273. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
3504. Eyes only for Secretary McNamara. Ref. DEF-009653 231859Z.2 I would like to amend the statement of my views expressed in the memo for the President dated April 21 in two respects.
- A.
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II, paragraph 1. “This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from Viet Cong failure in the south as from DRV pain in the north and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate Viet Cong failure in the South.”
Comment: This statement suggests that it may take a year or two to break the will of Hanoi to continue their present course even if we continue our bombing and introduce substantial U.S. forces. My view is that a favorable settlement should be possible from a combination of continued air attacks and by the introduction of sufficient U.S. and third country forces to demonstrate to Hanoi that the Viet Cong have no ultimate chance of success. This process will probably take months; how many is impossible to estimate.
- B.
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II, paragraph 2. “All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or two, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period.”
Comment: I subscribe to this statement less the phase “perhaps a year or two.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. There is no time of transmission on the source text, but the telegram was received in the Department of State at 11:49 p.m. on April 23.↩
- Telegram DEF 9653, April 23, contained the text of McNamara’s memorandum of April 21 to the President. (Document 265) It also noted an additional substantive point made in McNaughton’s minutes of the meeting, namely that it was agreed that “tasks within South Vietnam should have first call on air assets in the area and that, if at any time there are not enough assets in the area to perform all necessary tasks, more air should be brought in.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Minutes of April 30, 1965 Honolulu Meeting)↩