Office of the Historian

230. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carter)1

Washington, April 1, 1965.

Today’s meeting2 attended by the Principals with the President considered the final draft of the April 1st State paper on the key developments [Page 513] and strategy of South Vietnam.3 I will dictate a more comprehensive memorandum, however, I would like to discuss and exchange views with you and our Vietnam experts on the effect of certain decisions outlined below and to take such actions as are appropriate.

1.
The 41 point program of non-military measures4 was approved, subject to priorities and detail development of each point by the Mission and the agencies in Washington, and the concurrence of the GVN.
2.

We were directed to develop each of the 12 covert actions proposal advanced by CIA,5 to work out specifics with the Ambassador and the Mission, and to take implementing action as is necessary to carry out each of the 12 points, and to carry out other points approved by the Ambassador and in the manner and to the extent agreed by the Ambassador and the Station. No estimate of manpower or cost or of implementing the program were presented. No objections were voiced to any of the CIA suggested programs.

Action: DDP should implement, and a procedure should be established for a weekly report to you and me.

3.
The Rowan recommendations6 were approved and presumably the draft NSAM implementing the Rowan report will be issued.7
4.
The 21 point General Johnson program8 was approved.
5.
The Ambassador was given authority to increase GVN manpower programs using increased pay scale and other inducements, regardless of monetary costs.
6.
With regard to U.S. manpower the following actions were approved:
a.
An 18,000–20,000 man increase in U.S. military support forces to fill out existing units, and to supply needed logistic personnel.
b.
Two additional Marine battalions totalling about 3500 men.
c.
One additional Marine Air squadron of about 700 men.
7.
The United States Mission in South Vietnam was modified and U.S. Ground Forces were authorized to “engage in counterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam.” Heretofore, the Ground Force Missions have been advisory and for static defense.
8.
The JCS strongly recommended that we now reach a tentative decision to deploy three divisions—two U.S. Divisions and one ROK [Page 514] Division into SVN for counterinsurgency combat operations in that country. This recommendation was not approved and no decision was reached. However, some of the 20,000 man increase will be used in preparatory work to receive additional or third country forces for counterinsurgency operations. Preparatory work will involve dredging harbors, building roads, establishing POL and other supply depots, etc., etc.
9.
Air operations against the North were approved on a continuing ascending tempo directed toward varying types of targets but remaining outside of the effectiveness of the GCI range of the MIGs.
10.
I would like an examination made of the possible NVN and ChiCom reactions to the introduction of forces in:
a.
The size mentioned above.
b.
Plus the three divisions, U.S. and/or third country (recognizing this decision has not been made however). Also I would like an opinion from our experts as to the reaction of the SVN public, political leadership and the military leadership to the doubling of American presence in SVN.

Also I would like the views of our experts on the reaction of NVN and the ChiComs to the change in Mission from one of static defense to one of actual engagement in counterinsurgency operations in SVN.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80 BO 1285A, DCI Memoranda, 1 Mar 65–30 Apr 65. Top Secret.↩
  2. See Document 229.↩
  3. Document 228.↩
  4. See footnote 3, Document 228, and vol. III, Document 25.↩
  5. See the attachment to Document 222.↩
  6. For a summary, see Document 203.↩
  7. National Security Action Memorandum 330, implementing the Rowan Report, was issued April 9. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memoranda)↩
  8. For a summary, see Document 197.↩