Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, April 22, 1965, 10:52 p.m.

2397. For Amb Taylor from Secretary Rusk. After Honolulu discussions McNamara has now recommended to the President the following deployments in addition to the 2,000 Koreans and 33,500 U.S. troops already in-country:

1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Bien Hoa/Vung Tau	4,000 closing 1 May
3 US Marine air sqs + 3 btns at Chu Lai	6,200 closing 5 May
1 Australian btn at Vung Tau	1,250 closing 21 May
1 US Army brigade (3 btn) at Qui Nhon/Nha Trang	4,000 closing 15 June
1 Korean RCT (3 btn) at Quang Ngai	4,000 closing 15 June
Augmentation of various existing forces	11,000 already approved
Logistics troops for previously approved force level	7,000 already approved
Logistics troops for above enclaves and possible 3 divisions	16,000 not yet approved

Upon completion of these deployments, the U.S. forces would include 13 battalions and would have a total strength approximating 82,000 men, and the Korean and Australian forces would include 4 battalions with a total strength of 7,250 men.

For your wholly private information, and subject to private Congressional consultation, the President is inclined to favor McNamara’s recommendations, but before making a decision on them he wishes to obtain the opinion of the GVN. We believe the best way to pursue matter with Quat at this stage would be for you to make an exposition of the situation as a matter of your own judgment and recommendation, in essentially the following terms:

Instructions to Ambassador Taylor.

“The Embassy has completed a thorough review of the situation in SVN both in its national and international aspects and has reached certain important conclusions. It feels that in recent weeks there has been a somewhat favorable change in the overall situation as the result of the air attacks on DRV, the relatively small but numerous successes in the field against the VC and the encouraging progress of the Quat government. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that, in all probability, the primary objectives of the GVN and the USG of changing the will of the DRV to support the VC insurgency cannot be attained in an acceptable time frame by the methods presently employed. The air campaign in the North must be supplemented by signal successes against the VC in the South before we can hope to create that frame of mind in Hanoi which will lead to the decisions we seek.

Meanwhile the JCS have reviewed the military resources which will be available in SVN by the end of 1965 and have concluded that even with an attainment of the highest feasible mobilization goals, ARVN will have insufficient forces to carry out the kind of successful campaign against the VC which is considered essential for the purposes discussed above. If the ground war is not to drag indefinitely, they consider it necessary to reinforce GVN ground forces with about 20 or more battalion equivalents in addition to the forces now being recruited in SVN. Since these reinforcements cannot be raised by the GVN, they must inevitably come from US and third country sources.

The Embassy accepts the validity of this reasoning of the JCS and subject to your views, I am prepared to recommend to the President that:

(1) The US assist the GVN to raise these additional forces for the purpose of bringing the VC insurgency to an end in the shortest possible time.

(2) As part of this effort, the US bring in additional US ground forces. If the GVN will make urgent representations at the appropriate time following a schedule agreed with the USG, we believe it may be possible to obtain contributions of the following order: Korea, one regimental combat team; Australia, one infantry battalion; New Zealand, one battery and one company of tanks; PI, one battalion. I would propose that the US provide combat reinforcements of the order of 9 additional battalions distributed among points to be agreed upon, and the necessary logistic personnel to support the third country contingents.

You should seek to obtain the support of the GVN to the foregoing program, recognizing that a large number of questions such as command relationships, concepts of employment and disposition of forces must be worked out after Presidential review of your recommendations. At your discretion, you may indicate to GVN officials that if your recommendations are accepted the total US in-country strength would approximate 80,000.

You must emphasize to Quat that it is of utmost importance there be no leak or public disclosure of these matters which are of highest military and security importance to North Vietnam as well as to US.

You should also tell Quat that if he agrees with the proposed deployments it is not our intention to announce whole program now but rather to announce individual deployments at appropriate times.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only; Nodis. Drafted by McNamara, cleared by McGeorge Bundy and Rusk (in draft), and approved by Unger.