Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

265. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson¹

Washington, April 21, 1965.

Mr. William Bundy, Mr. McNaughton and I met with Ambassador Taylor, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland in Honolulu on Tuesday, April 20. Following is my report of that meeting:

1. None of them expects the DRV/VC to capitulate, or come to a position acceptable to us, in less than six months. This is because they believe that a settlement will come as much or more from VC failure in the South as from DRV pain in the North, and that it will take more than six months, perhaps a year or two, to demonstrate VC failure in the South.

2. With respect to strikes against the North, they all agree that the present tempo is about right, that sufficient increasing pressure is provided by repetition and continuation. All of them envisioned a strike program continuing at least six months, perhaps a year or more, avoiding the Hanoi-Haiphong-Phuc Yen areas during that period. There might be fewer fixed targets, or more restrikes, or more armed reconnaissance missions. Ambassador Taylor stated what appeared to be a shared view, that it is important not to “kill the hostage” by destroying the North Vietnamese assets inside the “Hanoi do-nut.” They all believe that the strike program is essential to our campaign—both psychologically and physically—but that it cannot be expected to do the job alone. They all considered it very important that strikes against the North be continued during any talks.

3. None of them sees a dramatic improvement in the South in the immediate future. Their strategy for “victory”, over time, is to break the will of the DRV/VC by denying them victory. Ambassador Taylor put it in terms of a demonstration of Communist impotence, which will lead eventually to a political solution. They see slow improvement in the South, but all emphasized the critical importance of holding on and avoiding—for psychological and morale reasons—a spectacular defeat of GVN or US forces. And they all suspect that the recent VC lull is but the quiet before a storm.

4. To bolster the GVN forces while they are building up, they all recommend the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 US troops already in-country (including the 4 Marine battalions at Danang-Hue):

1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000 closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns at Chu Lai	6,200 closing 5 May
1 Australian btn at Vung Tau	1,250 closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000 closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn) at Quang Ngai	4,000 closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces	11,000 already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level	7,000 already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions	16,000 not yet approved
Total: US 13 btns 82,000	ROK & ANZAC 4 btns 7,250

5. Possible later deployment, not recommended now, include a US Air-Mobile division (9 btns—15,800) to Pleiku/Kontum, and I Corps HQ (1,200) to Nha Trang; and even later, the remainder of the Korean division (6 btns—14,500) to Quang Ngai, and the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force (3 btns—24,800) to Danang.

6. All agreed on the action to be taken to meet the seven points of the April 15 message: Def 9164² (see the attached Appendix I for a summary of the seven points and related action).

7. It is therefore recommended that you approve:

a. A program of strikes against the North according to the principles stated in paragraph 2 above.

b. The deployments listed in paragraph 4 above.

c. The approaches to the governments of Korea and Australia implicit in those listed deployments.

d. Instructions to Ambassador Taylor (see Appendix II),³ relating to his discussions of the proposed deployments with the GVN.

e. Informing the Congressional leadership of:

1) The contemplated deployments.

2) The change in mission of US forces in Vietnam.

3) The creation of an International Mobile Security Task Force, as mentioned in Appendix I.

Robert S. McNamara⁴

Appendix I⁵

ACTIONS RELATING TO THE 7 POINTS OF DEF 9164

A. Points 1, 2, & 3

The cable proposed the deployment to SVN of approximately 9 additional US battalions and suggested the possible encadrement, on an experimental basis, of a limited number of ARVN units.

At Honolulu, it was agreed that 9 US battalions should be deployed to SVN (see paragraph 4 above) but General Westmoreland states that individual encadrement of ARVN units is neither required nor feasible. He does plan, however, to assign Vietnamese liaison personnel to each independent US platoon and to “brigade” US forces with ARVN troops in counter-insurgency actions. Furthermore he proposes a plan for an International Mobile Security Task Force which will contain third country elements as well as ARVN and US forces. Westmoreland will submit a written statement describing the command relationships which will pertain when US ground forces are engaged in offensive combat operations, alone or with Vietnamese or other forces.

B. Point 4

The cable suggested the use of US recruiting personnel and techniques to accelerate the expansion of the Vietnamese forces.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland stated the mission needs no additional expertise in this area, that the bottlenecks were not in obtaining recruits but rather in training facilities, trainers and leadership. These problems are being surmounted. They expect the strength of the Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces, including police, to increase by 127,000 men in the next 12 months.

C. Point 5

The cable suggested an experimental program to provide expanded medical services to the countryside, utilizing the assistance of the Surgeon General of the Army.

Ambassador Taylor welcomes this proposal. The representative of the Surgeon General will be sent to Saigon immediately to work with COMUSMACV and USOM to develop a detailed program.

D. Point 6

The cable suggested an experimental introduction into the provincial government structure of a team of US Army civil affairs personnel (or similarly qualified personnel).

At Honolulu, it was agreed that it would be wise to experiment in three provinces with full and carefully selected US teams designed to provide ample civil as well as military initiative and advice. It was suggested that in these three provinces the US effort would be put under one person, and that in at least one of the three provinces the person would be a civilian. It is understood that the Ambassador may call on the Defense Department for whatever specialized personnel are required for these three provinces.

E. Point 7

The cable proposed an experimental program of food distribution direct to the families of military personnel.

Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland said that there is no evidence that the regular and paramilitary forces or their families are short of food. They said that an earlier food-distribution plan was abandoned because of corruption and difficulties in administration. It was agreed, however, that the mission would undertake a study to improve the fringe benefits for the forces and their families.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVIII. Top Secret. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 705–706. The memorandum follows very closely McNaughton’s minutes of the Honolulu meeting. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Minutes of the 4/20/65 Honolulu Mtg.) For another account of the meeting, see Document 264; for recollections, see Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, pp. 342–343; Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 132; Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, pp. 77–80; and William Bundy’s unpublished manuscript, chap. 25, pp. 2–8. (Johnson Library, Papers of William Bundy)
2. Document 256.
3. Not printed here, but for the instructions as sent to Taylor on April 22, see Document 271.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
5. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.