285. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- The Radhakrishnan Plan for Vietnam2
You asked for our thoughts on the usefulness of the Radhakrishnan plan for a Vietnam solution.
The Plan: Originally Radhakrishnan’s personal inspiration (proposed rather casually last month on receiving a newly accredited diplomat), this plan now has the full support of the Indian Government and should be taken seriously, if for that reason alone.
Essentially, the proposals are for (a) cessation of hostilities by both sides in Vietnam; (b) policing of the boundary between North and South Vietnam by an Afro-Asian force; and (c) maintenance of the present boundaries so long as the people concerned desire it. In more recent discussions, the Indians have indicated that (a) “cessation of hostilities” would not interfere with the GVN’s right and obligation to preserve peace within its borders; (b) the proposal for Afro-Asian troops in the area did not imply a request for concurrent evacuation of U.S. forces (the Indians assume that U.S. forces would “pull back” into camps but would remain in South Vietnam); and (c) the Afro-Asian force would patrol the 17th parallel and also the Cambodian and Lao borders.
Status of the Plan: The Indians have now solicited support for this plan in most capitals of Europe, Africa and Asia, with the exception of Karachi, Djakarta, and Peking. They report favorable responses from Nkrumah, Nasser, Tito and Souvanna Phouma; they say that the Soviets find the proposal “interesting” and are ready to “use their influence with Hanoi”. Peking has denounced the plan. The Indians are currently working on the command, recruitment, and financial aspects of the proposed Afro-Asian force; it is envisioned that such troops would come mainly from Japan, Nigeria and the U.A.R. (India is also ready to contribute, but its role has to be worked out so as not to prejudice its position on the ICC.)
The U.S. Response: Bowles and the Department have privately told the Indians of our interest in the Radhakrishnan initiative. We are not [Page 621] under pressure for an immediate public response, since the Indians themselves believe that the U.S. should refrain from public endorsement until Moscow and Hanoi have made their position clear. However, Bowles argues that a public statement that we are considering this plan would further demonstrate our reasonableness and flexibility, would help to build up Indian influence vis-à-vis China before the Algiers conference, would increase India’s good will towards us at a critical juncture, and would test Hanoi’s and Moscow’s desire to end the fighting on honorable terms.
Embassy Saigon’s Reaction: Embassy Saigon has just reported its views (Saigon’s 3682)3 that the Radhakrishnan plan has attractive features and that we should encourage the Indians to develop it. Saigon also suggests that we refrain from public endorsement of the plan to avoid giving it the kiss of death in Hanoi. The GVN Foreign Minister is currently in New Delhi, and something further may come out of his talks with the Indians.
Conclusion: This plan has considerable merit. At the very least, it provides yet another means to show our peaceful intentions and to test the other side; conceivably it might serve as the basis for a negotiated solution.
For the time being, we seem to be playing this one just about right; but we should be ready to move with some speed toward public endorsement if either Moscow or Hanoi makes such a move.