in the vicinity of Suu’s and Huong’s residences, no troops were deployed in Saigon. Neither has there been as yet any criticism or opposition by general public in or outside Saigon. In short, the general public attitude is one of indifference.

5. It is not entirely clear just how much support Khanh has mustered within the military leadership for his move. Previous reports had indicated a three-way split among the generals, the largest group reportedly not in favor of a military takeover. Some generals and even middle-echelon officers were apparently considering a pre-emptive coup against Khanh. It remains an open question whether the anti-Khanh elements will now move against him or adopt a wait-and-see position, pending further moves by Khanh, together with public and US reaction.

6. Khanh has almost certainly acted in conjunction with the Buddhist leadership. Buddhist religious and political leaders, Khanh, and some of the other generals, particularly Thi (Corps I Commander) and Ky (Airforce Chief), reportedly agreed on a “solution” similar to the one now in progress. However, this coalition is at best a marriage of convenience which cannot be expected to last given basic Buddhist suspicions of Khanh, not to mention the personal ambitions of Both Khanh and Tri Quang. Despite Khanh’s apparent belief that he can control the Buddhists, he has voiced some concern as to their ultimate political direction, and there are already indications that the Buddhist leadership does not intend to hold to the alleged agreement particularly regarding the claimed willingness of Tam Chau and Tri Quang to leave the country.

7. Khanh’s overriding ambition, coupled with his repeated maneuvers against known US positions, have in the span of one year precipitated five major crises in Saigon. In the process, he has seriously reduced if not almost eliminated any public respect for US political advice or for those who accept it. Moreover, his actions, coupled with those of the Buddhists, have fostered a rising crescendo of anti-American feelings.

These developments pose the serious question whether Khanh has considered an alternative course, i.e., a negotiated “neutralist” solution for South Vietnam. Should his short-sighted actions prompt him to explore this possibility, Khanh may ultimately overreach his power and be overthrown by his more dedicated colleagues.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Southeast Asia, Vietnam, 1965 General, 1/65–2/65. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limit Distribution.
2. The implications of the coup were also analyzed in Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton’s draft memorandum of January 27, which he showed to and discussed with Secretary of Defense McNamara at 7:45 a.m. on January 27. The memorandum is printed, along with McNamara’s comments on certain points McNaughton raised, in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 686–687.
3. See also CIA Intelligence Memorandum, The Situation in South Vietnam (as of 2:00 pm EST), January 26, 1965, No. 0751; and informal INR Note to Mr. Hughes (as of 1:30 p.m. EST), January 26, 1965. [Footnote in the source text. The CIA intelligence memorandum is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXVI; the INR note has not been found.]