297. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Governor Adlai E. Stevenson
- Secretary-General U Thant
1. Vietnam
In my conversation with the Secretary General on Wednesday, May 12th, from 12:00 noon to 1:00 p.m., I informed him about the “pause” after his assurance that the information would go no further. His comments follow:
Hanoi is now more responsive to the USSR than to China, and the new Foreign Minister is more pro-Moscow than pro-Peking.
[Page 646]Last September, when he made his first sounding about private peace talks,2 Ho Chi Minh was ready to talk with the United States and South Vietnam alone, but a new element has now been introduced. While originally only Peking insisted that in any peace talks South Vietnam should be represented exclusively by the Viet Cong, Hanoi has now taken this position too.
In early March U Thant asked Algeria to inform the Viet Cong and Hanoi representatives in Algiers that it was unrealistic to insist on the Viet Cong as the exclusive representative of South Vietnam in any talks with the United States. So far he has had no reply. U Thant thinks that if the United States excludes any Viet Cong representation in any peace or cease-fire discussions, there will be no discussions. But he also believes a compromise possible, i.e. assuming there were six seated at the table, North Vietnam would be represented by two, the United States by two, and South Vietnam by two—one from the Viet Cong and one from Saigon. He cites the recommendation of the three factions in the Laos negotiations as pertinent.
If any such discussion relates only to hostilities over the frontiers, then in his view the representation should be just the United States and Hanoi, thus avoiding the Viet Cong problem. However, he doubts that Hanoi would talk on this basis.
While he doubts that there will be any response, as a result of the “pause” from Hanoi satisfactory to us, if the question of the Viet Cong representation could be worked out privately in advance he thinks there is a good chance of discussions starting. When it appears that the United States is being more than reasonable, he suspects Hanoi with Soviet encouragement will overrule Peking.
He would clearly consider with us making a public (or private) appeal for a cease-fire or for discussions of conditions for the cessation of hostilities, either during or after the “pause”. He thinks it certain that Peking would oppose but assumes that the USSR and France would go along. He would welcome our views both as to language and timing of any such appeal. And when I suggested that it might include something as follows, he did not dissent:
“The United States has offered to discuss peaceful settlement in Vietnam, without preconditions. The United States has suspended its bombing temporarily. It is time the belligerents opened discussions of conditions for the total cessation of hostilities preliminary to discussions of peaceful settlement.”
He seemed eager to cooperate in any way, and if we have any suggestions as to Viet Cong representation, he would clearly explore the [Page 647] possibilities (through the Soviet Union) privately, without in any way committing us in advance.
On the basis of previous experience with explorations in Hanoi, he thinks it might take ten days to two weeks to get a reply.
In view of the “pause” he did not press me for an answer on his proposal for a cease-fire appeal at this time.
2. Indian Proposal
I also discussed with him the Indian three-point proposal3 with which he was not very familiar. He proposes to discuss it with the Indian Ambassador and give him such encouragement as he can.
3. Cambodian Conference
U Thant sees little hope of doing anything through Cambodia and reported that he had asked Sihanouk to receive Narasimhan before his departure a fortnight ago. The reply was that no useful purpose would be served by such a meeting, that Sihanouk’s position was well known—that the United States troops should get out of South Vietnam.
Narasimhan is on his way back; moreover he is confident that he would not have been received in Hanoi at this time.
U Thant’s report was that in his soundings with Federenko about Vietnam he has always been brushed off, and he saw no hope of ever doing anything with him in New York.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, NODIS-MAYFLOWER. Top Secret. The source text was transmitted to the White House on May 12 under cover of a memorandum from Executive Secretary Read to McGeorge Bundy, which noted that Stevenson had dictated the report of his conversation with U Thant to the Department by classified telephone.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, Document 427.↩
- See Document 285.↩